UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

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VOLUNTARY INFORMATION-SHARING SYSTEM WORKING GROUP

OPEN MEETING

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WEDNESDAY
JUNE 20, 2018

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The Voluntary Information-Sharing System Working Group met in the Federal Highway Administration Research Center, 6300 Georgetown Pike, McLean, Virginia, at 8:30 a.m., Dr. Christie Murray, Designated Federal Official, presiding.

PRESENT

DIANE BURMAN, Chair
ALAN MAYBERRY, PHMSA Representative
ERIC AMUNDSEN, Member
MICHAEL BELLAMY, Member
KATE BLYSTONE, Member
ROBERT BUCHANAN, Member
DAN COTE, Member
JASON CRADIT, Member
BILL CROCHET, Member
YIMING DENG, Ph.D., Member
MARK HERETH, Member
LEIF JENSEN, Member
WALTER JONES, Member

MIKE LaMONT, Member
JOHN MacNEILL, Member
RANDY PARKER, Member
HOLLY PEAREN, Member*
JOE SUBSITS, Member
MICHELLE THEBERT, Member
CHRISTOPHER WARNER, Member

ALSO PRESENT

CHRISTIE MURRAY, Ph.D., Designated Federal Official AHUVA BATTAMS, Attorney Advisor, PHMSA SHERRY BORENER, Ph.D., PHMSA JOHN DeLEEUW, American Airlines MICHELLE FREEMAN, PHMSA DREW HEVLE, Kinder Morgan KAREN LYNCH, PHMSA HUNG NGUYEN, PHMSA PAUL ROBERTI, ESQ., General Counsel, PHMSA NADIAH RODRIGUEZ, PHMSA JOHN STOODY, Association of Pipe Lines VICKIE TOMAN, SMS Manager, American Airlines PETE VEENSTRA, TRC Solutions CHERYL WHETSEL, PHMSA DOUGLAS WHITE, Ed.D., PHMSA NANCY WHITE, PHMSA

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

8:32 a.m.

DR. MURRAY: Good morning and welcome to everyone. I'm not sure if anybody is joining by phone, but if there's anyone on the phone line, if you could say good morning. Okay, we'll just leave the line open for now, but welcome, and thank you for joining us for our Voluntary Information Sharing System Working Group Federal Advisory Committee meeting.

My name is Christie Murray, and I will be presiding as the designated federal official for the meeting today. The purpose of our Federal Advisory Committee meeting for voluntary information sharing is to fulfill Section 10 of the Pipes Act of 2016.

The overall objective is to consider the development of a voluntary information sharing system to encourage collaboration that improves pipeline safety across the industry -- and I'm paraphrasing -- and ultimately, the goal is to provide recommendations to the secretary of

transportation. The main deliverable of the VIS working group is to submit a recommendation report to the secretary of transportation that addresses these items listed here on the screen. I don't necessarily want to read through each one of them, but they will be provided in the meeting documentation.

The goal of this Advisory Committee is to develop and finalize the recommendation report by the end of this year, December 2018. Just a few housekeeping items. One, the restrooms are immediately out the door, the exit to my right.

Make a right past the security desk, and you'll find the restrooms down the hall, on the right-hand side.

If you have not done so already, please silence your mobile devices. Also, thank you, those members of the public that have joined us today. We appreciate you being here with us. There will be opportunities for the public to participate in the Advisory Committee meeting today.

We would ask that you would hold your comments until we actually open the floor for them and try to keep your remarks brief, up to five minutes, so that we can hear from multiple individuals, if needed. Also, you can submit written comments to the docket, PHMSA, P-H-M-S-A, dash 2016-0128. In case of an emergency and we need to evacuate the building, if you leave out of the exits immediately to my right, make a right immediately and go out those main entrance doors that we just came in, it's right in front of the security desk.

We will go all the way to the back.

Follow the path right through the trees straight ahead, and we will meet right at that area before you hit the parking lot. That will be our rallying point. Next, I will turn it over to the chair.

CHAIR BURMAN: Thank you. I'm going to go around, have everyone say their name, their title, and their company and their representative, so that we can establish a

1	quorum. Why don't we start at the end?
2	MR. CROCHET: I'm Bill Crochet. I'm
3	the senior director of asset integrity for Plains
4	All American Pipeline, representing the industry.
5	DR. WHITE: Good morning. I'm Doug
6	White. I'm the director of PHMSA training and
7	qualifications, and I serve as the ADFO for the
8	Training and Qualification Subcommittee.
9	MS. WHITE: Good morning. I'm Nancy
10	White. I'm the director of policy and programs
11	for the Office of Pipeline Safety in PHMSA, and
12	I'm the ADFO for the Missions, Objectives, and
13	Governance Committee.
14	MS. LYNCH: Good morning. My name is
15	Karen Lynch. I work in PHMSA's Office of
16	Pipeline Safety and serve as the ADFO for the
17	Reporting Subcommittee.
18	MS. FREEMAN: Good morning, Michelle
19	Freeman. I'm the deputy director of budget and
20	finance with PHMSA. I'm the ADFO for the
21	Regulatory, Legal and Funding Subcommittee.
22	DR. DENG: Good morning. Yiming Deng,

associate professor at Michigan State University, representing a research institution.

DR. BORENER: Good morning. I'm

Sherry Borener. I'm the chief data officer in

the Office of Planning and Analytics at PHMSA,

and I'm the ADFO for the Process Sharing

Subcommittee.

MR. COTE: Good morning. My name is Dan Cote. I am a consultant to the gas industry for pipeline safety and compliance. I was with NiSource 45 years, until the end of November of last year, where I was their vice president of pipeline safety and compliance, and I'm here representing NiSource and the gas distribution industry. In addition, I chair Commissions and Governance Subcommittee.

MS. BLYSTONE: My name's Kate
Blystone. I'm outreach manager for the Pipeline
Safety Trust, and I'm here representing pipeline
safety advocacy groups.

MR. HERETH: I'm Mark Hereth. I'm the managing director of the Blacksmith Group. I'm

1	also the chairman of the INGAA Foundation. I'm
2	serving as the chairman of the subcommittee on
3	process sharing, and I represent the pipeline
4	industry.
5	MR. SUBSITS: Joe Subsits. I work
6	with the Washington Utilities and Transportation
7	Commission, and I'm here representing state
8	regulators.
9	MR. PARKER: I'm Randy Parker. I'm
10	vice president of regulatory affairs at Kinder
11	Morgan. I represent the industry. I'm also the
12	chair of Regulatory Funding and Legal
13	Subcommittee.
14	DR. MURRAY: Good morning. I'm
15	Christie Murray, and I'm with PHMSA. I serve as
16	the designated federal official for the advisory
17	committee.
18	CHAIR BURMAN: Good morning. I'm
19	Diane Burman, New York State Public Service
20	Commission, representing state regulators.
21	MS. BATTAMS: I'm Ahuva Battams. I'm
22	an attorney advisor with the Office of Pipeline

Safety, PHMSA, and I'm here to assist should you 1 2 have legal questions. Chris Warner, senior vice 3 MR. WARNER: 4 president for Mears and, today, serving as the 5 chairman for the Technology R&D Subcommittee. MR. JONES: I'm Walter Jones. 6 I'm 7 director of occupational health and safety for 8 the Laborers Training Fund, and I'm representing 9 labor. 10 MR. LAMONT: Good morning, Mike 11 LaMont, director of integrity services, TRC 12 Solutions. I'm here representing industry. I'm Bob Buchanan with 13 MR. BUCHANAN: 14 Seal for Life Industries. I represent coating --15 MR. AMUNDSEN: Good morning, Eric 16 Amundsen, senior vice president, operations, for 17 Energy Transfer Partners, representing industry, 18 and also the chairman of the Best Practices 19 Subcommittee. 20 MR. MACNEILL: I'm John MacNeill. I'm 21 the national safety director for the Utility Workers Union of America, and I'm representing 22

labor.

MR. JENSEN: Good morning, Leif

Jensen, Sunoco Pipeline, a division of Energy

Transfer. I'm a senior director of technical

operations and also serving as chair of what's

currently known as the Training and

Oualifications Subcommittee.

MR. BELLAMY: Good morning. I'm Michael Bellamy, with Baker Hughes, GE, and I represent the line inspection community.

MS. THEBERT: I'm Michelle Thebert, the director of pipeline safety and facility protection at the Georgia Public Service Commission.

CHAIR BURMAN: Is there anyone on the phone? Hearing none, there is an established quorum, and I call this meeting of the Voluntary Information Sharing System Working Group Committee to order. The meeting is being recorded, and a transcript will be produced for the record. The transcript and the presentations will be available on the PHMSA website and on the

eGov docket at www.regulations.gov, and the docket number for this meeting is PHMSA-2016-0136.

I'd just like to remind folks to introduce yourselves each time you speak, so your comments can be acknowledged in the meeting transcript. You can set your tent card on its side if you care to make a comment. I will note that some of you are very low speakers. Because we don't have microphones available, we're going to have to project our voices.

Just warning you that I may ask you to speak up, and people shouldn't be shy if we can't hear. It won't be considered rude at this point.

I just want to let you know. Right now, we're going to go over the agenda. I turn it back over to Dr. Murray.

DR. MURRAY: Since Alan is not here, and Drew has not joined -- I think he may still be ill -- what we'll do is we'll talk about -- we'll share a few announcements here this morning, and then we'll move right into the

Committee business, and we will focus on the subcommittee report out discussions, starting with Mission and Objectives.

Then we will have those conversations through lunch, or up until lunch, at noon, and we'll break for about an hour and a half for lunch, since this facility doesn't really have any dining facilities. We'll talk about lunch options on the next slide, but I want to allot more time for those who need to go out and get lunch and come back.

Also, this afternoon, we have several different great discussions coming up. One, we have John DeLeeuw will be joining us with the Aviation Information Sharing to talk about SMS, as well, so I'm looking forward to that discussion. If you remember at our last meeting, in April, he joined us by phone, in the morning, just to introduce himself and to talk a little bit about his American Airlines experience and his experience working with SMS, so he'll be joining us in person to share more today. Also,

we will have Drew Hevle coming in to talk about the APIRP 1163 In-Line Inspection standard. I know there were some discussions about it in the subcommittee meeting, so we're looking forward to that.

Then we'll turn it over to the -- I think it's the Technology Committee, Chris, to a little bit more about IT architecture for the broader parent committee. Then we'll move into a committee participatory discussion to talk about prepping for the next meeting and any other logistical items that need to be covered.

So start thinking, as you're sitting here listening today. If you have ideas for the next meeting, which is coming up in August, for speakers, if those are of interest and there's things that stick out to you as you're listening, bring those back forward this afternoon, so that we can talk about them.

Then we'll share any action items from today's meeting and have closing remarks. Any questions about today's agenda? Okay, great.

For those who weren't here yesterday for the subcommittees, there's really three options for lunch. If you haven't -- some of you may have brought your lunch, if you knew to bring your lunch and wanted to take advantage of that option, but also, you can stay in the building and order in. I'm bringing up these numbers.

There's also a restaurant list on the table in the far corner, to my right. If you're interested in just ordering in on a break and having it set up for lunch, you can have that brought in, or if you want to car pool and join some of your colleagues for lunch, that's an option, as well.

We'll resume our meeting at 1:30 this afternoon. Just some general announcements. For those who may not be aware, if you're looking for documents from any of the VIS Advisory Committee meetings, they are located on our PHMSA meeting registration pages.

So for each meeting, whether it was this meeting, you'll see it posted, previous

meeting in April, February, November, and backward. Each meeting has its own registration link. If you click those links, it will have all the documents, the transcripts, Federal Register notice, agenda for the previous meetings, if you're looking for that information. Also, you can visit the VIS Working Group PHMSA web page for more information about the Committee. As we're sitting here now, August is right upon us, if you really think about it. It's already June.

That's when we're having our next meeting, on August 22nd and 23rd, so please save the dates. On the 22nd will be subcommittee meetings, which are closed to the public, and on the 23rd of August we will have our normal VIS Advisory Committee meeting, which will be open to the public.

We do have a location, so we won't run into the issues we've with trying to find meeting space. We will be meeting, actually, for the rest of our meetings this year at our DOT headquarter facility in Washington, D.C. The

address is listed here.

It looks like that's pretty popular.

I know there are some cheers for that, so good to hear. I know Mark's looking forward to the trapezoid, the old school with the trampolines and that sort of thing. If we see him drifting off, we may have to go retrieve him. He'll be somewhere in the air. The registration page for the next meeting, in August, is also available.

The link is shared here at the bottom of the presentation. Just a snapshot of the meetings we have left for the remainder of the year, August, which I've mentioned.

We'll be getting back together in

October, on the 16th and 17th, and then

hopefully, in December, with celebrations,

finalization of the report. I'm just looking in

my crystal ball. I'm not being presumptuous, but

I'm dreaming.

I think we're in pretty good shape, and we're on track to meet that timeline, so I appreciate everyone's efforts and encourage the

Committee and the subcommittees to continue the great work that you're doing. As I mentioned, all of the meetings will be at our DOT building.

Next up, I want to tee up the conversation regarding the subcommittees. I know we're going to move in to subcommittee report outs, but for those who aren't members of the subcommittees, I want to make sure that we provide a little context over what we're doing with the seven subcommittees, so just bear with me here briefly. I put this together to describe what is going on with how we're operating with the structure. Ultimately, we're issuing reports to the secretary of transportation, recommendations to the secretary. On the left side, in blue, you have the Advisory Committee, which is the group sitting around the U here this morning, the members of the Advisory Committee, and the PHMSA staff -- raise your hand if you are part of the PHMSA staff supporting this Advisory Committee. Great.

You see who we are. We really support

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the parent committee. As the parent committee organized and thought about the aggressive schedule and the substantive work that needed to take place over this year, it made sense to organize into subcommittees.

What you'll see is for the Advisory Committee members on the left, where there's 25 members, you'll see a corresponding group of subcommittees, which there are seven, who support the parent committee. The subcommittees are not able to make direct recommendations to the secretary of transportation. It has to go through -- they only work through the parent committee, so their recommendations will go to the parent committee for their consideration and deliberation. With that, PHMSA staff also supports a subcommittee. Each subcommittee has an alternate designated federal official, who supports each subcommittee and has to be present when subcommittees meet.

To underpin all of those efforts, that are contract support staff. You have a court

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reporter who helps with the transcription of our meetings, and also, we have, now -- we've recently introduced technical writers to help the subcommittees with drafting any documentation and, more specifically, the recommendations that will be included in the report.

This is just a quick snapshot of who the ADFOs are from PHMSA staff and who, from the parent committee -- those individuals who were chairing the subcommittees, just as a point of reference.

Note that Alan Mayberry, myself and
Diane and one of our chief counsel members, we
really float between the subcommittees to provide
guidance and support, as needed. Not going to
get into the minutiae of who's on each
subcommittee. It's provided in the presentation
that will be posted for your reference, and it's
too small to read, even for me. I just wanted to
make sure that list of who's participating was
available to the public. How the subcommittee
will function. There's inputs that will go into

the overall report.

You have your parent committee input.

There's a draft outline or guiding report

sections that help to guide how the

recommendations will likely come together. Then

you have input from the subcommittees.

The subcommittees were given -- or they actually have developed, but they have approved task statements, which really guides the work of the subcommittees. Without the task being described in these task statements, they're unable to take on new work without it being approved by the parent committee.

Subcommittees are working. They will be bringing recommendations back to this parent committee, some of which you may hear today, and those recommendations will need to be voted on and approved before they can actually become drafted parts of the actual report. Just as a snapshot, there is a framework for the recommendation report that is being considered. Here, you will notice that there is a normal

table of contents, front matter, with an executive summary, key terms, etc., introduction and background. The key essence of the report will be the recommendations section.

You'll notice alignment with the seven subcommittees that were formed and alignment with the key areas that will be focused on in the recommendation report and, of course, the conclusion and the appendices for reference material.

This is just a snapshot of the timeline. I think the parent committee and subcommittee approach is working well for this body. There's progress that's been made since the beginning of the year and a lot of good work that's currently taking place.

Right now, the Committee and subcommittee is in full mode to flesh out recommendations, seek out input from subject matter experts and guests with relevant information to share, and really working to start to formulate some of the key aspects of the

report, itself. The goal is to have an initial recommendation report developed by

August/September time frame of this year. Then at that point, it will go through several iterations of review by this parent committee for comment and input. As I mentioned, the overall goal is to have the report submitted to PHMSA by the end of this year, in December.

Since we've established subcommittees

-- they kicked off back in February of this year.

Subcommittees had its first face-to-face meeting
in the February 29th meeting, and then

subcommittees have met face-to-face twice since
then, in April and just yesterday, in June.

There have been a number of guest speakers invited into subcommittee meetings, both the phone conference meetings, and also the face-to-face meetings, some of which we've had some really robust conversations.

I know FAA came yesterday and spoke about funding with the aviation information sharing efforts, and it was quite informative, I

think, for all the subcommittees to hear from FAA. Also, I know that some of the subcommittees are beginning to draft sections of the report and provide some input. Some things you may hear come up in the report outs today may require parent committee input and voting, so be objective and keep an open mind as the subcommittees report out today. I mentioned the tech writers are assigned to assist, and we're going to continue next with the report outs from the subcommittees.

With that being said, I will turn it over to Dan Cote, who will kick us off with the subcommittee report outs with mission and objective. You guys could pass this around for me. That would be great. While we're doing that, are there any questions about the subcommittee overview that I just provided, how that will work?

CHAIR BURMAN: The only thing that I'd like to say is I think it's really critical now that we have focus on the first reporting that

we're going to be doing for August. We really are at a critical juncture.

engaging with the tech writers, I think that's very important and that we make sure that they are going to continue with us, as well, and that it's a seamless process, so that we don't lose -- they don't change who they are, so just making sure that we establish that is very important to the Committee.

DR. MURRAY: Thank you.

MR. COTE: Interesting you should say that, Madam Chairman, because I was going to cover both points on behalf of missions and objectives. When I say both points, we are not going to ask for any sort of vote today from mission and objectives.

We're on a trajectory to do that in

August and feel like we can do it comfortably.

Do want to use this time to really solicit input

from the Committee on a couple of key points that

we're dealing with that will provide

directionality going forward to us.

I guess the second issue that supports that is following this meeting, those technical writers are going to become very, very critical to this team, particularly because we will have all of our base information. It will really be a matter of sitting down and really creating our final document. That support over the next 60 days is simply going to be critical to us.

Appreciate that observation.

DR. MURRAY: I'm going to make one point about the tech writers. Please keep in mind that the tech writers are certainly here as a resource. If they ask questions because they don't understand, there's a great chance that whoever's the product of the report may not understand it.

They will serve as a great resource and sounding board to make sure that your recommendations are clear, concise, and they make sense, and they're written in plain English for others to be able to digest.

MR. COTE: I would only add to all of that, the one that missions and objectives has been working with has been simply outstanding and was very, very good at fleshing out those issues that were not clear. They were very clear to us, and not clear to anyone else. All of that is incredibly helpful.

That's a fine group of professionals, and we are very grateful for the support. Having said all of that, here is our subcommittee makeup. Obviously, we are excellently supported by Nancy White as the alternate designated federal official. Our team, I won't read the names, but very robust group, excellent participation. Want to thank the entire team. Over the last, particularly, several meetings, we've raised any number of issues, hammered a lot of them out.

There are still one or two, again, that we want to test with the full Committee to make sure our strategic vision of this is correct. Certainly grateful to the Committee.

Please, all of you, Walter, Leif, Bob, Randy, I'm not sure if Holly's on the phone, Joe, feel free to weigh in as we have this discussion.

Just a little bit of history.

Obviously, we started out as the missions team.

We completed our initial work in February, moved that to finality in April. We're in pretty good shape. Our reward for that contribution was it was decided that we should also handle objectives and organization. Here we are.

It's been an interesting discussion.

Before we get into a lot of the specifics, I

would say that we've been dovetailing pretty well

with Randy's group and the legal group. The way

we envisioned it, the legal group outlines the

strategic vision for the way the legislation

works, the areas that require legislation, and

the overall, very high-level organization stream.

Our job was really to take those strategic

concepts that we pretty fully agree with and

operationalize them, in terms of what does that

mean, in terms of what a VIS organization looks

like?

Ninety percent of that translation, in my mind, is in pretty good shape. We are pretty well aligned. I think 10 percent of it, at a very high level strategic level, will need a little bit of debate and a little clarification from all of you in a minute.

That is really the key purpose that I am looking to achieve in this morning's discussion. With that said, again -- this is nothing more than more of that background, in terms of our getting our initial mission statement approved and moving on to the organizational model and governance.

Just a number of recommendations.

These are just to give you a flavor of it. We're really not going to work this today, but wanted you all to have a sense of the work we've done.

In terms of structure, any VIS system should have a formal governance structure, including an executive director, executive board, so on. That is the tenor and level of detail that we're

producing. All of these bullets are consistent with that central philosophy that I reviewed.

There is one key point, though, that we want to explore again. That's the strategic purpose of this morning's presentation. We really want to answer and discuss two strategic questions. To outline the strategic questions, let's start with a fundamental premise that the governance group has, at least.

That is the absolute key to VIS is industry participation in risk identification, risk remediation, and strategic risk avoidance going forward. To do that, we need robust industry participation, providing data on findings, near misses, strategies around remediation, and particularly strategies around future risk avoidance.

The best incidents are the ones that we never know about and never have because we simply avoided them as a strategic purpose and outcome. The key to all of that is getting enough critical mass from pipeline liquid,

pipeline gas, and distribution company operators. Without that, all of this becomes an academic exercise. I'm going to pause there for a minute. That's a very fundamental strategic conclusion.

Does anyone disagree with that? Please, Chris.

MR. WARNER: Chris Warner, from Mears.

I don't disagree with that. The question I would have is -- one of the things we've been wrestling with is does that mission statement expand to also looking at how effective technologies are at finding those threats and identifying the need for new technologies, or at least making the industry aware of what technologies are most effective at identifying threats. I didn't hear that in your description of the purpose of the VIS.

MR. COTE: No, but that is a critical one because, again, I address that strategically in that final bullet that talks about risk avoidance. I can easily see VIS processing data that flows through the system, in terms of, again, identify a risk, near misses, and even

incident data that concludes that -- as we see today, everyone can be doing the right things under 192 and we still have incidents. The question is how do we reach a point of genuine risk avoidance? Because our proactive analysis of our systems are so robust that we're actually preventing them without even having to deal with them. That's what you're really talking about. The short answer is yes.

MR. HERETH: Dan, I don't disagree with your emphasis on risk and risk mitigation, but I think it's the information sharing which has the emphasis of which identification of risk and risk mitigation can be an outcome. It's a subtle -- because I think when you look at the title of our work, it's voluntary information sharing. It's not risk reduction. It's voluntary information sharing for the purposes of improving pipeline safety.

MR. COTE: Intrinsic in my remarks is in doing those things, risk reduction will be a result. Would you disagree with that?

I think it can be, yes. 1 MR. HERETH: 2 I think there's a difference in leading with risk, as opposed to leading with information 3 I think our mission is information 4 sharing. 5 sharing, of which an outcome can be risk reduction, risk identification and risk 6 7 reduction. 8 MR. COTE: I understand. 9 MR. HERETH: It's subtle, but I think 10 it's important. Others may disagree. I don't 11 disagree with your statement. I sort of, at a strategy level, tend to think of what that end 12 game looks like, in terms of -- maybe risk 13 14 reduction is a poor choice of terms. I think 15 it's good. 16 MR. COTE: Increased pipeline safety 17 may be a better way to put it. Is that fair? 18 MR. HERETH: Yes, thank you. 19 MR. COTE: I appreciate that. Other 20 thoughts and comments before we move on? 21 CHAIR BURMAN: I would just point out 22 that the mission statement talks about,

initially, the voluntary information sharing, the 1 2 need for gathering that information for risk assessment, and then using that in a 3 collaborative way to lead to actionable outcomes. 4 I think that incorporates a lot of 5 this conversation in a way that I think makes 6 7 sense, and also doesn't put the cart before the 8 So it gets to the voluntariness of it, horse. 9 the information sharing, the risk assessment that's done with that, and then leading to 10 actionable outcomes. 11 12 MR. COTE: That, we trust, will 13 ultimately improve pipeline safety. 14 Right, and improving CHAIR BURMAN: 15 pipeline safety is in the mission statement, as 16 well. 17 MR. COTE: Alan, did you have a 18 comment? 19 MR. MAYBERRY: Yes, I 20 compartmentalized the different building blocks 21 The ultimate goal, improving pipeline 22 safety, what leads to that is risk reduction, and then what leads to risk reduction is data sharing, to your approach there. I did have a couple of questions on this.

MR. COTE: That's our next stop. Wanted to create that overall understanding of Here was the debate. It became a very purpose. significant strategic question. Because we need people to volunteer to participate, we saw three critical tools that, again, in working with the legal group, that were intrinsic to creating an environment where people would want to share Those three are obviously confidentiality, data. a non-punitive system, where the things that you report to VIS are not used in any sort of punitive or enforcement action, and finally, obviously, PHMSA or federal funding for at least the initial development of the program.

The question that I'd like to put before the Committee is in everyone's mind, as they think about our industry, is that enough to overcome the traditional industry reluctance to share data on things like -- detailed data on

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near misses and findings, whether that's ILI or simple leak investigation findings?

Is that enough incentive for the industry to really want to join? There was a bit of a debate on our committee and a sort of sense that there is -- I don't want to use the word distrust. It's probably too strong. But there is not a strong bond of trust today, necessarily, between state and federal regulators and many in the industry.

It's not that there's necessarily distrust, but what I will call an absence of trust, which could be an impediment to people being willing to share information. The simple question at the heart of the discussion is if we offer those three mechanisms, along with that sense that as you identify risks and create remediation plans or create proactive preventive plans on the things that you find in your system and report them through VIS and share that information, what you found and what you're doing -- again, the heart of VIS -- and there's no

enforcement action, your data's absolutely confidential, but ultimately gets aggregated and shared with the industry, and where PHMSA is essentially funding the cost of that program, as opposed to making that an industry only standalone program, all of which, in our minds, there are advantages to, in other words, PHMSA involvement and the funding and the organizational structure, at the same time, is that enough to get operators to play? I would be interested in thoughts, comments, and feedback on that. Joe.

MR. SUBSITS: I think what you've listed there are the friction points you overcome initially, but as the program matures and progresses, people like to see, I think, the fruits of their labor materialize into something which is going to be effective. I think, ultimately, the system needs to be effective enough to bring back learning which people can benefit from. If people do work and they're not getting any benefits from it, they're going to

stop doing it. Once the momentum of the program is established, people need to see the fruits of their labor come to fruition.

MR. COTE: The key to that is getting an initial critical mass to produce enough flow of data to provide that. You're right. If, a couple of years after initial implementation, there's enough data to say we've got these ten findings; this information is great and we can act on it, I agree with you. But one of the -- I don't remember who, precisely, it was.

I think it was one of the associations of operators who put together a system in the past five years that had ten reports, clearly not enough critical mass that we heard about yesterday. It's essentially an academic exercise, a moot point, because there's not enough mass to produce the data that they need to make those improvements, so it's, again, essentially sterile. That becomes the heart of the challenge.

CHAIR BURMAN: We'll go to Kate, and

1 then Mark, but if I just could remind you to 2 state your full name and where you're from for the transcript. 3 4 MS. BLYSTONE: Kate Blystone, Pipeline I think the other critical factor 5 Safety Trust. 6 in that example you used with the Railroad 7 Commission is a major player was part of it, and 8 then left. I think that's another key factor is 9 bigger organizations, like Energy Transfer Partners and Kinder Morgan, for example, need to 10 play as long as physically possible because 11 12 that's going to lend credibility to the whole 13 process. 14 MR. COTE: No disagreement. I would make the same argument on behalf of the LDC, same 15 16 if the large players don't engage. Mark. 17 MS. BLYSTONE: I need to speak louder? 18 MR. COTE: Mark. 19 CHAIR BURMAN: We can give you the mic 20 if we need to. I think that's better. Thanks. 21 MR. HERETH: I appreciate this, Dan. 22 Thank you very much. I really like Joe's

characterization of these as friction points.

That's a really great way to describe it. I

think that's a great starting point. I think

there's a couple of others, possibly, one of

which is that if you go back to -- Michael, maybe

this sets you up -- to why GE was really helping

to drive this in the legislative process was to

try to find ways to advance technology more

rapidly than might otherwise occur.

I'll leave that to you to expand.

That's my sense, and I think that's the opportunity, one. Then I think the other is that we have to overcome -- how do I say this --

MR. HERETH: I think that's a part of this, as well.

MR. COTE: No disagreement with you.

Absolutely couldn't agree more, particularly the inertia part, where our industry, this is very new, at least structurally, in our industry, so a lot of people, to your point, will tend to hang back and watch what happens.

MR. HERETH: The other part of that

that I wanted to state was that I think that generally, operators would agree that if there is a failure, it's not just that operator who suffers. It's all operators who suffer, in that regard. So the extent that we can eliminate and prevent incidents, then that benefits everyone.

MR. COTE: You bet.

MR. HERETH: I think that's part of the incentive for operators to be in this is to ensure that they find ways -- we had some discussion in our subcommittees yesterday about learning from others and the importance of that, so it prevents you from having that same incident.

MR. COTE: You bet. Couldn't agree more, thank you. Alan.

MR. MAYBERRY: I just want to say we're really shifting the paradigm. Let's be clear that we have, and will always have, the traditional approach for oversight and the relationship that goes with that.

Realizing that -- obviously, we

publish the regulation, the federal minimum standard. We inspect against that standard. There's an information exchange that happens in that process. One of the friction points that Joe points out is the concern over just overly sharing. We're only answering the question that's asked. I knew that as an operator. I know that as a regulator, to ask the right questions. That's going to continue and evolve. This is okay, we do that, we have a very robust program, but accidents still happen.

Pigs are on the line, we still need to improve the technology. What is another domain to work within? That's where SMS comes into play, and in particular, sharing of information because the other friction point is the ability -- the concern over intellectual property and the ability to really share the way it needs to be shared, so people understand the capabilities of the technology and what they need to watch out for.

We really need to break away from that

traditional paradigm that will always be there to what will make this work? How do we remove the barriers to make this work? That's where I see -- okay, we're going to be an enabler. The federal government will be an enabler, but we wouldn't necessarily own it. I think that option is still open. I wouldn't say we own it or that we don't own it. I just don't know. But my druthers might be that we don't. Anyway, we're moving barriers of friction points to make it happen.

MR. COTE: Appreciate that

perspective, and that's helpful. You touched on

our second question, as well, in terms of

ownership. An intrinsic question is really

tight, what I'll call PHMSA or federal ownership

of the process and program. Is that an

impediment, or at least a concern as a potential

impediment? Thank you.

MR. MAYBERRY: I see executive director in all caps, and then in not all caps.

We do have a position called executive director.

MR. COTE: I think that envisioned an executive VIS director, a daily senior leader of the VIS effort. Someone's got to mind the store every day. That was the underlying question.

You sort of caught the essence of it, in terms of that ownership comment. Thank you. Please, Eric.

MR. AMUNDSEN: Eric Amundsen, Energy
Transfer. Speaking as an operator and speaking
for Energy Transfer, I think there's a
demonstrated willingness for operators, in
general, to share information in the environment
that you described. It happens today in a number
of different forums, AOPL, API, SGA, PRCI, so
it's happening today. We probably don't get the
credit, if you will, or the recognition for doing
that.

I think that demonstrates that there is a willingness when safety -- when it's a matter of public safety and a matter of integrity, there definitely is a willingness to share. Speaking for our company, there's a

willingness to share with our regulators on a routine basis to develop and foster a really good working relationship with PHMSA.

We go out of our way to meet with our region directors on a regular basis. Our thinking is let's develop that relationship when things are good, so that when things don't go so well, that relationship is developed and you're not trying to develop it during a situation of enforcement.

There's a lot of good out of sharing, a lot of good that comes out of sharing. We recognize that. I think, again, if we can overcome these friction points, well described by Joe, and break loose and get some inertia and get some momentum, for one, Energy Transfer is willing to lead the way, or certainly be involved in that pack that breaks loose. I think we've demonstrated the ability to do that in other forums, so I don't see any reason that we wouldn't do it here.

MR. COTE: Appreciate that, thank you.

That was an excellent comment. Don't disagree that there's a fair amount of that going on in the industry. Thank you. Other thoughts or comments? I'm sorry, Randy Parker. I missed the card.

MR. PARKER: That's okay, Dan. Randy
Parker, Kinder Morgan. With respect to PHMSA's
involvement, we've had some great discussions
about that recently, and today is a good one. I
think from my perspective, everything I've
learned, it's absolutely essential that this be
done under a PHMSA umbrella.

which pieces are private and which pieces are PHMSA, we can discuss that. In order to create this environment where there's trust by the operators that if they share information, it won't get out, it won't end up in a lawsuit against them, there will be no punitive actions by state or federal agencies, with respect to all that that we need to build or else no one will come to play, with respect to all that, it needs

to be done through PHMSA because we need 1 2 congressional intent to apply the commerce clause to PHMSA's worthy goals of pipeline safety. 3 4 To do that, we will be able to create 5 that system that's very difficult to challenge by people who want to break down the VIS if they 6 7 don't like it. More than anything, it will 8 create the incentives for operators to 9 participate. I don't think we can do that unless we have PHMSA intimately involved because that's 10 our link to Congress and their unassailable power 11 12 under the commerce clause. 13 MR. COTE: That's helpful, thank you. 14 Again, you and I have had that conversation. 15 Thank you. Other thoughts or comments? 16 (Simultaneous Speaking.) 17 MR. MAYBERRY: Dan, I was just going 18 to add, I agree. It's critical that various 19 people know if they want to keep variables as 20 statutory, that needs to happen early on in the

Got you.

Thank you.

MR. COTE:

process.

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CHAIR BURMAN: Before we go to the audience, is there anyone else at the subcommittee who wants to say anything? Anyone?

No? On the phone?

MS. PEAREN: This is Holly Pearen.

I'm on the phone. I just wanted to echo Mr.

Parker's statement. I think that was a really

clear articulation of the importance of PHMSA

involvement, in order to incentivize

participation. Thanks so much for entertaining

this dialog. The feedback is very helpful to the subcommittee.

CHAIR BURMAN: Thank you, Holly. Now, anyone in the audience, if you want to just move forward.

MR. STOODY: John Stoody, with the Association of Oil Pipelines. I'd say certainly, reflecting the liquids pipeline industry, we have an inherent desire to participate in this and an inherent desire to gain the benefits of sharing. That's why we're working hard to break down the barriers to what would enable that. To the

extent this is a surrogate conversation for should the director be a federal or a private employee, I don't necessarily have a final opinion on that, but I would very much echo what Randy said. If the director is a PHMSA person, we need a person on the inside to be a leader for this, to be a champion for it going through the budget process, working to change the culture within PHMSA in dealing with the inspection group, with the enforcement group and the programmatic group and managing up to the secretary's level.

There are a number of advantages for having our leader be someone on the inside that can help the program versus the opposite. it's an industry person leading it, then in a couple years, maybe this becomes an industry thing, and it just gets shunted to the side.

I think there are a lot of plusses to having PHMSA engaged. Time will tell whether we have the things that make this a success. There'll be plenty of opportunities for all

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involved to prove their commitment to making it succeed. I'm not as worried about that in this ultimate question of who should be the director.

MR. COTE: Thank you so much.

Appreciate the comment and agree.

CHAIR BURMAN: Thank you. Randy.

MR. PARKER: Randy Parker, Kinder
Morgan. I might add one other thing. We've
spent months learning about the advantages of the
FAA experience over the last ten years, so we've
warmed up to this idea of voluntary information
sharing, as long as we have adequate protections
and we build the trust.

But people who aren't on this

Committee, or people who haven't had this kind of
education we've had may not see that. If they
see PHMSA administrating a program, an operator
who doesn't understand all this yet may say these
are the same guys that just fined me last month.

I'm not going to go sharing information with
them.

I think that the PHMSA part of this

needs to be recognizable as an independent effort, not related to enforcement, so that whoever the leader is in PHMSA is tasked with that, so that it's visible to the industry as a voluntary program, unassociated with punitive actions or enforcement. That's just an idea, and I'd like to hear what Alan might have to say about that.

MR. MAYBERRY: I totally agree.

That's why I mentioned earlier we will always
have that program, the traditional oversight

program. This is really our effort to -- another
way to skin the pipeline safety cat because
regardless of that oversight program, the efforts
that are going on, we still have failures that
happen. It's unfortunate.

None of us want them. What's another approach? That will be there, but this has got to be a separate -- you're really changing the paradigm. We're not in that box over there.

We're over here in a very communicative, collaborative box that says we're sharing

information, we're sharing lessons learned, without the fear of punitive action.

That's the gist of it. That's how I see this working. It's critical for that safe area to be there to set up the environment where information is shared. Again, I'm not -- we're always going to have the other side, but this is another area to -- really all about sharing information, not to beat that dead horse.

MR. COTE: Thank you. Fully agree.

Are there any representatives here of APGA or

AGA, for example? Thoughts or comments on the

discussion, in terms of that PHMSA VIS

relationship? Would you identify yourself,

first?

MR. TU: This is Wen Tu, from AGA. In terms of our member participation in such information sharing, with or without ownership being from PHMSA and with leadership from PHMSA and/or from the industry, I'm going to defer that to our members, honestly. I think there's certain advantages that's been already

communicated in this conversation, and disadvantages, as well.

In terms of individual member

participation, that's going to be decided -- and

I think that as each member sees more

participation from their peers within the

industry, I think there'll be more participation,

but again, that decision's going to -- I'm going

to defer that to --

MR. COTE: Let me put you on the spot and ask the question a different way. Do you see AGA encouraging its members to participate in that model out of the box?

MR. TU: Yes, but with a lot of qualifiers. I think that there's a lot to be decided within this group about how the data's going to be managed, how the data's going to be provided, and who has access to it. That's all being discussed within the scope of this working group.

The decision ultimately is going to drive the AGA recommendation to our members, but

certainly to at least see the benefits of information sharing in progressing pipeline safety overall. We obviously support that ultimate goal.

MR. COTE: Appreciate that. Just for the record, both the legal -- and Randy, I don't want to speak for your team, but both the legal and governance groups see the questions of anonymity of data, avoidance of punitive within very broad boundaries that are excluded by criminal acts, essentially, but very broad boundaries, in terms of no enforcement really gets reported through the system, obviously being absolutely essential and a baseline requirement of the system.

MR. TU: I would add one more thing, as well. From my perspective, we're also looking for some clarification on how the system's going to be managed. A lot of discussion about how the data will be managed and who's going to manage that data within these groups, but when we talk about being able to digest, store, and make

information available, there's a system component 1 2 to that, as well. System architecture and system governance is something else that we're looking 3 for some discussion about. 4 5 MR. COTE: That's fair. That sounds 6 like the technology group. 7 CHAIR BURMAN: That also gets to when 8 we have the IT architecture discussion later, as 9 I think what this also shows us is how 10 important it is, in the report, to identify those 11 things that will be barriers and those things 12 that are important to have in whatever the 13 systems will be. 14 Thank you, Madam Chairman. MR. COTE: Final comments? I think we have used all of our 15 16 time, but this has been very helpful. Any final 17 comments from any members of the subcommittee? 18 CHAIR BURMAN: On the phone? Oh, I'm 19 sorry, Eric. 20 MR. AMUNDSEN: Eric Amundsen, Energy 21 Transfer. Randy, you bring up a great point. 22 think it's a management of change effort that

will need to take place if we move forward with this. So I think our report, that may fall under best practices, but it will be a huge management of change campaign, and we'll need to think about how we -- what recommendations we make in that regard.

How do we use the associations? How do we use the report, itself, to communicate all that we have learned, as a Committee, about the FAA's experience and compelling reasons for doing this? This is a major paradigm shift, not so much from sharing information in general, but sharing it in a different context, so we'll need to think about that in our recommendations and try and get our ideas and thoughts on paper about the key elements of an MOC process for it.

MR. COTE: That is absolutely a great point. Randy, as you said earlier -- at least I think it was you, but someone in the room said something along the lines of as we've worked this, we've all gained a clear understanding and really refined our vision around how to execute

this and learned a ton in the process that our industry brothers and sisters have simply not had the opportunity to do. We have a much higher level of trust that we can make this work, that the safeguards will work effectively, and this gets executed in a way that is secure and reassures everyone, in terms of our strategic intent, so critical points. To your point, translating that into something that will really resonate with our industry becomes management of change.

MR. BUCHANAN: Only one comment. The big guys are here, but there's a ton of small guys, small operators. We really need to think about this, really, in terms of what they're going to feel this thing is, and how will you get them to buy into it. That really has to be part of your thought process, as well.

MR. COTE: That sort of goes back to the trade associations helping, them hearing from multiple sources that sharing data is good for individual operators and good for our industry

really some of the keys. Anyhow, that being --1 2 CHAIR BURMAN: Alan. 3 MR. COTE: I'm sorry. 4 MR. MAYBERRY: I just feel compelled 5 to say this. Don't take it the wrong way, but as we look to roll it out, this is not -- this is 6 why -- there are a number of factors here. 7 It's 8 not a system to hide behind a compliance issue, 9 but it's a system to raise everyone's awareness of the challenges and really to get smarter at 10 11 what's out there and how to fix what's out there. 12 I just felt compelled to mention that. 13 I'm totally confident we can come out with a 14 system that doesn't do that. It's not a rat your 15 boss system, which I've heard that other systems 16 have --17 MR. COTE: Not a what? I'm sorry. 18 MR. MAYBERRY: Rat your boss system. 19 Anyway, thank you. 20 MR. JONES: A couple of quick points. 21 Dan, very good job. You pretty encapsulate -- we 22 had a lot of problems the last couple of days,

and he covered it all. We really need to hear from you guys. What you've said has just about solved all of our problems, I think, and made it -- I think everything is settled, pretty much. There are some devils in the details, but we're appreciative that -- I've been on many FACA committees, been in Washington for a long time. To be honest, when I came to this meeting, I was a bit shocked at the anonymity and the relaxed enforcement that the Agency was throwing on the table to get players involved. If this was occupational safety and health, certainly wouldn't have been in favor of that.

I would have taken the other view of this is nuts. Hold on; we're giving away the store. But the Agency has brought case study after case study and testimonial that has definitely allayed my fears. I would have to agree with Alan that I'm frustrated with the enforcement compliance paradigm, as well.

There's got to be a better way.

I have changed my mind to this idea of

	relaxed enforcement to encourage voluntary
2	information sharing, so that we can skin this
3	bird from a different angle, in terms of reducing
4	risk on these pipelines. I just want to say that
5	there are concerns from the other side, as well,
6	about relaxed enforcement and anonymity, but many
7	are looking for the big picture that this may
8	produce. The Agency has provided enough case
9	study to have folks encouraged. Thank you. Oh,
10	Walter Jones, Laborers Health and Safety Fund.
11	CHAIR BURMAN: Thank you, Walter.
12	Anyone else at the table? Michelle.
13	MS. THEBERT: Michelle Thebert. I
14	guess when you say relaxed enforcement, what does
15	that mean?
16	CHAIR BURMAN: Can you speak up a
17	little bit?
18	MS. THEBERT: I'm sorry. Relaxed
19	enforcement, I'm trying to follow what that
20	means, exactly.
21	MR. JONES: To me, I was just maybe
22	it was just a wrong term, but I was saying

non-punitive --

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MS. THEBERT: Right.

Relaxed enforcement is, I MR. COTE: don't think, a term that I or the subcommittee would use. What we're talking about is a situation where you are an operator. identify a problem in your system, it may be a safety issue, or it could be a 192, what would constitute a 192 violation. You do your own independent audit of your activities. identify it. It's identified as a concern or a risk. You report it through VIS. You create a remediation point around it, and you are addressing it. Four months later, either the state or PHMSA drop by and do a routine audit and say you're violating 192.605 because you do not have procedures that govern leak investigation and repair.

I'll take an extreme case for those of you that are operators. You say wait a minute, here's my draft. We're getting it approved. We found this four months ago. We reported it to

1 VIS.

PHMSA basically says as long as you are demonstrating that you're remediating it and that you identified it yourself, we will not cite you under 192.605 and fine you. Conceptually, I think that's what the vision is. Alan, would you agree with that characterization?

MS. THEBERT: Alan would have to -PHMSA would have to contact the states and say
Operator B, you can't tag them for this because
reported it, but Operator C didn't report it. He
can get them. I'm trying to make sure --

(Simultaneous Speaking.)

MR. COTE: Right. The states are a little bit different. I'm not sure that PHMSA has absolute unfettered control over individual state programs.

MS. THEBERT: Some states -(Simultaneous Speaking.)

MR. COTE: To the extent that individual states don't embrace the concept if it's recommended by PHMSA, their operators simply

1 won't join.

MR. MAYBERRY: It can get a little tricky there. Hard to comment on that example.

MS. THEBERT: I've got easier ones.

MR. MAYBERRY: I think even today, if an operator -- and we've seen that -- comes to us with an issue and self-discloses, it's a lot better than if the inspector happens upon it. I don't necessarily see the system for -- we're not building the system. It's really more to share information about the threats that are out there.

Initially, the discussion was that the directive was related to inline inspection, but we're covering the realm including distribution.

We'll just have to see what gets rolled up into it. I'm a little concerned about if it'd just be a -- here, again, if you crack the door open, do you give a blank check to getting a pass? I should stop.

(Simultaneous Speaking.)

MR. COTE: In a few minutes, Randy will cover a bit of detail around those

expectations. Again, either we have a meeting of the minds or we don't. I guess we'll shake that out.

CHAIR BURMAN: This is Diane Burman from New York State Public Service Commission.

Let's not forget the lessons that we learned from when FAA and the rail guys came in here. The focus wasn't in picking this over a way of getting around enforcement. It was that this was a tool outside of enforcement. It wasn't we have an issue; rush here, so we don't get tagged over there.

That wasn't the intent. The intent
was about a way of having voluntary information
sharing to help with pipeline safety, as a tool
to lead to risk reduction, the risk assessment
that could help us, as that tool. To the
perspective of there were processes in place, and
they have very clear guidelines that were
established after they had the legislative
authority that gave them the leeway to establish
what that -- there was very clear guidelines on

what it would mean if you were doing something that was intentional or grossly negligent that was outside of that. It really was about the utilization of that information to have a gotcha was not to be done.

That was some of the processes that were in place. I think some of this will get fleshed out, in terms of looking at other drill downs, as we go further, but we're not writing the program or getting back between what it will mean for a state that wants access to that.

If you remember, with the FAA and the Rail, they also had Memorandums of Understanding and confidentiality agreements for other players that were going to be a part of that. It wasn't just that the industry agrees, and then we'll see what folks do. If a state wants to be a part of it and to share it, they don't just get to be a part of it to then take and use as they see fit. That's something that will have to be grappled with.

MR. COTE: That's a great point. I

won't go off the reservation too far, but all of this moves from a compliance-based model to a risk-prevention model over time. This is just one piece, for example, with SMS, which is another critical initiative that the industry is adopting to improve that. A component of SMS is self-auditing, for example.

To the extent you find things, obviously, you're obligated to remediate them or to implement prevention technology. There are a whole variety of other things, but again, moving us away from that traditional compliance model.

CHAIR BURMAN: Sherry, did you have any comments?

DR. BORENER: I just wanted -- Sherry Borener, from PHMSA. I just wanted to support your point and say that in the ASIAS program, the fact that the data are pooled and de-identified actually means that they can't be used in an investigation later on. Compliance is compliance. That's a pathway.

But you would never, then, go back to

the VIS data and mine it for additional information to support a case against an individual. That's really the point of de-identification. By the time it gets into the VIS, you can't find out who that was, and you should not be able to then reconstruct anything about their operations using that voluntarily shared information. They really are just separate. That, I think, is the protection.

DR. MURRAY: Would it work the other way around, meaning an operator who wants to say we reported this in the VIS during a compliance matter, they wouldn't be able to use that same argument?

DR. BORENER: No. Under their SMS -FAA has an SMS rule, where this process where you
disclose issues and you do self-monitoring and
self-auditing and you report your metrics, that
special rule allows them some indemnification,
but it doesn't change a compliance issue. If you
discover a risk issue, that's different than if
you're breaking the law.

Once you've gotten to the point where you are doing something that is enforceable, it doesn't get you a get out of jail free card. Enforcement still is going to do enforcement, it's just that there's a very big difference because we have very minimal -- we have minimal standards. There's a big difference from having a known risk to having a violation. In that space between having a known risk and actually having to take action, there's a lot of things that can be done. This encourages people to take those actions without having somebody step in and say you're on the verge of a violation or something and having a threat. It also keeps them out of the lawsuit loop. So a third party who feels that they've been damaged by an airline can't go to the VIS data, and then use it in a court date. I think that's important for getting people to involve. CHAIR BURMAN: Okay, thank you.

MS. THEBERT: I guess the reason I'm

Michelle.

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asking is the state's obviously distribution. I know there's somebody trying to bring distribution into it, so I guess that's one we have to figure out. Is distribution part of it or not?

Because when you have 50 different states, you're going to have to work with their own state laws and certain regulations they may not be able to exempt a penalty. I guess I was thinking when you report to VIS, you're not doing it just to avoid enforcement. You're doing it hopefully to -- I guess I'm seeing them not really related, but they are sort of -- joint, maybe it's notice to help -- the pipeline safety person's getting some kind of monetary benefit or some kind of non-enforcement benefit. I don't know.

MR. COTE: I guess just to answer your question, Michelle, nothing in the discussions we've had in the last six months excludes distribution. Adding states into the mix does add a bit of a level of complexity for individual

But remember, in terms of our 1 operators. 2 pipeline network, that is 75 percent -distribution pipe is 75 percent or more of all 3 4 the pipe in the United States and --5 I'm not saying it's good MS. THEBERT: or bad. 6 7 MR. COTE: -- and just that many -- at 8 least that percentage of federally reportable 9 incidents today. I think we concluded early on that if we leave distribution out, we're sort of 10 11 missing the boat in driving a lot of incremental 12 pipeline safety. 13 MS. THEBERT: I'm not saying that's 14 right or wrong. Now having said that, yes, 15 MR. COTE: 16 that will -- just the states being in the mix may 17 add a level of detail that I think will sort 18 itself out pretty quickly, but it is something we 19 will wind up dealing with, no question. Having said all of that --20 21 MS. THEBERT: Some states have a lot 22 more -- mirror the Feds regulation, so it's going

to be a task.

MR. COTE: Yes, some states have their own almost independent codes more stringent than 192. That's true. Having said all of that, I think, as a committee, we got the guidance we were looking for, so we certainly appreciate it. Any final thoughts before we wrap it up?

MR. MAYBERRY: I have one quick thought, just related to -- to the extent that we make statutory changes, Michelle and Joe, and to the extent that we change the regulations, then it will become part of our annual state audit.

We would look to the states to -- the agreement covers that you adopt the federal minimum standard in the state law, and then we inspect against that. So to the extent there was a gap in the state law, it could impact -- it's the whole point system, ultimately, that we would look to the states to adopt whatever federal regulation would be relevant to this and would be inspecting against that. So the impact, like I said, could be an impact on the points that we

award to states.

DR. MURRAY: I think there need to be more points -- state law.

MR. MAYBERRY: My goal is for -- (Laughter.)

MR. MAYBERRY: -- not to lose any.

CHAIR BURMAN: I just want to say, though, that I think, again, we're getting into trying to figure out how a state may try to upend the program. That's where it comes into the congressional intent, as well as the actual statutory authority.

So it's not really about getting back to since you're being a part of this voluntary information sharing system, everything that you shared with them, you now have to share with us. That would go against the congressional intent.

I think that's sort of the things that we need to look into, I think. In the report, rather than getting into trying to figure out every scenario, more about needing to address the issues of ensuring that this -- that there are

not players who are going to upend the goals and the intent and needing that to be very clear in whatever statutes are put into place. I think that's how we try to address some of these issues. Couldn't agree more. MR. COTE: That's very fair. Thank you. Thank you for the time. Thank the Committee and our guests for the Thank you. input. CHAIR BURMAN: Now we're going to go

CHAIR BURMAN: Now we're going to go to the next -- process sharing is the next subcommittee. We're going to pull that up and report out for that.

MR. HERETH: I'm Mark Hereth, with the Blacksmith Group, the chairman of this subcommittee. If you'll go to the next slide, please. This shows our subcommittee members, our alternate designated federal official, Sherry Borener.

Sherry brings the added benefit of having worked in ASIAS in the FAA system, so she's been a tremendous asset for us. You can

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see the list of our members there. We added three in the last month or so, Warren Randolph, from the APGA side, Drew Hevle from the gas and liquid operator side, and -- I'm sorry; Warren Randolph is from FAA. I'm sorry. Warren has presented to us before and wanted to meet with us yesterday, but had a prior commitment.

Drew Hevle, from Kinder Morgan, and
Jim Crowley, I'm sorry, representing APGA.
You've seen our task statement before, so I won't
go into that in any great detail. There's
nothing that we've done recently that I think
would cause us to revisit that, but we're always
open to thoughts there.

In terms of things that we've done recently, we had presentations. We had one that was presented to us by Drew on API 1163, which this group, this Committee, will have the benefit of seeing later today.

We also had a presentation by Chris Warner on direct assessment, so we could see the parallels to be able to draw upon in the context

of direct assessment. Of course, yesterday we had a presentation from subcommittee, which others joined, on what I would characterize as -- our emphasis in asking Vivek to come present was really looking at what are the essential elements that we should be considering in making recommendations about a voluntary information system. For those of you that saw his presentation, I think it was outstanding. He has a great command of the FAA system, had great knowledge and insight on the funding side of it, as well, that he shared earlier in the day.

I think he was very, very helpful yesterday. We had followed up working in conjunction with the Best Practices Subcommittee to get PRCI to come back and visit us with a little bit more detail and a specific proposal framework, drawing upon what they're already doing with voluntary information sharing with ILI. Eric and I have been coordinating that.

Eric is actually on the board of the PRCI, or the executive committee, I guess.

That's in play, and we'll be bringing that back. I suspect that's something we'll want to recommend for August, so we'll talk with you guys about that. We're also -- one of the things that came out of a couple of our meetings yesterday is that we want to make sure that we have good coordination between the subcommittees and that we're not overlapping or doing the same work in developing the report. We're actually going to have a meeting on July 2nd. It will be, for those of us in Houston, probably face to face, but we'll have -- we're going to do a web meeting, so that anybody can join that.

Our purpose is to make sure that we're aligned among our sections, and also no overlap.

We thought that would be best to be the Process

Sharing, Best Practices, and Technology

Subcommittees. We welcome the others.

I think we find that we're going to be taking more direction from governance and mission and from legal and the budgeting side, so we saw the places where there's a real tendency or

potential to have overlap was with best practices, process sharing, and technology.

We've just seen that, so we had some discussions yesterday about how to clarify that.

We've decided we're going to create annotated outlines. We'll get those out in advance. Then we'll actually meet on July 2nd to try to work through that, again, to make sure we're aligned, but also that we don't have overlap and that we're pointing to each other. Ι know, for example, in process sharing, we're going to be pointing to best practices because we may have a set of recommendations, but they will rely on what best practices has described. The final point that was raised -- and this has come up a couple times, but it was raised again yesterday, so I think we'll spend some time on this, is what are the expectations of each of our stakeholder groups, particularly in what we share and how we share that?

We'll take that one. I think it was a great suggestion. We'll take that one and do

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some work on that. We have representation on the committee to help us, I think, make that happen.

Any questions or comments on ongoing work?

CHAIR BURMAN: Anyone the phone?
Holly? Anyone in the audience?

MS. PEAREN: No comments other than to commend the efforts to coordinate between subcommittees, at this point. I think that's going to be really helpful.

CHAIR BURMAN: Thank you.

MR. HERETH: Good. Thank you. The other thing that I wanted to do was show generally where we are with respect to our report outline which, as I mentioned, we'll further annotate prior to our July meeting with the other subcommittees. We think, at the very outset, that we had a discussion on the interrelationship with the safety management system. That might ultimately go into an introduction in this document, but it's so essential to how we share and the processes we use to share that we thought we'd tackle it here.

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Then, ultimately, you all can decide, the Committee can decide and the leadership can decide where it best fits. I know it's something that Sherry and others from the FAA side have helped us see, so we'll try and tackle that.

We'll revisit the categories of information sharing, and I'm going to talk about that a little bit more in a moment.

The next two topics we think are really important, which are when we go to make a recommendation, what are the things that are really critical, what we're calling essential elements of a voluntary information sharing How do you make it stand up and make it system? The second one, which is -- I think, effective? Dan, you referred to it a bit in your comments, so I think we're going to want to have some interaction here. As you recall, we had a discussion about this in one of our subcommittee meetings a couple of months ago, which is what can we do to make VIS compelling, which is one of the things I think Dan was trying to tackle.

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Ultimately, where that may fit, it may fit best in governance, but our subcommittee's done some work there, so we'll want to capture that. We'll describe what we think an information hub looks like. You've seen a diagram that we created, I believe, back in April.

Then we thought we'd have a series of case studies. This is one of the places where we're going to want to interface with the other groups because I think the Technology

Subcommittee has the idea of doing this. When I saw some of theirs yesterday, I think it caused us to maybe relook at how we might do this.

One of the things we want to do is to have some tangible evidence of how this is done and how it works, so that people, when they read this, benefit, as Randy, I think, you pointed out, that they have the benefit of knowing what we know. So we think case studies or examples do that, and we'll coordinate with the subcommittees on how to best do that. I think the Technology

Committee has a good way of looking at that, having sat in their meeting yesterday, so we'll draw upon the strengths there.

Once we get this further annotated, we began to ask for assistance in writing assignments yesterday. We were overwhelmed by the number of people that came up to us afterwards. No, just kidding. We know that people are ready and willing to help in that regard.

One thing I just wanted to go back to briefly was several meetings ago, I think, actually, Dan Cote and Eric helped us see an initial framework for information sharing types. They were captured in the first three, which are really learnings from routine use of assessment technology, a second being learning from reportable incidents and accidents, and even possibly near misses.

You'll note that we have the tie here to the SMS sections in this case to the section number in the APIRP 1173 document. We're going

to try to retain that throughout here, so that we always have a tie to SMS. Then there's a third one, which is learnings with our public stakeholders. I think we've not lost any focus or emphasis on those first three, but I think what we've seen, over time, is people have helped us see possibly two others.

I'm going to give Dr. Cote credit for No. 4. We heard this yesterday from Vivek, from the FAA, is that there are opportunities to have learnings about specific risks. That includes risk, risk assessment, risk mitigation, barriers, if we want to call them that.

We think those are important, so our subcommittee will spend some more time with those. Those are likely outcomes from this information sharing. Then sharing of specific assessment data, we'll go back and spend some additional time with that.

I think our discussions, frankly, with the Technology Subcommittee yesterday helped us see that. Any thoughts or comments on those?

Again, this is a place where we would welcome other input. It was very interesting, yesterday, that Vivek made the comment about the importance of sharing learnings with our public stakeholders. It was really good to hear him say that because I hadn't heard that, I don't think, as clearly as when he said it yesterday, so it reinforces the importance. I think we would all say that it needs to be on there, but I think it reinforces it.

MR. COTE: Mark?

MR. HERETH: Yes.

MR. COTE: This is Dan Cote. Just a comment. In my mind, I love what you have up there, but particular around 2. One of the things that I've found frustrating over my career was being aware of reportable incidents, obviously, particularly sensational ones that get a lot of publicity and potentially serious property damage, or even fatalities.

Sometimes it takes us a couple of years, as an industry, to really understand what

Typically, the investigation caused those. chain, let me say, is a lot shorter than that. People know. It doesn't take two years to figure out what really went wrong in most of those Yet, because of the historic litigation model and confidentiality and all of the impediments to information sharing, a lot of us who may have those risks can't react to them because we don't know. One of the things that I would love to see come out of this strategically is more willingness on the part of the operators who have those to share data on risk avoidance much sooner than actually comes out of the ultimate litigation or whatever regulatory process may occur.

In my mind, that's critical. One of the absolute keys to this is knowing quickly what went wrong. If we have those risks as other operators, we move quickly to prevent them. We don't, in my mind, at least in the distribution business, we don't do that particularly well today at all, and it's a critical outcome.

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1	MR. HERETH: Dan, this is Mark Hereth
2	again. I would say that's I think all of us
3	would share your concern there. I think that we
4	had a really key learning yesterday from the
5	representative from the Center of Offshore
6	Safety. The way in which she described how they
7	don't focus on root cause, and they look at
8	opportunities for improvement, that, they find,
9	is a way and I don't want to put words in that
10	person's mouth, but I think that was a really key
11	learning yesterday to see the focus that they use
12	there. I think we all share your concern.
13	MR. COTE: That's a great point.
14	You're right. That's another way to skin the
15	cat.
16	MR. HERETH: I thought that was a
17	really key learning from yesterday. It's a
18	concern that we all need to have.
19	MR. COTE: Thank you.
20	DR. BORENER: Sherry Borener, from
21	PHMSA. One of the things I think that he
22	talked a lot and told you a lot of things all at

once, but he talked about Infoshare. I think some of you have been to Infoshare. There are lots of ways and levels to get engagement.

Infoshare, which started with 10 people and is now 1,000, is a room where people talk about their information, period.

They don't necessarily come there to do analysis. Sometimes they present analysis at this time, but that's exactly the initiation -- that was the way people came in the door, in a lot of cases, is to come in just to share information, findings from incidents or trends that they're exposed to, and then using that platform, they developed the kinds of topics, like specific risks, that they would go back and study in ASIAS. For process sharing, the question is how do we get people to the table and keep them there?

I think that's one of our big issues.

What gets people in? What makes them want to

stay? I think we can have a lot of levels of

engagement that don't require a lot of additional

regulatory action to get people started in an idea and building trust well before they're actually engaged in the full information sharing platform.

MR. WARNER: Chris Warner, from Mears.

I want to follow on from what Dan said about

concerns that I think companies will have about

legal lawsuits regarding incidents and sharing.

I was interested to hear Vivec say, yesterday, if I'm remembering correctly, that companies were actually finding that it was better to say they were involved in this process, even though that may provide some vulnerability, in terms of the details coming out in a lawsuit, than it was to just not be involved and have to admit in court that they were blind to what was happening in the industry and how to respond appropriately to the industry. So I think some of that needs to be in our report because I think a lot of the public or operators who aren't in this room are going to be worried -- that's the first thing I would worry about is my lawyers

will never let me do this. 1 2 So some of that discussion in there talking about the learnings from the FAA around 3 4 how it was a better legal strategy to be engaged 5 in this, as opposed to segregated, might be valuable in the long run. 6 7 CHAIR BURMAN: Anyone else at the 8 table? On the phone? In the audience? 9 MR. HERETH: I think that's --10 CHAIR BURMAN: Okay. 11 MR. HERETH: Yes, that's it. 12 CHAIR BURMAN: You don't have any 13 voting items, right? 14 MR. HERETH: No, no items for voting 15 today. 16 CHAIR BURMAN: Okay, great. Next, 17 we're going to be, I think, Regulatory, Legal, 18 Funding. 19 This is Randy Parker, MR. PARKER: 20 from Kinder Morgan. As you know, the Regulatory, 21 Funding, and Legal Subcommittee is comprised of these members. Everyone is here, I believe, 22

except our external members, Dane Jaques and
Cynthia Dominik. Dane is a former commercial
pilot, also a lawyer, who has done NTSB/FAA work,
and also does pipeline work.

Cynthia worked at the FAA for the last ten years setting up the legal processes and regulations, etc., to make the voluntary information sharing program at FAA work and to create that trust between the aviation operators and the agency with respect to this program.

She will typically say trust, trust, trust is what has to be created to make this work. Our task statement, really boil it down, says that we should identify any barriers to any part of the VIS system that we're looking at and to recommend ways to overcome those barriers.

Let's go through -- there are eight barriers we identified, so let's just go through them one at a time. The first barrier relates to the authority and governance of the VIS.

One of the things that we found, it's not really clear that PHMSA has specific

authority to establish and maintain a VIS system or program, and it's not clear that they have the authority to enter into MOUs and other contractual arrangements necessary to establish and operate a successful VIS program.

Certainly, they have a lot of
authority to attempt to do this, but we thought
that it would be better, from the outset, to kind
of clarify this. The third barrier, with respect
to the authority and governance, is that
operators fear that the program, while called
voluntary, might be transformed into a mandatory
program.

participation that we should address. We don't want to discourage participation from the outset. The recommendation that we came up with is that we go to Congress. We recommend the secretary seek from Congress legislation, and direct PHMSA to promulgate regulations under that legislation authorizing PHMSA to establish a VIS, to be formed and governed in cooperation with pipeline

operators/inline inspection vendors, for the purpose of encouraging the voluntary sharing, collection, and analysis of pipeline integrity inspection and risk assessment information and other appropriate data, for the purpose of improving pipeline safety, transmission, distribution, and hazardous liquid pipelines.

PHMSA would be authorized, under this law, to enter into MOUs and other contractual arrangements with operators, vendors, third party data management contractors, states, and other entities or persons, as necessary, to establish, operate, and maintain a VIS. Neither PHMSA, nor any other agency, would require participation by any operator or ILI vendor in the VIS. So we tried to hit those three barriers with this proposed legislation.

DR. MURRAY: Randy, one question on the first paragraph, where you talk about the -- in cooperation with. It's just more of a question. Where would the state regulators or the states fit in there?

In terms of the 1 MR. PARKER: 2 cooperation? Right. 3 DR. MURRAY: I think states could be 4 MR. PARKER: 5 on the governance pressure that we ultimately 6 come down to as part of the Stakeholder 7 Committee. It's possible that states could be 8 there or fit in in other ways. But in terms of 9 setting up the VIS, itself, we're talking about cooperation between operators, ILI vendors, and 10 11 PHMSA, sort of the core participants in setting The states could be included in that. 12 13 (Off record comments.) 14 MR. PARKER: I think it could be 15 cumbersome and very -- subject to a lot of 16 politics if you had all the states able to come 17 in at the outset to try to shape what the VIS 18 looked like, but it's certainly worth 19 considering. Alan. 20 MR. MAYBERRY: Let's see; where to 21 start? I guess the way I envision it, typically, we would enter into an MOU with another 22

government agency, federal agency, so that's the relationship there as we look to another -leverage another entity to help us here. Then I would add that -- so our interaction with operators or ILI vendors or other third parties, to the extent we need expertise, we would probably need to have something in here that it's really not an MOU, but it would be really in conformance with the federal requisition regulations.

We're not allowed, really, to give free service. We have to pay for it. Just a little nuance there that we can wordsmith this a bit to just make sure we're in compliance with the FAR. Also, first and foremost, obviously you pointed out, and we've discussed the statutory changes that would be needed.

There are existing statutes that would need to be tweaked, but then also, we'd need to add some language related to just the whole concept of VIS, but the existing statutes, especially as it relates to how we handle

information from operators.

But it would be specific to this because, again, we still have our other program that we're working within. This is just -- the statutory changes would address setting up the ability to have this other voluntary system to work within.

MR. PARKER: This is Randy Parker, with Kinder Morgan. Alan, I appreciate those comments very much. I think we will have to see how this fits in with your other statutory obligations and mandates. With respect to the MOU paragraph there, we did look at the FAR requirements.

This paragraph comes primarily from the experience of the Federal Railroad

Administration, in terms of how -- when they set up various programs, they needed some kind of a document that laid out the ground rules for confidentiality and for how the data would come in, get processed, and come back out.

That may be overcome by some of the

governance work that we ultimately land on, but at least we wanted to enable PHMSA to be able to do, maybe, agreements they've never been able to do before, in order to make this work. That was the thought.

MR. MAYBERRY: Okay.

CHAIR BURMAN: When we flesh it out, that should also be clear, so they don't -- there's not a disconnect between the language here, and then that this is different from the normal processes.

MR. MAYBERRY: Right. We're carving this out. This isn't about diluting the existing program. This is about -- again, we have that paradigm that will remain, but then we're developing a new paradigm for.

MR. PARKER: Correct. This is Randy
Parker. I don't think we intend to recommend any
statutory provision that would be in conflict
with anything that's on the books right now. We
don't want to create that complication for
ourselves.

CHAIR BURMAN: Okay, we'll go Mark, Dan, then Kate.

MR. HERETH: This is a fine point, but

I think one of the things that's emerged is it's

not just pipeline operators and ILI service

providers, but it's also the third-party NDE

companies. Whether you capture those as a part

-- that they serve one or the others of those,

but I think there's a three-legged stool that we

have to consider there. We can't lose an

emphasis -- I'm borrowing that from Carl Weimer,

the three-legged stool. We need to consider all

three of those because the error -- the

uncertainty in those NDE measurements is just as

critical as in the ILI.

MR. PARKER: That's a very good point, Mark, a very good point.

CHAIR BURMAN: Dan.

MR. COTE: I was going down exactly the same road Mark was, ironically enough. I would like us to -- I don't want to get into the wordsmithing, but pipeline operators and inline

inspection vendors, that phrase, in my mind, sort of screams transmission facilities. I would think we would want to change that to something a little more generic.

Even though pipeline operators does define both distribution and transmission in code, a lot people won't look at the language and recognize it. So perhaps we say with jurisdictional facility operators, which casts that wider net, and various -- without being really specific, various technical vendors, something a little more broad, again, just to get us -- not that ILI isn't a critically important technology and mentioned by the legislation, but we are trying to expand that, just a thought.

MR. PARKER: This is Randy. I agree with you, Dan. I think we need to do a little bit of tweaking on this one.

MR. COTE: We'd love to help --

MR. PARKER: Okay.

MR. COTE: -- if that's beneficial.

MS. BLYSTONE: Kate Blystone. Just a

little more tweaking. The one thing that I feel like this lacks -- and I like it, generally, with the exception of the things the two gentlemen before me mentioned -- I would love to see it tied with a time frame because I'm slightly concerned that all of this wonderful work we're doing doesn't happen.

It would be great that if -- maybe

Congress should enact legislation within the

reauthorization of the -- or something you guys

tool with that, but it would be great if we could

say within the next five years or within some

time frame, so all this great work doesn't get

lost.

MR. PARKER: This is Randy Parker.

Yes, Kate, I agree with you on that. Matter of fact, our subcommittee is assuming that we're trying to get this done this year. We will get this done this year, Madam Chair.

DR. MURRAY: Right, December 2018.

MR. PARKER: And it will hopefully be

something that --

DR. MURRAY: December 18th and 19th, to be exact.

MR. PARKER: There you go. So the recommendations we deliver to the secretary can be used, if she desires, in the reauthorization process. I agree with you. It would be very good to have a date to drive these things forward because, as you know, you can work on things forever and not really get there.

CHAIR BURMAN: Just a couple of thoughts. This is really a draft recommendation for the report, and some of what will get fleshed out will be facilitated by other aspects of other things that we're working on.

To the extent that we're looking at the legislation, potentially, as the pipeline reauthorization legislation, that's something that could come out in the report, if appropriate. Also, some of the things that are necessary, in terms of facilitating a non-disconnect with ongoing PHMSA processes and legal authority will also be fleshed out in some

of the wording in the report. But to the extent that I just want to flag that ILI had been a specific topic of conversation in the first two meetings because we were stuck in what the legislation said, this is about enacting legislation for the future.

We don't necessarily need to be stuck in some of that wording, and we should make clear what some of our focus is and our intent is, if it's broader than ILI. That gets into the underpinnings of what we did in the first two meetings that led to the mission statement that made it a little broader. So to the extent that we flesh out from that, it ties in nicely when we get to the recommendation.

MR. PARKER: I agree very much that we need to have that in the report and that we need to revise this particular recommendation to make that clear that we made that transition. Scotty

PARTICIPANT: I would like to see labor included up there, as far as being a party

to an agreement like that.

MR. PARKER: To the formation of the VIS?

PARTICIPANT: Yes.

CHAIR BURMAN: I'd also, then, with that -- thank you; that's a good point. We did have, I think, at our last meeting, a pretty lengthy discussion that's in the transcript that got into how much we needed to clearly identify all the different stakeholder groups.

I think it lasted about an hour, the conversation, and we were grappling with the entire bucket or how do we summarize it. I think going back to that transcript will be helpful because there was some conclusions made at that, and I think we could take the lessons from what we said in our last meeting and refresh our memories, as well.

MR. PARKER: Thank you, Madam Chair.

That's a great idea. I'll go back to that

transcript and have the subcommittee look through

that and make sure it's consistent.

1 MS. BLYSTONE: Kate Blystone. Ι 2 think, actually, that is reflected in our mission statement, that list that we ended up on. 3 I just 4 conferred with my buddy, Mark, here. I think it 5 is, so you don't even have to read the whole hour. 6 7 MR. PARKER: It's right in there. 8 Okay, save me some time. 9 CHAIR BURMAN: But it was riveting. 10 MS. BLYSTONE: Edge of your seat 11 stuff. 12 CHAIR BURMAN: I do think that is 13 something to keep in mind. There were a lot of these discussions that I think it would be 14 15 helpful if we did have someone tasked with going 16 through the transcripts just to keep in mind if 17 certain things that we have gone down are 18 consistent with where we were. Even if we have 19 changed our position, I think it's important to 20 note where we changed it and to flag it for us. 21 MR. PARKER: I agree. It's a very healthy process. 22

CHAIR BURMAN: Anyone else? On the phone? Oh, wait, Dr. Murray.

DR. MURRAY: This conversation just reminds me when we're looking at recommendations across each subcommittee, A, to the point I heard earlier from Mark about integrating, having a meeting to integrate, I think that's going to be key because some of the things that you hear talked about -- I think, Mark, you presented on the types of information, and you have some clear categories, like the public, there was learnings from the public. But when you look at this, for example, it doesn't necessarily include the public, but there's an expectation that they may likely provide learnings.

From that integration standpoint, you might want to consider the Regulatory Funding

Committee, just to make sure that consistency

Diane talked about, it matches up to what the other recommendations will be.

MR. PARKER: That's a good idea. With that said, let's go to the next one. The second

barrier we looked at was funding. Of course, we learned a lot about funding yesterday from Vivec, but our subcommittee concluded that the lack of consistent adequate funding to stand up and sustain the program would deny the public many benefits from improved pipeline safety and fewer incidents.

MR. PARKER: We also realize that budget requests to Congress are going to require support from the government and industry champions. How do we get over those barriers? We recommend that the secretary ask Congress to authorize and appropriate consistent funding for establishing and sustaining the VIS at levels adequate to achieve the goals of the VIS.

Language should be added to the Pipeline Safety Reauthorization that authorizes appropriations for VIS for the next five years. The VIS would provide high quality data that's needed to drive safety management systems. An investment analysis that quantifies the safety benefit of the VIS would justify the budget

request to Congress. That's a lot in that recommendation for thought and discussion. Sherry.

DR. BORENER: Sherry Borener, from I just want to talk about this last thing about the investment analysis. This is a peculiarity of FAA, that they have a very long investment analysis process. You may not have to do that, but because it's an IT investment -- and I don't know the details of this; I can find out -- but because on our part, it would be an IT investment, it might have to go through an IT investment analysis process at DOT. It would come under the CIO. That's a technical issue that you're introducing by having PHMSA be the manager. That's just a topic that I think -- you don't need to necessarily deal with that specifically in the recommendation, but it's something we can find out for you.

MR. PARKER: Thank you, Sherry.

That's important. We were thinking of the IT investments when we added that particular one.

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DR. BORENER: If you have to follow that process, that would be one thing, but maybe you don't have to.

MR. PARKER: Maybe we don't. Okay, great.

Diane Burman, from the CHAIR BURMAN: Public Service Commission of New York. I think part of the investment analysis in quantifying the benefit and justifying the budget request really also comes about from the explanation of that, where we're having to showcase that we prevented incidents. That's a very hard quantifier when you don't have the incident, necessarily, to say look what we've done. Ι think some of this is needing to flesh out the analysis in justification for how beneficial it is and what's the quantification, rather than a strict benefit cost analysis, and others that would be typically done, looking at those things. Sherry.

DR. BORENER: Yes. Further, the department is very much involved with, for

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instance, Waze and Lyft and various other data collection repositories for information sharing, and they're working on that for federal highways, for accident risk, for passenger fatality risk. They have a model for information sharing with industry on very detailed data.

I don't think they went through an investment analysis process to decide yes, it would be a great idea for us to get Waze data. I think we want to see what they're doing, but that's just an action that we can work on offline.

It doesn't have to be -- this isn't really painful. The FAA process was painful, and it was \$1 million. If we could find a way to get you through that without having to go through that process, that would be better.

MR. PARKER: Great. I'm all for that. Alan.

MR. MAYBERRY: Alan Mayberry. I was going to say, I guess rightfully so, IT projects are under a lot of scrutiny these days from the

federal government. I know at least now -- we're 1 2 in a three-year cycle. Currently, we're in the 2020 budget cycle to request funding. 3 4 Where we don't have the report yet, 5 it's a bit of a challenge, but I think we have some options for at least providing -- no 6 guarantees, but at least to cobble together 7 8 something. The FAA alluded to that, really, 9 yesterday, about how you use expiring funds and the like, but I think we may have some 10 11 flexibility to at least get the ball rolling as we go forward, working within our existing 12 13 budget. 14 That's good to know. MR. PARKER: 15 MR. MAYBERRY: Certainly, that's not 16 sustainable, though, but we do need to start 17 somewhere, and that's how I think we'll start. 18 Okay, thank you. MR. PARKER: 19 Murray. 20 DR. MURRAY: Food for thought -- and 21 this is just food for thought. As we're talking 22 about funding, this may be a good time to talk

about a phased approach to the development of this system, which aligns very well -- I know it's very heavily system development focused, initially, to get it off the ground, with some accompanying other people/process components to it, both internally, to the federal government, and externally.

I would just throw out, for food for thought, to consider some sort of a system development lifecycle approach, as we're thinking about it from a funding standpoint, because that will allow some of the up-front analysis to take place, the opportunity to create requirements based on user needs.

Your funding can very nicely parallel that sort of a process approach, so it'll help to lay out the foundation of what you'll need in subsequent years, as you look for that. Also, it allows for natural check gates or exit gates. In order to clear to the next process, you've got to have some deliverables or outcomes achieved and decisions made to move forward, which would tie

nicely with how you're funded, so just for consideration for the Committee.

MR. PARKER: That's very important.

We will have to -- our committee will have to

work closely with the other subcommittees, in

terms of how they see those phases coming in.

MR. CRADIT: Jason Cradit, CRC. In the Technology Subcommittee, we've absolutely talked about a phased approach. We'll allude to that today in the IT architecture discussion this afternoon. It was a topic of discussion I want to make sure we talk about in that July 2nd meeting with the other committees because it's a point of integration.

What we're going to look to focus on is minimum viable product. If you had this information and shared this information and used this type of a structure to process it, you could have this kind of reporting mechanism at the end.

I think it was Mike's recommendation in our subcommittee to talk about that. I appreciate that. We're going to allude to that

1 this afternoon, but I think it's an integration 2 point, to Christie's earlier point. Thank you, Jason. 3 MR. PARKER: That's 4 very good. Mike, did you want to add anything to 5 that? No, I think that's well 6 MR. LAMONT: 7 said. 8 Holly, on the phone? CHAIR BURMAN: 9 Anyone in the audience? We have two. 10 MR. STOODY: I think we can give this 11 some more thought, and also not overthink it. 12 It's certainly the case that the appropriators 13 have not responded favorably to past PHMSA 14 information requests, database requests. I'm not 15 saying that to pre-judge this one, but there are 16 certain chunks of money that are within the 17 comfort levels of the appropriators. 18 Plus, you go in and you make your 19 policy and political case -- I don't mean 20 partisan, but you just go in and you state your 21 case. You go in and state your case. Sometimes,

you want to strike while the iron is hot and you

have the justification for it. You get the money that you need.

If you ramp up, they won't really be able to digest or care, or maybe they'll even be suspicious. It's like you're trying to get the camel's nose under the tent now, and then this thing's going to become larger later down. We can give a lot more thought to this, but I think we should be cognizant not to recommend something, folks that go to the Hill or develop presidential -- the president's budget requests or work this through DOT and those processes, we have to be cognizant of those processes to gauge a recommendation.

Obviously, you all can recommend whatever you want, but there can be -- there's potential for some interplay on the strategy of are we trying to recommend what we think we can get or recommend what we have a plan to try and get or recommend what we think would be ideal? Those are all strategy questions.

MR. PARKER: Thank you, John. Anyone

else?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: I'm the tech writer, so if everyone could just speak a little bit louder because the air conditioner is competing with everyone, just so I can make sure I capture everything. Thank you.

CHAIR BURMAN: Thank you. Anyone else?

MR. TU: Wen Tu, AGIA. Jason, when you were talking about minimum viable products, I do want to make a recommendation for the Committee and the subcommittee to also consider and compare the NBP (phonetic) against the benefits that the operators will see, and all the stakeholders will see, and share that those aren't deferred into Phase 2 or 3.

With those funding concerns and making sure that the benefits are there to the discussion this morning about how to entice operators to participate, making sure that does happen within that.

MR. PARKER: Any other questions on

this particular recommendation before we move on?
Okay, we'll go to No. 3. Barrier No. 3 is about disclosure of information.

The barrier we'd identified is the participation in the VIS is highly unlikely, unless the participants are confident that the information submitted to the VIS will be protected from disclosure, including personal confidential information, confidential proprietary business information, commercially sensitive information, sensitive pipeline security information, information that has not been properly de-identified, information that could be used by PHMSA or other agencies for enforcement action, and information that could be used in litigation. That's the primary fear that would-be participants have.

Our recommendation with respect to
that barrier is that Congress should enact
legislation and direct PHMSA to promulgate
regulations providing that neither PHMSA, nor any
other federal or state agency, nor any person,

shall disclose information that was voluntarily provided to the VIS, expressing the intent of Congress to encourage industry participation in the VIS, in order to further the goal of improving pipeline safety.

PHMSA would be directed to issue regulations for the protection of confidential, proprietary, sensitive commercial and sensitive pipeline information provided to VIS.

regulations governing the use or publication of summary reports or analysis, based on de-identified VIS information. The thought here was to embody in the statute directly the protections that we want to hold out there to encourage participation in the VIS, but also allow PHMSA the flexibility, under its regulatory rulemaking ability, to shape that agenda. Any questions on this one, or comments?

MR. WARNER: Hey, Randy.

MR. PARKER: Dan. Oh, I'm sorry.

MR. WARNER: Randy, Chris Warner, from

If I remember, yesterday FAA had a 1 2 similar promulgation that they used. wondering if this is based on the language from 3 4 that? 5 MR. PARKER: It is. That may be important to 6 MR. WARNER: 7 communicate in the write-up, too, that this is 8 not something that we're coming up with that has 9 an historical basis for being done elsewhere. We plan on putting that 10 MR. PARKER: 11 in the report, Chris, so that we can tie where we 12 relied on past successes by the government and 13 information sharing programs, like the FRA and 14 ASIAS, etc. We'll put that in there as a support, probably in a footnote with an 15 16 attachment, so you can go look at it. MR. WARNER: When I look at this 17 18 initially, it seems like quite a stretch, but 19 knowing the FAA has done something similar makes 20 it more reasonable. 21 MR. PARKER: Right. It's built on

Dan.

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their statute.

MR. COTE: This is Dan Cote. Just to tie this together, from a governance perspective, we operationalized that with some strict language, as well, around the notion that this would be solely -- this confidential data would be solely in the hands of a third party, whose first obligation will be to strip out any specific location or operator identifier.

No one, in terms of the VIS governance

-- not the board, not the executive director -no one involved with VIS management would have
access to that data. Again, we tried to create
some pretty clear guidelines around
operationalizing this.

MR. PARKER: Correct, thank you.
Mark.

MR. HERETH: Mark Hereth, with the Blacksmith Group. I think one thing that we heard yesterday in a presentation from Vivec -- it may have been in the other presentation, as well -- was that the concept of actually not de-identifying until you've actually done the

analysis. That's one that we need to consider further. I just point that out because it's a subtlety. I think it's a learning we had yesterday. I'm not saying that we would -- we still have to decide that, as a group, if that's a direction we want to go in, but I thought it was a really interesting point, and it seems to be one that was well thought out.

MR. PARKER: To that point, in fact, the way we envision it operationally is that the third party would obviously know who reported and have latitude to go back and forth to make sure all the information is captured and questions and sufficient detail are achieved to provide a learning from it, to the extent that's available.

All of that would be in the hands of that third party, but for the third party, it would not be anonymous data. They would know who reported and what the incident was and be able to go -- we envisioned a back and forth to make sure that all the information that was required was adequately captured.

MR. HERETH: 1 Thank you. 2 MR. PARKER: Any other questions or comments on this prohibition against disclosure? 3 4 CHAIR BURMAN: At the table? I just want to make 5 MR. MAYBERRY: sure we're clear that we're not developing an 6 7 alternative regulatory approach. We're developing an information sharing system. 8 9 (Simultaneous Speaking.) 10 MR. PARKER: Alan, your comments are 11 in the transcript, but I agree with them. 12 CHAIR BURMAN: Anyone in the audience? 13 MR. STOODY: I'd just make the 14 comment, it's inherent for those that understand the regulatory process, but maybe through the 15 16 language, when the report's written, that 17 promulgating regulations will allow for public 18 notice and comment, and the public will have the 19 ability to provide comments and participate in 20 the rulemaking process under the regulations we 21 develop. So I think it's a good add to emphasize

the notice and comment that will be afforded the

public as the Agency considers these.

CHAIR BURMAN: That's helpful to be in the report, itself.

MR. PARKER: Yes, we will definitely put that in the report, the comments that John just made and Alan's comments, as well, because we see this and the other recommendations as focused on having Congress pass laws clearly showing Congress's intent to set this up and what the rules are and giving PHMSA the normal powers under its authority to promulgate regulations. Nothing would change in that respect.

MR. MAYBERRY: This is Alan, again.

Just so I'm clear, this really, it's a new
approach to say we have what we have, we use what
we have, but something else has got to give. We
still have accidents. We still need to know
more. We need to have a mechanism to share
better. It's all about that. It is a new
approach, but it's an approach that it's focused
on sharing information. I know I've said that
enough.

MR. PARKER: 1 Thank you. 2 CHAIR BURMAN: Anyone at the table? In the audience? 3 On the phone? MR. PARKER: Let's move to Barrier No. 4 5 Barrier No. 4 relates to the lack of participation in the VIS due to fear of potential 6 7 FOIA release and potential negative consequences from such a release. 8 This is aimed at giving 9 PHMSA the protection they need to exclude from FOIA release information that was submitted to 10 11 the VIS. The recommendation says specifically 12 Congress should enact legislation and direct 13 PHMSA to promulgate regulations providing that 14 PHMSA shall not release, under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, any information 15 16 that was voluntarily disclosed to the VIS. 17 particular recommendation is based on the statute 18 that FAA obtained for its voluntary information

MS. BATTAMS: This is Ahuva Battams, from PHMSA. I just am trying to figure out what's the difference between this recommendation

sharing system.

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and the last recommendation?

MR. PARKER: The last recommendation relates to disclosure, by PHMSA or anyone else, through any means, of information that was submitted to the VIS. This relates to outside parties coming to PHMSA and saying we know you have this VIS over there. We want to see that data.

MS. BATTAMS: Right. I'm still not understanding what the difference is. Because under FOIA, PHMSA would be the one releasing the information. So if the last recommendation is to prevent PHMSA from releasing the information, it seems like a duplicate. Maybe I'm just a bit slow, but the -- when I was reading the last recommendation, I thought that the purpose of that language would be to make this an exemption-free statute, which would exempt the release of information under FOIA.

So I'm wondering if this is -- I'm not saying that's not an important thing to recommend. What I'm trying to figure out is are

they sort of the same thing? Recommendation 4 saying please put language in so that this information is protected from FOIA, to me, is related to Recommendation 3, which is PHMSA should not release any information. Are you thinking that PHMSA should not release the information is a broader subset than just a specific FOIA request?

MR. PARKER: Yes. I think Recommendation 3 goes to any release of any information that was put into the VIS, by PHMSA or anyone else, through any instrumentality of release, however they might release it, through an investigation or through a press release or through an enforcement action or investigations or just accidentally or intentionally distributing information. But we thought we also needed a specific FOIA exemption, so that if PHMSA gets a demand letter to release information, they could quickly just refer to the statute. No, this is excluded from FOIA. protects -- it makes the job easier for PHMSA to

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fend off FOIA requests for VIS information.

MS. BATTAMS: It completely makes sense to me. I, personally, would consider maybe combining them, but obviously -- both points are important. I'm not trying to eliminate --

MR. PARKER: I think you could combine them.

MS. BATTAMS: Obviously up to you guys. That was what my question was.

important is making sure that the intent is clear in the statute and that whether it's FOIA or any other mechanisms for the release of information or the sharing or the confidentiality to be taken and lifted off is not to be done, so that it's not limited to FOIA, and it's not solely as a way of saying information in your hands is not to be released. It's the data and the ability to share, that's the processes that will be set up for the anonymity, but we need to make sure what's being done with that data is very important in how, then, it is utilized. It's not

just don't release this information; it has to go deeper, which we get into in other provisions, as well.

We'll have to flesh that out, but the statute, itself, has to be very clear, but also not being perceived as limited to. Also, internally, what they do with that information is key. I do see a hand that might help us, if you want to defer to the audience member.

MR. STOODY: A FOIA provision, itself, would be insufficient. Thus, the two recommendations, which could be combined, but they deal with different processes and different actors. FOIA applies only to PHMSA, but we have other actors within this program who would not be PHMSA, who would not be found by FOIA.

FOIA also is a specific process that's commonly used, but there are other processes that could occur. PHMSA could release this information because they felt like it, outside of a FOIA request. Again, whether it's one recommendation or two, FOIA is an important part,

but it's only one part, and there's a broader set of needs to address.

CHAIR BURMAN: I think that was the point that I was trying to make, too. It's important, but it's not limited to, and that we're explaining the intent. The intent needs to be in the statute about the importance of that confidentiality and what that data can be used for, similar to, in my mind, what gets inputted into a DMV system or something else.

There's certain strict requirements about who gets to use it and how you get to use that information and how it gets shared externally. Violation of that is very important, what that means. Those are the types of things that have to be in there so that people feel comfortable about the safety of that data being shared, and then what's used for it and how it's used and what the players are that can access that.

MR. PARKER: Those are great contributions, Madam Chair and John Stoody. We

will definitely work on making sure that the intent is clear.

CHAIR BURMAN: Dr. Murray.

DR. MURRAY: I have to be careful with how I craft my question. In the recommendations and the barriers that have been identified, has there been consideration -- and it probably has -- for the various ways of how the VIS is stood up that -- the different ways that you can require certain actions to take place in this process, in addition to PHMSA promulgating regulations, such as other legislative means, self-executing -- just coming up with different examples -- just going back to Kate's point regarding timeliness and being strategic, I think John talked about being strategic in some of the recommendations, how that may all play out? That's probably very unclear.

MR. PARKER: I'm not sure exactly what the question is. We did consider a lot of those things. I think you also have to think about whatever structure the Committee decides to use

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with the data management piece and the executive director and the board, however it's structured, you may have strong contractual provisions in there that accomplish certain things that you don't necessarily need legislation or regulations for, but they're also governed in the broad umbrella of these statutes and regulations. So even if you had an MOU that a lot of people signed, they would still be subject to the statutory prohibition about disclosing anything they learn. Sherry.

DR. BORENER: This is just sort of minor. Sometimes, though, you might want to tell people we know you're doing really well. If we write this the wrong way, it would be we know we're doing really well, but we can't tell you how we know. You have to be able to tell them how your evidence supports the answers that you've gotten to.

You want to be able to communicate to the public what you learned, without being restricted by this non-disclosure framework.

It's more of a comment -- for instance, in this one, you could word it that PHMSA cannot be required, under FOIA, to release, as opposed to enacting and saying that they would never release under -- so they can't be required to and, similarly, that they have the authority to restrict access to any information that's released under -- or provided under VIS, as opposed to no one can ever share. If you have that very exclusive language, my concern is then you can't show why it's working for you. public, at the end of the day, when you want to communicate to the public that we're doing better, we've got better trending, etc., you have to be able to use that information in some way. Your governance structure would set up the means and method by which that data -- that information would be shared, not the data.

MR. PARKER: Absolutely. In

Recommendation 3, we talk about -- the last

sentence there, PHMSA would be directed to issue

regulations governing the use or publication of

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summary reports or analysis, based on de-identified VIS information. I'm assuming that PHMSA would craft regulations, in conjunction with the Governance Committees and boards, regulations to --

(Simultaneous Speaking)

DR. BORENER: Right, whatever your governance structure is. If it's an executive board that's composed of industry and PHMSA, they would then decide under what circumstances they would release conclusions. But if you wanted to benchmark yourself against others, if you wanted to if you wanted to use the data for benchmarking, there's a lot of places where you might -- you just have to think about how to say that, so that you still have the ability to use what you found. I think that's what I'm saying.

MR. PARKER: That's a good point.
We'll have to scrub the language very carefully
and not cut off those abilities to use the data
in different ways.

CHAIR BURMAN: The one thing that I

just -- I don't want to take us backwards, but I do want to raise -- thinking through this a little bit with a lot of the recommendations that are recommending that PHMSA does regulations, while we've been focused, from a report perspective, of not getting too far in the weeds, in terms of writing a program and specific drill-downs, I want to make sure that we convey that the legislation and the authority is robust enough to not just say here, PHMSA, go do it, and doesn't give the tools -- enough tools in the statute.

My fear is that regulations can then not get done or take a different pathway that may trip us up. To the extent that some of these recommendations doesn't necessarily need to say and PHMSA should do regulations, but rather, at the end, we have a catchall that to the extent that the regulations -- we have to identify what we really are saying that we want, and then making sure that it's in the statute, per se, and that regulations flow in conjunction with that,

as necessary, and that the statutory language would help flesh out that. I just worry that someone reading this would say okay, good, we'll just do a three-sentence statute and be done with it.

MR. PARKER: Right. There's a real tension in there about whether or not to -- in each legislative piece to say PHMSA has the right to promulgate regulations or just having one recommendation that in all these statutory areas -- we had it the other way, and we changed it back to this because we didn't know how the Committee would reject or keep some of those. That's what we have to always keep in mind.

CHAIR BURMAN: Right. So when we go through this, when we see the full report in the draft, some of what we'll have to also do is look at what needs to be taken and maybe said in a way that leaves some wiggle room for what's in the statute and where PHMSA does the regulations. I want to just point that out. That's something that we'll need to consider.

MR. PARKER: We'll definitely keep that in mind. Anybody have any other questions on FOIA before we go on? Let's go on to Barrier No. 5. This relates to enforcement action. The barrier we've identified is that parties will not voluntarily share information due to the fear of potential PHMSA or other agency enforcement action or other potential punitive actions.

with, after much discussion, is that Congress should enact legislation and direct PHMSA to promulgate regulations providing that neither PHMSA, nor any other federal, state, local, or tribal agency, shall take enforcement action, or other punitive action, against the pipeline operator on the basis of information voluntarily provided to the VIS.

Notwithstanding this prohibition,

PHMSA would be permitted to use information VIS

if that information is essential to the ability

of PHMSA to address an imminent threat to public

safety. Questions?

CHAIR BURMAN: Anyone at the table?

MR. PARKER: Do you have questions or

comments on this particular one?

CHAIR BURMAN: Mark.

MR. HERETH: Actually, it's a

MR. HERETH: Actually, it's a question, which is can you give us a little bit of color on that, on the reasoning behind that last one. I think I understand, but I suspect you had some good discussion around that.

MR. PARKER: We looked at statutes in the aviation arena and the railroad arena. There were various exemptions made. We thought if we're going to give PHMSA an exemption from this prohibition, what should it relate to? You really can't remove PHMSA's obligation and its mandate to protect public safety.

So if they felt like there was a gas storage field or a pipeline underneath a lake, or something like that, that was an imminent threat to public safety, and they learned about that information through a VIS report, they would have the ability to act. They would need to act

because they would know about the imminent safety threat. Alan may have some thoughts on that.

MR. MAYBERRY: I'm sorry; say that again.

MR. PARKER: It's about if PHMSA looked at a de-identified report coming out of the VIS that said we have some pipelines that are cracking underneath the Great Lakes. PHMSA felt like it was an imminent threat to public safety. This should be addressed immediately. You should be able to use that information coming out of the VIS to take action.

MR. MAYBERRY: That would fall under the realm we currently use for issuing an advisory bulletin, if that's the case. So yes, we would still do that, although we'd have to look at how we would -- it has to be worked out. Normally, we -- it might be a descriptor of the operator. It's probably not hard to guess who it is currently, but we'd just have to address that if we did leverage the VIS information. I don't know why that couldn't work, as well.

1 MR. PARKER: Thank you.

CHAIR BURMAN: Dan.

MR. PARKER: Dan.

MR. COTE: Dan Cote, just a comment on that. I certainly do not object to the language and agree with what both you and Alan said, but just a comment. If this process works as designed and envisioned in governance, then they really shouldn't be able to tell.

PHMSA would need to have other information or data from other points that identified it because intrinsic in our vision is to strip out anything that makes that in any way visible. So if we do it correctly -- again, this would require a mix of data, not just that single data point.

Just wanted to make that point clear because that's part of the compact we're trying to establish with the industry, that the information really will be absolutely scrubbed and anonymous. If we don't do that, then we're sort of violating that trust.

MR. MAYBERRY: This is Alan, again.

Even now, to the extent -- what's important is we issue an advisory bulletin, it's important to get the information out. The operator name is less important. We typically -- I think I've seen that work both ways, where we have or we haven't, but what's important is to get the word out.

CHAIR BURMAN: It's important, I think, to take a moment and look at what we're saying. Notwithstanding this prohibition, PHMSA would be permitted to use information submitted to the VIS if that information is essential to the ability of PHMSA to address an imminent threat to public safety.

I'm not sure that's exactly what we want to say or mean. I think that what we've been focused on is that the system, itself, and the data being put in, is done in a way that is protective and gets to the anonymity.

Then we're accessing the information in a way, on the aggregate, that isn't putting one particular company or one particular employee

at risk. Then it's not about permitting to use that information submitted to the VIS for enforcement. It's a separate situation.

It's similar to -- and I think we had someone speak from the FAA that talked about when they present their testimony, whatever gets said in their testimony isn't necessarily -- can't be used for enforcement. They can't share information. I can't remember exactly. It would be in the transcript. To the extent that you have to get the information from other means, the enforcement mechanisms -- it's not weakening the state's or the federal's enforcement mechanisms outside of the system. If you find information outside of that system, it can be used, just like it would be used in any other way.

It's that you can't try to retrieve the information submitted to use for your enforcement. I think that's critical. Because otherwise, what you'll really have is -- taking it to its extreme, you'll have people saying since what you're sharing with us is aggregate

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data that shows that there's an imminent threat to public safety, or potential imminent threat to public safety, we don't care about any of the other stuff because the congressional intent says this.

so we want to retrieve and dig down and go as far as we can to retrieve that information and find out who gave that information to you. That's why I think it's important that we look at that we are recognizing that enforcement will continue, but this is not the enforcement tool or mechanism, so this information is not to be utilized in that, to the extent that there is other information elsewhere that can still be utilized, even if it came in through this mechanism. Does that make sense?

MR. PARKER: Madam Chair, I agree with that analysis completely. As a matter of fact, I think that you could strike the notwithstanding sentence feature from this because for all the reasons you just said, it's inconsistent with our vision of how this works.

Secondly, we're just stating the obvious. PHMSA always has the ability to address any imminent threat to public safety that it encounters, without other mechanisms, other than its inherent power. So I think we should strike that sentence as unnecessary. Alan, do you have any thoughts on that?

MR. MAYBERRY: I was just thinking I agree because part of the success of this depends on it being de-identified, so we won't see that. We're dealing with public data, then, really, so that would be an additional data source that we would use, but again, it's de-identified. It's the data that's posted. I think if there's any thought that we would have a glimpse of what said that, that would really undermine what we're after.

MR. PARKER: I think that's right. I think that's what the Chair was trying to describe.

CHAIR BURMAN: The key is making sure that this information is allowed to be utilized

in an anonymous fashion. It then gets back to what we talked about at another time about how, then, we share with the public the public information that we have. That's separate.

We're really trying to make sure that people understand that this isn't a way of getting around enforcement but, yet, it's also not to be utilized as a tool to get people, as a trip up.

MR. PARKER: Correct.

CHAIR BURMAN: Dan.

MR. COTE: This is Dan Cote. I fully support removing that sentence. To echo, in a different voice, everything the Chair said, the optics of this, for operators who are not privy to this discussion, looks very contradictory.

That's just going to create a level of confusion with all the assurance that the data's been fully scrubbed and is entirely anonymous. I just think this creates a level of doubt that will not suit us well.

CHAIR BURMAN: But I also will say, going back to the FAA, they talked specifically

1	about this. I'm sure that there is language that
2	they have, either in their processes or in the
3	specific regulations, that address this,
4	specifically, which is really the intent that we
5	have, too.
6	MR. COTE: To the extent it's already
7	a clear PHMSA mandate and clearly within their
8	purview, do we need it?
9	MR. PARKER: We don't need it, no.
10	MR. COTE: Or does it simply create
11	confusion? That's why I like that idea.
12	MR. PARKER: Any other comments on
13	this particular recommendation?
14	CHAIR BURMAN: Anyone on the phone, in
15	the audience?
16	MS. PEAREN: This is Holly Pearen.
17	CHAIR BURMAN: Holly, I think you need
18	to speak a little further away from your phone
19	because it's muffling or something.
20	MS. PEAREN: Is this better?
21	CHAIR BURMAN: Yes.
22	MS. PEAREN: Great. I think Dr.

Burman's comments really reflect the intent of the subcommittee, so your comments are really appreciated. Striking that sentence makes sense since the conversation also indicates that the report needs to clarify more about the extent to which enforcement would continue if it was based on information obtained through other sources, just to make expectations very clear to sufficiently convey that piece.

CHAIR BURMAN: My thought is -- this is Commissioner Burman. My thought is that the question will come is this a way of getting around enforcement? The report should really reflect why this is not seen as a way of getting around enforcement.

We're really being offensive in explaining what the intent is and how it's separate from enforcement, and it's a tool, but it's not seen as a get around. I think if we do that in a way we address the naysayers who are seeing it as a relaxed enforcement and as a tool to just avoid getting in trouble. I think that

1 will be helpful.

MR. PARKER: I think that will be very helpful. Holly Pearen is a good drafter, so we will ask Holly -- she's in our subcommittee.

We'll ask her to help us with that. Is that agreeable, Holly?

MS. PEAREN: Absolutely.

MS. BATTAMS: This is Ahuva Battams.

I also just want to remind everybody, as you're crafting this for the report, our statute doesn't give us authority over other federal, state, local, or tribal agencies.

If the Committee wants to recommend something about PHMSA entering into agreements or having links to the state partners, things like that, they might want to consider addressing something like this there. Because just by law, the pipeline safety statutes aren't going to bind other federal agencies. Just a legal issue to consider.

MR. PARKER: Ahuva, that's a good point. I think there's some precedent for the

1	fact that other state and federal agencies can be
2	bound by the Congress through the commerce
3	clause, with the intent of regulating pipeline
4	safety, but there's some ambiguity there, so we
5	might want to think about how we address it here.
6	MS. BATTAMS: Yes, you want to make
7	sure that you're clearly articulating, so that
8	you don't end up in a situation where you're
9	thinking you're recommending language that then
10	ends up not being available to you.
11	MR. PARKER: Capable of being enforced
12	or whatever.
13	MS. BATTAMS: Exactly.
14	MR. PARKER: I think what we'll do is
15	our subcommittee will invite you into that
16	discussion.
17	MS. BATTAMS: I'm happy to help.
18	MR. PARKER: Okay, great, thank you.
19	CHAIR BURMAN: I think we have a
20	comment from the audience.
21	MR. STOODY: I think we definitely
22	need to describe the intent in the report, but

we'll also need the clear rules of what are the powers of the federal government, under federal statute? Where are they limited by this program? We have every expectation that there could be scenarios where PHMSA could, and should, act through enforcement based on information gathered in this. The FAA provision provides for that. We'll definitely work with folks in that process to get what everyone agrees is a reasonable provision. We wouldn't be able to get anything through Congress that didn't have that reasonable balance of wanting to encourage information sharing, but then not allowing abuse of the system.

Whatever you decide on how to report

-- do the recommendations and how to write that

up, we're definitely committed to finding that

balance in the statutory language that authorizes

this program and would provide for enforcement

discretion, but then also clearly articulate to

operators what is across line, what is within the

line, so everyone has a clear understanding of

what are the limits and the powers of this program.

Thank you for that, John MR. PARKER: John is an excellent drafter of Stoody. legislation. I think we might ask him to meet with the subcommittee, as well, when we get to that point of the report where we're really trying to articulate carefully that balance. Any other questions? Let's move on to Barrier 6. One of the barriers we identified as a subcommittee was the fear of litigation, based on the basis of information that's submitted to the Our recommendation is that Congress enact VIS. legislation protecting any information voluntarily submitted to the VIS from disclosure in discovery, or admissibility into evidence in any federal or state litigation.

This particular proposal is supported by case law. The federal Highway Transportation and Safety Administration went all the way to the Supreme Court protecting a similar statutory provision, and it was deemed totally within

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Congress's power to limit the use of information in a voluntary system if that voluntary system had been determined to be helpful to highway safety.

Same thing in the pipeline industry.

If Congress decides that this prohibition is proper to encourage participation in the VIS, then I think it would withstand any kind of judicial challenge. Any questions, comments, criticisms? Let's go to No. 7. We thought that one of the good sources of information for the VIS would be the results of self-audits. Dan mentioned this quite a bit, and I agree with everything he said about that, but operators are afraid that PHMSA will take enforcement action on self-audit information voluntarily disclosed to the VIS. So how do we get around that barrier?

We ask Congress, again, to give us a statute that directs PHMSA to promulgate regulations that in order to encourage improvements in safety, anybody who voluntarily self-audits and submits the information produced

to the VIS will receive immunity from enforcement action and penalties by any federal or state agency for violations discovered in the self-audit and disclosed to PHMSA in a confidential report and corrected within a reasonable amount of time.

This immunity would not apply,
however, if the violation was intentionally
committed. The voluntary self-audit information
would also be privileged and be protected from
release under FOIA and from discovery and
admission into evidence in any federal or state
litigation.

The recommendation also encourages operators to produce and share this information, furthering the goal of improvements to pipeline safety. Again, we're trying to tie Congress's clear intent to encourage participation by saying that if you self-audit yourself and you make a good faith attempt to correct it and you notify PHMSA of what you're doing, you're not going to be prosecuted for it, or there's not going to be

1	an enforcement action.
2	CHAIR BURMAN: Michelle.
3	MS. THEBERT: I think that's what Alan
4	just said you're not going to do. It seems like
5	you're doing an alternative regulation. Alan
6	said. I don't know.
7	MR. PARKER: Right, that there's a
8	tension there.
9	MS. THEBERT: Is that right, Alan?
10	MR. MAYBERRY: I'm sorry; what did you
11	say, Michelle?
12	MS. THEBERT: This sounds like it's a
13	different way of regulating (coughing) 100
14	percent immunity right here. I know Georgia
15	would not
16	(Simultaneous speaking.)
17	MR. MAYBERRY: Right.
18	MS. THEBERT: I'm thinking like a
19	regulator because I am. I'm not trying to
20	dismiss your recommendation.
21	MR. PARKER: Dan.
22	MR. COTE: Just a global comment.

Michelle, I do agree that this does create a certain tension between a proactive view of pipeline safety and adherence to regulations.

SMS, for example -- and I've talked a lot about it -- which is, again, a PHMSA recommended practice, as everyone knows, and some people perceive to be the future of our industry, in terms of a more proactive, preventive approach to risk. One of the key tenets of SMS is ongoing self-audits to identify weaknesses and holes and potential regulatory, as well as pipeline safety, problems.

All of that, in my mind, is just great for the industry to do, as opposed to the traditional model. If the traditional model of simple regulation and enforcement worked perfectly, we wouldn't be in the room, and we wouldn't need this.

This is a step beyond compliance, and there is going to be a bit of tension. At the same time, encouraging the industry to do self-audits, and then act on what those

self-audits describe, is intrinsically getting better. That's one of those philosophical, 40,000-foot strategy questions that either you do or you don't do. We either encourage it and believe in it as the future of our industry, or it's not, and it sort of begs the issue why are we all here?

MS. THEBERT: But if you're an operator and you haven't had records for the past five years and you report to the VIS I don't have records, I'm good, but that means a performance-based regulation. You have records this year, but you didn't the past three years. You're still going to get a violation for those three years you didn't have.

I don't know how -- if you're self-auditing and you say we don't have all these records, in my opinion, you could still get some type of enforcement, whether you found it okay is not going to be a penalty, and you came forward, but just saying I don't have it because I didn't save it, now I'm going to get a pass because I'm

going to submit this to VIS, I think that's really -- I don't know. That doesn't make sense to me why this Committee would be able to take all that away if that's what -- if the Congress does this. I'm just confused on, I guess, what you're looking for --

(Simultaneous Speaking)

MR. COTE: I think what this -- I'm not sure this says what you just described because that requirement -- let's say it's leakage survey and you do not have -- you can't demonstrate that you did leakage surveys for five years.

That doesn't get you a hall pass, per se, on not having those records, even if you report it to VIS, because that is a clear pipeline safety risk. It implies that you didn't do the leakage surveys. That isn't the intent. But identifying voids in records for companies and reporting that to VIS will challenge other people to do audits, it seems to me.

So what this says is that PHMSA will

not use -- let's say 5 percent of companies or 10 percent of companies report to VIS that they don't have all the records they required for the last five years for leakage surveys. PHMSA doesn't use that to go hunt down those companies and find the data.

MS. THEBERT: Because then you didn't do it. If you don't have the records, you didn't do it. Now you're saying I don't have the records; I know I don't have them. I'm going to get --

MR. COTE: I think the distinction that you did not recognize in your statement, Michelle, if I may, is the use of it. If PHMSA's out doing audits every day and they find from 2013 to 2018, you don't have leak data on mandated surveys, then your having reported it three months ago to VIS does not get you a hall pass on it.

Maybe, as an operator, you say we identified it. You're right. We did an audit three months ago; we found it. We're working on

fixing it. But if you don't have data that you're required to have under 192, that doesn't get you a hall pass. I think that's the distinction.

MS. THEBERT: But they're under audit already, and that's discovered by the inspectors, and they're just like -- I just feel a conflict.

We're in the process of doing a VIS report, so you can't get on us this. I feel there's an incident related to a leak survey that wasn't done, I think there's a huge liability for states and for PHMSA. All they did was report to this group. We didn't do any enforcement on it.

That's one of the things I see with that.

MR. COTE: Again, you and I read it differently. Let's refer back to -- Randy, was my description of that correct, in terms of using the VIS data as the key?

MR. PARKER: Right, that was the key is that if we want to funnel this information into the VIS, so that it helps improve pipeline safety for the whole community, a self-audit

that's submitted that way should not be subject 1 2 to enforcement action, unless it was intentional. There's a carve-out there. If you intentionally 3 4 did that --MS. THEBERT: But how is that 5 determined? 6 It would be determined in 7 MR. PARKER: 8 an enforcement action as we think this was 9 intentional. CHAIR BURMAN: We'll come back. 10 11 think people may information or thoughts to add to this. Alan, then Mark, then me, and then 12 13 we'll open it back up and Michelle and you may 14 have thoughts on it. Alan. I'm just struggling 15 MR. MAYBERRY: 16 with this a bit because it just -- aren't we here 17 about sharing -- let me think of an example for 18 distribution related to assessment information, 19 something related to taking corrosion readings 20 and correcting shorts or correcting -- shorted 21 casings. That could apply to both.

Let's say deficient corrosion

readings, lessons learned related to that,
because that can be a challenge, or the ability
to detect hook cracks, an improved way to do that
for the transmission guys.

I feel like if we're going to have a conversation about this, we have a conversation about this in that realm, but it's a different realm than sharing information, not that it couldn't be expanded to this, but I guess my thinking going into this is it's not so much about which -- SMS is a lot about self-audits and correcting deficiencies, and that's a good thing. In that realm, we are training our staff to see that, as operators implement SMS, that if you find bad stuff, that's a good thing. I see this as a bit different, though.

MR. COTE: Dan Cote, if I can respond.

Let's use your corrosion one. In my mind, it's a

very good one. Let's say I'm an operator. For

whatever reason -- every year, as we do readings,

as you know, on mains, we find deficiencies.

Typically, you have until the next

regularly scheduled inspection to remediate those. Let's say 5 percent of mine, whatever reason, bad weather, could be 100 things, we didn't get to.

We found that by missing our annual deadline by 18 months, we were seeing some corrosion on the facility, which became a bright line to the rest of the industry, saying you know what, instead of using that -- because a lot of operators -- I happen to know that for a fact, sad to say -- use that entire 12-month period, and sometimes up to 15, if it's the next -- and you know the language of code.

Compliant, but is that necessarily safe? Saying to the industry you know what, waiting that long isn't smart. The reality is if you're focused on pipeline safety, corrosion starts taking place after six months, you really want to jump on this stuff. That is valuable to the industry, in my mind. To Randy's expression, you have made a contribution to the knowledge of the community. PHMSA wouldn't use that, saying

we have some operators out there that reported to 1 2 VIS, that said that they weren't getting their inspections done. 3 4 Inspectors, go find them. That would be a bit of a breach. I do agree with your 5 6 initial hypothesis, though. This area, we need to spend more time on outlining what that really 7 8 means, in terms of content, in a way that there's 9 more global consensus on it. 10 MR. MAYBERRY: My concern is with 11 diluting the value of what we're trying to 12 accomplish. If we crack the door open on that in this realm, it becomes a system for -- to hide --13 14 I'm saying it very negatively -- to hide behind. 15 MR. COTE: I don't think any of us, 16 just to reassure you --17 MR. MAYBERRY: That's not the intent. 18 MR. COTE: -- we are not trying to 19 find -- we are not trying to create a haven for 20 bad actors. 21 MR. MAYBERRY: Most operators aren't. 22 MR. COTE: In all of our discussions,

that has been absolutely clear. The question is how do we craft that in a way that sort of balances the frame? Agreed.

MR. HERETH: I'm Mark Hereth, with the Blacksmith Group. Help me understand how this would fit within the scope of our mission.

CHAIR BURMAN: Before you answer that, can I just offer my thoughts on this? I think what I'm hearing is that there's a need to make sure that with this program, there is sufficient data that is being gathered that can be given for that review, and the focus is on allowing a -- whether we call it data sharing, voluntary self-audits -- that are utilized, really, solely for the purpose of helping with the VIS, so to the extent that you do whatever your processes are, not as okay, great, I'm going to do self-audits to get around it, and then if I'm find something, I'm going to share it with VIS.

The voluntary self-audit is being done, potentially with certain people that are in that same realm of confidentiality and other

things, but it's a system process that is being utilized for the purpose of that data gathering. That information that is being utilized in that self-audit, really solely for the voluntary information sharing, isn't utilized as a gotcha, so that the people in the room who come together to share aren't now saying since I gave it, and since I know the specific information, I have to give it over for enforcement mechanisms or others.

They're trying to establish the mechanism to be able to say I did the self-audit for the purposes of VIS and now don't have a gotcha on me. Is that kind of --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

CHAIR BURMAN: Rather than we're going to do a self-audit, and if we turn over any of our information to VIS, you can't go after us.

That's the distinction I see is needing to get back to the purposes of collecting. Whatever that data collection is, you don't want to chill people's ability to give that information. I'm

sorry.

MR. HERETH: That captures a part of the concern that I had. I just don't think that we want to -- I don't think -- I hope that your intention is not to extend the scope of what we're doing within VIS to cover audits of SMS systems. That's the way I read it.

MR. MAYBERRY: That's what I'm trying to articulate, too. I think it's a relevant discussion in a separate area --

(Simultaneous Speaking)

MR. HERETH: You could even extend it to a discussion about credits. There's other areas where you could go with that.

CHAIR BURMAN: In a sense, you want to give the tools for the ability for people to have specific information or to collect specific information and to share, so that you're encouraging that be aware and share, whatever that mechanism is, and that will be the tools of the program that get worked out and fleshed out, in terms of what that is.

Again, going back to the FAA model, that's some of the things that they had to work out in how do we gather it, what are the right people to be a part of it, how do we our self-assessments and our self-audits outside of the enforcement, and yet, not being, now, in the since I have the information, I have to turn it over to the enforcement folks, because otherwise, I'm in trouble, which gets to, I think, Michelle's concern about if you have that information, you're supposed to do something with it outside of VIS.

MR. PARKER: It definitely merits further investigation and discussion. Mark, did you have a comment? Kate?

MS. BLYSTONE: Kate Blystone, Pipeline Safety Trust. I think this goes back to Dr.

Murray's comment about phasing. I wonder if this language could be softened to say that this is a consideration, instead of saying Congress should enact. I don't know. It just feels like it should be softened because I don't think this is

necessary for the functioning of a voluntary information sharing system, just personally.

I feel like this is a bit additive.

That said, we could walk out with Phase 1 and have this included. I just want more discussion on that, and perhaps it's part of the phasing process that this becomes something that we add if we can't get participation.

MR. PARKER: That's very possible.

Another option would be, maybe, that the VIS, as it matures, may want to say we want all the operators to self-audit this area. Go out there and do a self-audit on this particular scope of thing and bring us that information. Then there could be some protection for that, where it's generated by the system, itself, not presumed up front as a separate thing.

CHAIR BURMAN: Alan.

MR. MAYBERRY: This is Alan, again.

Just want to make sure -- I think I understand

the concern. I've seen it work both ways, where
an operator may come forward with a

self-disclosure in our region or we worked with 1 2 them closely and there wasn't any punitive action. 3 But then I've also seen it the other 4 5 way, where they kind of wish they had not brought 6 it up, too. So I can see the desire to have a 7 mechanism that really is fully within the tenets 8 of SMS to have that. 9 MR. PARKER: SMS is what we're talking about here, so it's worth further discussion, but 10 11 we don't want to inadvertently blur the lines on 12 what the VIS is all about. Mark. 13 MR. HERETH: Mark Hereth, with 14 Blacksmith Group. I guess the only point of 15 clarification I would see relates to the Chair's 16 comment, which is does this relate to VIS, or 17 does it relate more broadly to the use of 18 self-audits in a broader SMS program? 19 MR. PARKER: Our conception was that 20 it was related only to VIS use. 21 MR. HERETH: Okay, thank you. Our subcommittee looks at 22 MR. PARKER:

VIS as an element of SMS, really. 1 2 CHAIR BURMAN: Mike. Randy, did you look at 3 MR. LAMONT: the State of Texas's Audit Privilege program? 4 5 They require that you make notification of self-audit prior to initiating the audit because 6 7 you don't get immunity for penalty just going we 8 did a self-audit, here's what we found. You have 9 to make notification prior to the audit, say this is what we're auditing, those specific things, 10 11 and then you disclose what you found. 12 MR. PARKER: This is based on the 13 Texas statute. 14 MR. LAMONT: Just to point out -- I 15 think Mark has a very good point. As it relates 16 to VIS -- if we're starting to include a 17 third-party integrity management program review, 18 that's required under code. We're not doing 19 these add-ons for other pipeline safety programs. 20 This is specific for VIS, correct? 21 MR. PARKER: Correct. To the extent that I 22 CHAIR BURMAN:

think this is really very important, though, and so that we're extracting from here the necessary information to be useful in the program and that we're trying to open up what that means, so that people are willing to share, and to the extent that incorporating SMS as part of it, I think, is really key.

I think we need to keep in mind the high-level intent and what some of the tools are that we're going to need to, again, have drilled down, whether it's in the statute or in the program, itself, and allowing the flexibility for inclusion into the VIS system voluntary self-audits as it relates with SMS, I think, is really key.

Some of those things, in terms of what would fall in it, how is it determined will be helpful. The other thing I think that we need to also keep in mind is this report is a report to the secretary. When we do the full report, and when we look at this, we also have to keep in mind that while there are certain things that we

identify that are going to be needed for legislation and/or regulation, the misstep that I don't want to have is that we aren't giving her a report that, then, she can determine from this she wants to ask Congress for. Because here, all that we've done is made recommendations, but we're making recommendations to her for, then, the next step. I think we need to focus on that.

MR. PARKER: That's exactly how we see it in our subcommittee. This definitely needs additional work, which we will do. Michelle.

MS. THEBERT: I'm not trying to belabor the whole distribution versus transmission, but I know at least in Georgia, we have some operators with less than 100 services. We have maybe seven who can actually afford to do a self-audit.

That's where I'm concerned about any kind of discrimination later on. If you can self-audit and report yourself, you're okay. If you're not able to because of financial restrictions -- because they can do auditing for

real, they would never have the resources to do a self-audit. They wouldn't even qualify for this kind of stuff. I don't know if that's -- if we should limit the number of customers on the distribution side, or if they're all in -- because the ones I know of, most of them are -- we have maybe 10 or 12 who are big enough to do any of this kind of stuff.

I don't know if that's -- I know we're past that already in this discussion. I'm just throwing it out because that would be a concern, at least with states who have smaller municipals, for whatever it's worth.

MR. PARKER: Thank you, Michelle.

CHAIR BURMAN: Dan.

MR. COTE: Dan Cote. Just to respond to what you said, Madam Chairman, I really agree, and I want to reinforce that a bit. First of all, there has been discussion -- and this is sort of fascinates me. I won't rant; I promise.

There has been discussion of VIS reporting as though there were a clearly defined

standard in place today and a flow of reports
through a system that doesn't exist yet, so none
of that exists. Where this started was a
statutory obligation to essentially share ILI
data. That's where we started. For all the
right reasons, in my mind, we expanded that
dramatically to a much larger universe, to
encompass more of the universe's pipeline safety,
for all the right reasons.

So now, we're well outside of any of that. Really, in my mind, what constitutes appropriate VIS reporting hasn't been defined yet. We can make that scope as large or as small as we want it to be to fall under VIS.

But I remind everyone that the more data that we get through on what operators are finding that constitute both benefits and opportunities to improve, as well as risks, benefits us all enormously. In order to get people to report, we've got to think about the tension around all the existing mechanisms now.

For myself, I'll just swing for the

1	walls and say I don't much care whether it came
2	through an SMS audit, a transmission integrity
3	audit, a DIMP (phonetic) audit in review of data.
4	Findings that constitute either opportunities or
5	risks are beneficial for the industry to
6	understand because if one of us has them, many of
7	us are likely to. All of that is good data. I
8	would just encourage everyone to recognize those
9	opportunities for our industry and to scale that
10	against Alan, I understood your concerns
11	fully, and this is not about hall passes, but
12	there is a bit of tension. Really do like the
13	idea of our weighing that carefully in a
14	different form.
15	MR. PARKER: Thank you, Dan, that's
16	very good.
17	MS. PEAREN: Commissioner Burman, this
18	is Holly Pearen, with EDS, on the phone.
19	CHAIR BURMAN: Great.
20	MS. PEAREN: After listening to the
21	discussion, it occurred to me that perhaps this
22	recommendation regarding collecting information

from voluntary self-audits might be better
articulated by Process Sharing or Data Management
Subcommittees, rather than specifically called
out in the Regulatory, Legal and Funding as a
specific enforcement provision.

That way, any information submitted to the VIS would be covered by the general confidentiality and enforcement provisions, regardless of the type of information or where it was gathered from. Then Process Sharing or other subcommittees could articulate the very important role voluntary self-audits play in providing that essential information for risk analysis to the VIS.

MR. PARKER: Holly, I think that's a good idea. We probably should wrestle with this in the other subcommittees before we try to find a legislative solution to the protection because we're not far enough along in our thinking. I think that's a great idea. Okay, which committee wants to take on this challenge?

(Simultaneous Speaking.)

1	CHAIR BURMAN: I think both Process
2	Sharing and Best Practices can work together on
3	that.
4	PARTICIPANT: Best Practices is
5	(Simultaneous Speaking)
6	CHAIR BURMAN: With, then, the
7	backstop being that Regulatory and Legal comes in
8	to identify what is necessary to extract with
9	that.
10	MR. PARKER: Right, whatever they come
11	up with a recommended approach, then we could
12	supply whatever we think is recommended legal
13	backdrop.
14	PARTICIPANT: You have a comment from
15	back in the public.
16	MR. TU: Wen Tu, AGIA. After hearing
17	this discussion, I did have one question that I
18	had for the Committee, overall, which is that
19	there's a distinction between data and
20	information.
21	My question is, is the intent of VIS
22	to collect that data from operators who

voluntarily deliver that data, and then to do the analysis to get that information within the system, which we're calling VIS today, or is it for the operators to provide the information in a consolidated database to be shared amongst -- so the distinction is are we doing analysis within the system, or are we allowing the operators to do it and providing just the information?

MR. PARKER: Dan.

MR. COTE: I think the way we envisioned this, 90 percent is operators are providing data that the third-party vendor turns into macro information. Obviously, a single data point -- it becomes very hard, in a single data point, to make it anonymous. At that point, it isn't even necessarily information. Again, it's a single data point. Again, I never say never. Some sorts of occurrences and findings may be so compelling, with a single data point, that we all need to hear it immediately, but that would be the exception, rather than the rule, just by way of high-level vision, the way I see that.

MR. PARKER: Mark, that falls right 1 2 into your area. I'm Mark Hereth, with 3 MR. HERETH: 4 Blacksmith Group. I agree with what you're 5 I think I would refer you back to saying, Dan. 6 the slide in our subcommittee presentation, where 7 we talked about the types of sharing. 8 It includes data, but I think it also 9 includes information that we learn from incidents, information that we learn from the 10 11 application of assessment technology, so it's I think it's both. 12 both. That's something we've 13 had as a theme probably from the first or second 14 meeting. By the way, Mark, I liked 15 MR. PARKER: 16 that slide a lot. That really helps, in terms of 17 people are always asking me what are you guys 18 doing? What information are you sharing? a good way to distill it. 19 20 MS. HICKS: Randy, could you speak up 21 a little? We couldn't hear you over --22 MR. PARKER: Yes, I'm sorry.

just saying that I like the slide that Mark's referring to, that we saw earlier today, because it's a good way to impart to others, outside our Committee, what types of information we're talking about sharing. Let's move on.

Barrier No. 8. Near miss information is extremely important, but there's a real fear, a palpable fear among operators that near miss information could lead to enforcement and penalties by PHMSA or other federal and state agencies. I think everyone understands that.

If you've ever been in a meeting when someone says we had a near miss, what happened, and everybody gasps for air, like oh, my God, we were so close to having a really catastrophic accident. One little element prevented it. Most of that information is kept inside each operator. It doesn't get communicated because of the fear of what might happen. We came up with this recommendation that Congress should enact legislation providing that a pipeline operator that voluntarily submits to the VIS near misses

will receive immunity from prosecution and enforcement related to the near miss information that's disclosed to PHMSA in a confidential report and corrected within a reasonable amount of time.

In other words, if it's a near miss that requires something to be done, you commit to doing it, but you also give a confidential report to PHMSA that you're going to do it, and that near miss information is part of the VIS that can't be used against you in an enforcement action.

However, there are exceptions. The second paragraph is the exceptions to the immunity. Those are really tracked through the FAA carve-outs of the five deadly sins.

If it's an intentional violation or an employee's action or failure to act that was intended to damage the facilities or injure other employees or purposely place the public in danger, or if the near miss, itself, was caused by prohibited use of alcohol or drugs, or if the

near miss report contained knowingly falsified information. Near miss events eligible for immunity under this act are protected from, again, disclosure, release under FOIA, and from discovery or admissibility into evidence.

The idea here is to create a safe harbor for companies that normally would never report this near miss information, to give them the assurance that they won't be -- won't face consequences in enforcement action, but has the added feature that PHMSA gets to learn about this and the VIS gets to process the information and publicize it as it feels necessary, for instance, in a safety bulletin, if it's something that's urgent, or in whatever manner that the VIS system manages these kinds of data points.

CHAIR BURMAN: Walter, and then Alan.

MR. PARKER: Questions, comments?

MR. JONES: I have a few questions.

I was sitting here, I was wondering if -- because your pretty extensive recommendations on anonymity and protection from retaliation and

extending any of those protections to workers and employees in any of your recommendations? Then when I do one, it's actually removed protection from an employee's action. I would suggest that you look at an option of extending the same amounts of anonymity you want to many of your contractors to these employees, so they will report these near misses and not face retaliatory actions as a result of reporting them.

Then I want to also comment on your use of drug and alcohol language in there to point out that most states allow workers to use medicinal marijuana and other drugs.

As we all know, you can smoke on joint on Thursday, not be high on Monday, be involved in an incident and be drug tested, and now that incident is related to you being high on the blood that's in your system on Thursday, so you're not even really going to address the situation.

You're just going to pawn it off on

some employee that was high, when they really wasn't. Our drug tests are unable to test for impairment, like we can do with alcohol. I would just throw some of this back at the committee to really look at again. I would still encourage you guys to -- if you really want workers to report a lot of these issues that you're looking to receive immunity and a lack of retaliation and enforcement, you should probably look to probably extend that to some of your workers, and then also drill down on these drug and alcohol issues.

MR. PARKER: Walter, those are good points. As a matter of fact, we intended to include, in the language of the first part, the protection to employees, specifically. I don't know why it didn't end up in this draft, but it was in there before because we specifically modeled it after the FAA's protections.

It extends to everybody on the tarmac, including manufacturers and employees of manufacturers. That was a mistake on our part.

I don't know enough about the alcohol and other

drug prohibitions to really comment much on that, so we'll have to study that some more.

MR. JONES: The rules three years ago
-- now in Rhode Island and other places, if
you're tested for a metabolite for marijuana and
you produce a medical marijuana card, so your
doctor can show your metabolites -- I think it
was Rhode Island or somewhere in New England, you
could get your job back because you're complying
with the rules. These things are really fluid
right now. I don't know which direction we're
going. Everything seems to be dependent on
safety sensitive, but in our industries,
everything is safety sensitive, every position,
even a janitor.

That type of broad blanket coverage is even now being questioned, this idea of safety sensitive jobs. I just throw that out there that there's a fluid moving target these days that maybe we don't need to really jump into, at this point.

MR. PARKER: That may be the case.

Those are good points. By the way, the Federal Railroad Administration also has kind of an exemption like that. They cover employees, but then they have --

(Simultaneous Speaking)

Everyone does because your MR. JONES: insurance is basically driving that, requiring test everybody after every accident. I'm walking down on a work site and a brick hits me on the head, I had nothing to do with that, but now I've Now maybe I don't want to got to go get tested. report the incident because of my activities a month ago. It's a burgeoning issues. I don't know that we need to really get into it. There were a bunch of recommendations we made. know that this is one we need to be dying on the stake over.

MR. PARKER: I'll say this. I don't know about the exemptions, but as far as the near miss information, itself, it's extremely valuable. Right now --

MR. JONES: (Simultaneous Speaking)

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don't get reported, though.

MR. PARKER: Right now, it's not getting reported to anyone, so we've got to figure out a way to get that into the VIS, so that people can take advantage of it. Mark.

MR. HERETH: This is Mark Hereth. I commend you for including near misses, and I think you should keep working on this language because I think another place where you'll find protections like this is in OSHA, in process safety management. This is a great place to be going, so thank you.

CHAIR BURMAN: Alan, then Sherry, and then it sounds like Holly wants to talk, too.

MR. MAYBERRY: Alan Mayberry, to that end, actually, OSHA probably already defines it, but just from experience, I know defining close calls will be probably the funnest part of this type of change. You may have covered that previously, but did you guys talk about what constitutes a close call?

MR. PARKER: No, we haven't talked

about that today, but you can go ahead and explain it.

MR. MAYBERRY: That ultimately would be defined -- we're not here to implement this or design it, but that will be something to consider. If there are any words related to what constitutes a close call, put some boundaries around it.

MR. PARKER: The Federal Railroad

Administration does have a close call system.

It's voluntary. That has been very valuable,

I've heard, in terms of what they're able to do

about analyzing why these close calls happen.

CHAIR BURMAN: Sherry.

DR. BORENER: Sherry Borener, from PHMSA. I think this goes back to the earlier question that we had, and Christie's point. Just from experience, it's very hard to construct voluntary reporting systems, like ASAP, the Aviation Safety Action Program, where carriers can report near miss information, voluntary disclosure programs, where they can report a

problem and enter into an investigative process with the agency and get indemnified from investigation. That doesn't mean that they don't report.

These things are very elaborate programs. If these things are essential to getting VIS, then I think we should talk about them. If they're not essential at the moment, if it doesn't close the door if this doesn't exist, then could we find a way to address the variety of issues that might come up because you were a participant in VIS as an ongoing process in the development of the governance of the system, so that it's not -- so that this doesn't become the thing that keeps you from getting started?

I just want to say, again, it took ten years for FAA to get to the point where they had a structure, and maybe it will take three years for Singapore, but if you try to do everything at the same time, it is really going to be daunting.

Maybe the most important thing is some basic information that will move the ball forward.

MR. PARKER: Thank you for your comments.

CHAIR BURMAN: We have Holly, and then we have the audience, but I also do want to say that near misses and that information seems like it is very relevant and very important to be part of it. I do think that goes into when best practice and process sharing is looking at the information.

It's important to identify that the collection of that information is important, which is why it also needs to be protected and confidential and all of the different sort of same issues. Then to the extent that regulatory and legal identifies that there needs to be a mechanism to allow that and to have protections in place, I think, is important.

That, I think, gets to very similar things, so it may be taking a lot of these and putting them together, but the process sharing and best practices can help to flesh out the rationale, if that makes sense.

MR. PARKER: That does make sense. It makes a lot of sense, just as we did in the previous one.

CHAIR BURMAN: Holly.

MS. PEAREN: Thank you, Commissioner
Burman, Holly Pearen, Environmental Defense Fund.

I wanted to address Walter's concern about the -related to the suite of things listed. It's our
understanding that PHMSA has authority to -- or
discretion over enforcement in certain cases, but
no statutory discretion over enforcement in
certain cases.

Those are spelled out in statute, just like they are for the FAA and Railroad. We understand that since it doesn't have discretionary enforcement authority over things like intentionally committed acts and acts in which there was a drug or under the influence indication, if that turns out not to be the case, we can certainly amend it, but the list of instances that you see on the slide really is based in the discretionary enforcement authority

of PHMSA versus the non-discretionary enforcement authority.

MR. PARKER: Thank you, Holly. I recall those discussions. You're right. I might add, in one response to that, at the bottom of that paragraph it says language to be refined. Yesterday, we gave a task to Dane Jaques, who's an external member. He's a lawyer, former pilot. He's been through all of the FAA programs. He's going to pull together a memo for us on that immunity, where it doesn't apply to employees and exemptions/exceptions for all the different programs at FAA.

Then he's going to discuss that with Cyndi Dominik, who's a lawyer at FAA who's also aware of all those programs, of course, and then report to our subcommittee on what we think would be appropriate -- if we have a near miss statutory authorization, what would be appropriate to exempt and how you would do it in a PHMSA context. We'll have more homework to do for you on that. I think that will help, Walter.

We will probably pull you into that, too. 1 2 MR. JONES: Sure. I'm around. MR. PARKER: Go ahead. 3 4 CHAIR BURMAN: No, I'm good. I think 5 we have audience, and then we have --MR. PARKER: John. 6 7 MR. MACNEILL: John MacNeill, the 8 Utility Workers Union. On the near miss programs 9 and close call programs, any of these programs that we get involved with with any of our 10 11 employers, we go into an MOU. There's language 12 built in there, on these programs, that these 13 programs -- it's a no name, no blame program, 14 where the employee making the report doesn't have 15 to give his name, but he could if he feels like 16 he wants to, but there is no blame attached to 17 these programs. 18 I think the way you're writing this up 19 here, it would take away from the MOUs that we 20 have in place with our employers. It contradicts

That's something that we already have in

place.

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MR. PARKER: That's really good to know. I know that for the Federal Railroad Administration, it's not actually a voluntary program. It's mandatory, I think, the reporting, but not the -- if an employee does it, it's under an MOU, right?

MR. MACNEILL: In the utility industry, what we do is we -- in our collective bargaining agreements, when we get into these close call programs and near miss programs, we stress that this is a no blame program. If somebody puts in a close call, there is no retaliation attached to -- there's no period that gets attached to that.

MR. PARKER: Thank you, John. We'll pull you into this group, too, in discussing how we might want to look at -- the options for looking at this. That would be an elegant solution.

MR. MACNEILL: It's something we deal with all the time, anyway. It does stop people from being involved in reporting if they feel

that there's a possibility they're going to be punitively disciplined attached to that. It is something that can prevent people from reporting.

MR. PARKER: That's interesting. I think we'll have to make a distinction, as we work on this, between the operator versus the employees because they have very different needs they want to protect.

CHAIR BURMAN: Eric, and then Walter.

Eric Amundsen, Energy MR. AMUNDSEN: The only thing I would offer the Transfer. Committee is that in my experience and our company's experience, some of the highest value learnings out there come from near misses. Ι think it's really -- and Mark touched on this -it's really worthy of our best efforts to get this part right because I think if we don't, and we don't have provisions in place to mitigate the barrier that obviously exists, we're really going to lose out on some of the very highest learnings in the industry. Our presentation from yesterday on COS, I think they have a way of classifying

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and tiering those kinds of events.

They had HVLEs. We use the same terms in our company. So again, I think there's ways to classify and prioritize those types of -- and the value associated with those learnings.

Again, I think we've got to get this part right.

It's relatively low fruit because it's out there.

These things happen. We keep them to ourselves because of the kinds of issues we're talking about here. I think the reality is it's a source of extremely high value of learning and improvement.

DR. BORENER: Can I just ask a question there? Sherry Borener, from PHMSA. You have an internal voluntary reporting program at your organization?

MR. AMUNDSEN: Yes.

DR. BORENER: This statute's not going to -- I don't think could protect an employee who reports from having their company respond to them. It only has to do with the government.

That's what I was trying to get at is there's a

whole structure -- what ASIAS is taking advantage of is that companies have voluntary reporting programs.

They get the data, and then they share that data as part of their involvement with -- so the protection between the employee and the operator is not part of the VIS. That's a different structure that we would have to build in order to make that happen.

MR. PARKER: Dan.

MR. COTE: Dan Cote. She has a point.

That's exactly right for many companies. We
happen to have a voluntary reporting program
that's really robust. The question that we're -we see the data, and we analyze it.

To your point, it can either be anonymous, or if someone chooses to can sign it, but it's essentially no fault. The question is -- what is not happening today is we're not sharing any of those findings with the industry. That's the piece that Eric is really referring to, in terms of we're missing the boat. Eric, I

1	agree with your analysis fully. These will be
2	among the most valuable learnings we could be
3	sharing because of the very nature of the near
4	miss. Couldn't agree with you more.
5	MR. PARKER: My context was energy
6	transfer sharing with the rest of the industry.
7	DR. BORENER: All of industry
8	MR. AMUNDSEN: But your point's well
9	taken.
LO	DR. BORENER: All of industry might
L1	not be under a program like that, so smaller
L 2	operators might not have anything like that. We
L3	would need to do something so that everybody in
L 4	the industry could participate. That's a
L5	project. That's something that we might do as
L6	part of the development of the program.
L 7	CHAIR BURMAN: Walter, did you you
L8	had your hand up.
L9	MR. JONES: No, I'm fine, thanks.
20	CHAIR BURMAN: Anybody else at the
21	table? On the phone? In the audience?
22	MR. PARKER: Okay, Madam Chair, we

have completed our eight recommendations and given ourselves a long list of homework items.

also gave best practices and process sharing homework, so that's good. I do want to do a time check. We still have four more reports to go through. The way I've re-established on the agenda is we're going to best practices now, and then we're going to end for lunch, which means that you have a shorter -- not an hour and a half lunch, but just an hour lunch.

For those of you who are ordering in, you should be cognizant of that. For those of you who are not, it would be helpful to have a carpool or something, so that others can go. The Madison Deli around the corner is easy and quick. We went there yesterday, and it was fine.

Then at 1:30, when we come back, we are going to do our presentations, but then we're going to, at the break, just take a ten-minute break, and then start at 3:40. We will do the training and qualifications report out, and then

we will do the technology report out, which leads 1 2 into the discussion on IT architecture. That's on Agenda 4. Then Agenda 5, 3 4 which is the Committee prep discussion leading 5 into the next steps, we'll have the Reporting Committee report out, which I think will be a 6 7 nice segue into where are we going from next 8 steps. We will end, if not before 5:00, at 5:00. 9 Does that make sense for anyone? 10 MR. WARNER: Madam Chair, Chris 11 I have to leave at 4:00 to catch a Warner. 12 flight, so we can swap the R&D and the other one? I know it doesn't flow as well, but if we could 13 14 swap that, that would be great. 15 CHAIR BURMAN: Yes, that's all right. 16 Yes. 17 MR. JENSEN: There's conflicts with 18 T&Q, as well. I have to leave at 4:00 to get to 19 a flight. 20 CHAIR BURMAN: So when we come back 21 from lunch, we'll rejigger a little bit, but 22 hopefully, we'll also be able to figure it out,

1	so that maybe we can end
2	PARTICIPANT: (Simultaneous Speaking)
3	through lunch?
4	CHAIR BURMAN: Do people want us to
5	order in and work through lunch?
6	PARTICIPANT: Yes.
7	CHAIR BURMAN: Does that make sense?
8	Are we ordering pizzas?
9	PARTICIPANT: Sounds good to me.
10	CHAIR BURMAN: Who ordered last time?
11	Who did the ordering last time? I went out, so I
12	don't remember. I don't know who ordered. I
13	just know that when I came back, there was pizza
14	here. I'm going to assign somebody from here to
15	be in charge of ordering in pizza, and we'll
16	figure out the payment and all that.
17	I don't want to assign anybody. We
18	need one person for industry to take care of
19	industry folks, and then the government people
20	have to do it separate. The government folks,
21	I'm assigning someone from PHMSA to take care of
22	state regulator people and PHMSA.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter 1 2 went off the record at 12:08 p.m. and resumed at 3 12:29 p.m.) 4 CHAIR BURMAN: All right. If we can 5 settle down. We're going to get started with best practices. 6 All right. 7 MR. AMUNDSEN: You ready? 8 CHAIR BURMAN: Yes, we're ready to go. 9 MR. AMUNDSEN: Okay. Eric Amundsen 10 with Energy Transfer and Chair of the Best 11 Practice Subcommittee. I'm going to go into a 12 little bit of schedule recovery mode here. 13 don't intend to rush through this, but there's 14 been fantastic participation thus far this morning, so I don't want to --15 16 CHAIR BURMAN: Yes, no, we're good. 17 MR. AMUNDSEN: Don't want to not 18 encourage that, but we'll just get going here. 19 So Subcommittee members supported by our ADFO, 20 Max Kiebia, he wasn't able to be here this week, 21 so thanks to Chris McClaren, who supported our 22 group, leading up to the meeting, and yesterday's

meeting, so those in attendance are in blue, Leif Jensen is here, but he was attending another subcommittee meeting, Bryce Brown is -- has been mentioned, he was on vacation, and Cliff Johnson, with PRCI, had a conflict that he couldn't manage and wasn't able to join us, so thank you to the rest of the committee members, subcommittee members, for their participation.

And just throw this up real quickly.

It's our existing task statement. No changes to

it. And when you read this, you might recognize

a lot of overlap with the process sharing

subcommittee and there is a lot of overlap in the

context of the sharing.

Again, the way that Mark and I kind of keep this straight is, you know, they kind of focus on the what and we kind of focus on the how in terms of -- or in the context of what's being done today in our industry in terms of best practices as well as what's being done in other industries, like FAA, in terms of best practices. So again, that's a pretty easy delineation to

understand.

And by the way, we have no formal recommendations to make, no voting to take place today, so again, encourage questions and discussion, but, you know, may be a little bit one-sided until we get to the end here.

I'd like to throw up our, kind of, visual model that Mark and I had worked on, you know, several months ago, and we talked about this again in our subcommittee meeting yesterday. I think at the end of the day our report will, in a lot of ways, attempt to describe this model, you know, kind of -- and its evolution from one that doesn't have a data hub in the middle, and not a lot of interaction between the various entities portrayed on this graphic, so at the end of the day it's, how do we interact, maybe, more effectively association to association, or association to stakeholders, or the regulators, or others on this graphic?

And again, that's ways that we will suggest in terms of best practices and the

process sharing committee will also identify what those pass and what the information might be, but I always like to come back to this to kind of keep grounded in, kind of, what I think our mission is, it's to, really, describe an effective way to manage information amongst all of these groups and to leverage the sharing that already takes place within a lot of these circles.

So a slide, basically, kind of highlighting our discussion from yesterday. We received, prior to the meeting, a draft report from Cliff Johnson and Jason Skow on ILI and ITD, or in the ditch, data management.

The report's been drafted in the report template, or outline, so we think a lot of the content in there will be able to slide right into the report as we start writing. In essence, it's a review of the -- or highlights API 1163, which will have another presentation today from Drew, Drew Hevle, on that, but again, kind of highlights the elements within API 1163 and how

that works, and recommended practice 0102, which again, is another ILI deployment industry standard.

And then the PRCI NDE 4E project, again, which was presented to us a couple meetings ago from Cliff Johnson, which is a really good example of how ILI data gets collected, de-identified, QA/QC'd, and processed and analyzed, so again, we feel like that model within that particular project within PRCI is really ready made for what we're talking about in terms of ILI and in-the-ditch data resolution and the sharing.

Next, we talked a taxonomy model that was developed by Joe Subsits and presented during the meeting yesterday. The model, in its simplicity, provides a common language and terms for a learning system, which is really results oriented.

I think it had some similarity to the model that COS, Center for Offshore Safety, presented yesterday as well. I think the beauty

of what Joe came up with is, it's a model that would kind of sit, if you, you know, go back to our graphic, could kind of sit within the VIS hub.

Maybe not amenable to sharing ILI data, per se, but certainly, sharing lessons learned, sharing near misses, sharing learnings from industry operator incidents, so again, Joe has provided a taxonomy model which, again, I think would be critical, you know, especially if we try to leverage the best practices that are currently occurring in a lot of the industry associations, like API, ALPL, and kind of give us a common platform for them to, maybe, use that taxonomy as they share information, but then also feed that into a broader sharing hub.

So I think Joe's model has a lot of utility in that regard. Joe, I don't know if you have any comments that you want to add to that or any clarifications.

MR. SUBSITS: The only I'd add, when we start looking at systems approaches, it's just

very hard to standardize and approach that allows you -- it already comes from more industry misses. There's a lot of opportunities going on in the learnings about quick possibilities for improvement. You have those available at your fingertips.

So I think it's important, it's something that's versatile and something that's effective, and something that's agile enough for the operator to be able to input personnel to utilize. So I think the model tries to encompass that.

MR. AMUNDSEN: Okay. Thank you.

Again, thank you for your efforts in putting that together. Next bullet. Subcommittee is awaiting delivery of various program and governance documents from some of the industry associations. We received some of that type of information from Asias, and thanks to Warren and Sherry for passing that along.

But again, we're looking for documents, already existing documents, that tell

us about, you know, how information sharing occurs within those different associations, you know, how it's governed, how they do the de-identification, how they do the QA/QC of the data, how they get over the barriers that might otherwise inhibit participation, and how they communicate results.

So again, that's kind of to those four or five bottom sub-bullets, but at the end of the day, we're trying to kind of focus and describe our best practices in terms of those elements of a sharing system or a process sharing system.

So looking for information so that the subcommittee doesn't have to go out and generate, or create, or write that information based on our knowledge or being involved in those processes.

We're looking to kind of maybe save ourselves some work and looking for written information in that regard.

So to the extent we can get that, I think that'll help us move the report writing along and give us a document that we can

reference.

The next bullet, we discussed -- had a lot of discussion, probably, and I would kind of open that up to this group, maybe, for some more discussion about the opportunity for the public and other stakeholders to have an input into the VIS context, other than just a consumer role.

I think we've maybe not given enough thought and consideration to receiving input, you know, questions, or observations, or any kind of feedback from, you know, the outside stakeholder groups like the PSTs and other NGOs, the public, you know, how can we more -- how can we enrich, kind of, their participation in VIS as opposed to just a consumer of information?

So again, looking for more 360

feedback from those types of groups. So again,
more discussion to be had within our subcommittee
on that. You know, John suggested -- I think
he's had some contact with CONED and hopefully
we'll gain some experience from them on how they

do that, how they -- you know, if they have a call center and how they receive, and process, and react to information from the public.

So I don't know if there's any questions, comments about that aspect of the VIS model. Kate? No? Okay.

Lastly, we had, as Mark mentioned this morning, there is a lot of overlap and, you know, we'll continue to discuss those overlaps and interdependencies with other subcommittees. You know, again, we're focused on best practices, kind of, in these five sub-bullets that I've mentioned.

That's where we're really, kind of, aligned, you know, in these various associations, and then even using, you know, Joe's taxonomy model, how do we address, you know, best practice in terms of how that model would be governed, you know, how we would, again, QA/QC the data and information that comes in, how would we apply common taxonomy in Joe's model, how we would secure the data and information, how we would,

again, overcome barriers to participation, a lot of what was talked about in Randy's discussion earlier, and then communication, and results, and performance.

So those are essentially the items that we're progressing. Kind of, next steps and action items, continue to develop our report outline and associated high-level content, target to complete a draft of that outline by the end of this month in preparation for July 2nd meeting that Mark mentioned this morning amongst process sharing, best practices, and the technology subcommittees.

Third bullet, solicit API and other associations, again, for documented practices. I know I've talked to Stewart and others about getting those documented practices to us, so we'll continue to run those down.

I think further development of a taxonomy model, again, kind of taking all of the things that we talked about earlier today and learned this week. You know, a good example is

Center for Offshore Safety and the model that they have on how they classify different types of learning events.

And I think, again, can be part of that taxonomy, kind of, defining criteria for the various types of learnings, I think, is very valuable.

And then last, but not least, you know, commence writing. You know, we're not going to get done if we don't get started, so I think that's going to be a real focus on -- for our subcommittee between now and the next inperson meeting for sure, is to actually start putting words on papers and, you know, finding ways to reference existing documents and working with, again, process sharing and the technology team to make sure that we're not duplicating any effort, that we're not creating any gaps in the report, and getting all those things fleshed out.

And with that, I'll end my report and open it up to comments, questions.

MR. BELLAMY: Michael Bellamy with

Baker Hughes G.E. Eric, at the end of your 1 2 session there was a brief, kind of, discussion about API 1163 as a mechanism and its 3 4 effectiveness as a mechanism for today, as 5 configured today, for sharing information back and forth --6 7 MR. AMUNDSEN: Yes. 8 MR. BELLAMY: -- and there's a 9 suggestion that we, the committee, somebody, 10 might conduct a survey of inline inspection 11 operators to understand --12 MR. AMUNDSEN: How that's being affected. 13 14 MR. BELLAMY: -- how that's working. 15 MR. AMUNDSEN: Yes. 16 MR. BELLAMY: And I don't know whether 17 that's worth picking up on or not. There seemed 18 to be some enthusiasm, Bill, I know you seconded 19 Joe's suggestion, and, Joe, you suggested it, so 20 I'm just wondering if that's something you want 21 to take forward or not. 22 MR. HERETH: So in the report out I

did this morning, we talked about the idea of polling the respective stakeholder groups on what their expectations are out of this, so that would be a subset of that. If that could work, so our intent was to take that away, Sherry and I were going to work with the subcommittee to figure out how to go about doing that, because I think it's probably -- so, yes, we can do that, but I think we were thinking a little bit more broadly in terms of what your expectations are as a whole.

But I think, to your point, we should probably poll with respect to 1163 with both the ILI service providers as well as the operators.

That's a good point.

MR. AMUNDSEN: You know, I think it's important to get both perspectives. You know, we put it out there as a best practice and something that is being done in the industry, but I don't have a good sense of how each operator and each service provider has participated in that event.

MR. HERETH: That's a great point.

MR. AMUNDSEN: And I think it would be

-- I think the results will be enlightening, and then as part of that, I think if the operators are not participating, what keeps them from doing that, right? Or what barriers, you know, keep them from participating in that.

MR. BELLAMY: Yes.

MR. AMUNDSEN: So understanding, not just the data, but maybe some of the whys of what the data might reveal, so we'll take that as a to work with, Mark.

MR. HERETH: Yes, we'll take that away. That's a good point.

CHAIR BURMAN: Any other comments?

Questions? Holly? Is she on the phone? All right. So looking at this, there's nothing we need to vote on. Looks like we have a pretty good handle on things. Does anyone from the audience have any comment? I'm sorry, I forgot to ask. All right. I think we can go. Thank you very much.

And I do want to say a special thank you to Joe for your presentation and the

thoughtfulness that went into it, and the substantive processing of it, and just, you constantly amaze me in terms of your ability to make things sound very easy, and also, get focused on very substantive and difficult topics in a way that makes sense.

And bridging, sort of, the distinction between industry and regulators and helping to facilitate communication is very, very helpful, so thank you very much. I appreciate it. With that, next, we will go to technology or, no, the training. TMQ or TMC?

MR. JENSEN: Good afternoon. While he's getting started, I'm Leif Jensen,
Chairperson of the, what's currently, Training and Qualification Subcommittee. We might be entitled competency awareness and training.

(Off microphone comments)

All right. We met yesterday

afternoon. Doug White was our ADFO. There's the

numbers of our respective team. We do have a

motion at play, if you've been listening to me

1	carefully how I've been characterizing our
2	current subcommittee name. We are proposing that
3	we change the name to Competency Awareness and
4	Training.
5	There's two primary reasons. It
6	aligns directly with the title of Element 13 and
7	PSMS, and it dissuades the confusion with respect
8	to operator qualification, so I will open it up
9	to discussion on my motion.
10	MR. PARKER: I'll second.
11	MR. JENSEN: The third reason, it's an
12	acronym for CAT.
13	MR. AMUNDSEN: Not that you're hurting
14	them.
15	MR. JENSEN: Yes, not that we're
16	hurting cats.
17	CHAIR BURMAN: All right. Well, as
18	the floor person now, you've lost my
19	(Simultaneous speaking)
20	MR. JENSEN: Hearing no discussion,
21	I'd like to make a motion.
22	CHAIR BURMAN: Okay. There's motion,

any discussion? 1 No. Second? 2 MR. PARKER: I'll second. CHAIR BURMAN: All right. 3 Any 4 discussion? Okay. Hearing none, all those in 5 favor, please say aye. (Chorus of ayes) 6 7 CHAIR BURMAN: Opposed. Abstentions. 8 The motion carries. You're now CAT. 9 MR. JENSEN: So what we did yesterday, and let me backup just a little bit, previous 10 11 meetings, the subcommittee members have been 12 doing a lot of listening, participating in other 13 subcommittees, because we really can't project what we want to train until we know what the 14 15 deliverables and recommendations are from the 16 other subcommittees. 17 But yesterday, we actually met and we 18 took everything that we've heard thus far and 19 documented, and categorized them into the three 20 categories; competency, awareness, and training. So this isn't a comprehensive list of 21

everything that we've compiled, but it's a good

chunk of it. So first and foremost, job

descriptions should be offered that defined the

education, knowledge, skills, abilities, and

experience necessary for those working with

confidential data and information that'll foster

the hiring criteria for third-party data

administrator.

And the concept here is that the people who are working in the hub need to be capable and competent. Second one is, a process should be established to prepare VIS analytical staff with pipeline and ILI SMEs, as those who are hired to perform data analytics may not know our language.

And that's directly from the FAA and that they had -- they've hired mathematicians and statisticians and they needed to bring in pilots and professionals so that they could speak the language.

And then thirdly, a vetting and certification process should be developed for employees working within the VIS to ensure,

primarily, two things, that they protect the security of the data, and preserve members anonymity and confidentiality.

So those are the fundamental tenets of competency.

Moving on to awareness, the theme here of awareness, as we've all been talking, trying to influence and persuade people to voluntarily participate in the program. So we ought to, you know, offer educational materials, calling them talking points, that we should use to promote the pipeline safety and encourage stakeholders to join.

And so listed there are just some of the elements that we brainstormed that could get incorporated into those talking points. And then ultimately be used at conferences, on Web sites, for all the variety of stakeholders, and even literature that we may produce, and to use some else's term earlier today, as we campaign to get people to join our effort.

I won't read through them verbatim.

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You can glance at them before I put them away.

Lastly, I have a few slides on training and

training is a little bit larger than the other

two in that, we have to recognize the audiences

that we are going to train.

So the distinct audiences are those who are going to give us input, and then those who are going to process that input, and then, we have to train those who are going to receive the output, right?

And then with respect to the output, and this came up at our last meeting, we really have two distinct audiences, there's going to be the audience that's really thirsty for the ILI-rich data, the big data, all the features, the as-found versus the as-called-type data, to improve what's, literally, specified in the statute, that ILI vendor to operator correspondence to rapidly increase the advancement of technology, and finding out where those features exist.

The second type of training or

deliverable is that information-rich, the lessons learned, the near-miss data, the trending, the stuff that, to much extent, already exists today within INGA, SGA, AGA, API, all those different forms, but formalizing that underneath this VIS as it's prescribed in our mission statement.

And then, of course, all the regulatory agencies, including local, state, and federal.

Training, initial training should be developed to enable the development and implementation of VIS. I know that's extraordinarily broad, but I wanted to plagiarize it out of the PSMS API 1173. That's almost verbatim what they say in 1173, so plagiarism at its best.

Second bullet, training modules should be developed that instruct participants utilizing a systematic approach to training. Meaning, we want to teach the right things to the right people at the right time and the right methodology.

So training participants in the methodology for data submissions include types of input, how to input, the format, et cetera, and essentially, if we're going to create a form for data submission, we're going to take that form and train to the form.

We ought to have a code of conduct for handling both identified and de-identified data. And let me just pause there for a minute and reflect on some of the things we heard from the FAA that, you know, they desired an approach where the information get processed prior to the de-identified, so they could ask clarifying questions to the submitter.

So if we institute a similar process, we're going to make sure, and have to have in place, rules of the games so the people who see that data are held to account not to leak that data or that information.

And then training modules with certificate of successful completion for entry into that hub. And then lastly, confidentiality

requirements, how are we going to de-identify the data and then methods to validate data integrity with rigorous and robust QA/QC prior to publishing any reports.

And then lastly, at the last VIS meeting, if you recall, we were asked to reflect on, you know, what type of funding do we need and what is all this going to cost?

And while this isn't final, but we believe that in the final report, we ought to recommend that funds be appropriated for defining the job criteria and documenting the hiring process, funds ought to be appropriated to develop the training curriculum, and that training curriculum really should be designed and developed by qualified instructional designers, we should appropriate funds for Web-based and instruction-led training courses, and then of course, the fourth bullet, all the costs to administer that training.

There's possibility for cost-sharing mechanisms for definitions by industry and

government, I think we ought to explore that, and then what we heard yesterday from Vivek, you know, when you look at the evolution of funding and in the spirit of phasing this, maybe we start with grants and then we go into the R&D, and then once we have the program developed, we actually look for a building, or, you know, a complex to rent, and some fixed equipment, and then phase into an operational, and bring this to conclusion.

Hopefully not in 12 years, but something much less than that. And in the spirit of rapid and going through that at warp speed, that's the Competency Awareness and Training Subcommittee's report.

CHAIR BURMAN: Any comments? Any questions? Holly? In the audience?

MR. VEENSTRA: If you go back one slide that said, my eyes are correcting me, you said phase money and grants, research development, facilities and equipment. Where do you see facilities and equipment, what role to do

you see that playing?

MR. JENSEN: Well, you know, I'm basing that statement -- we're basing that statement off what we heard yesterday from the FAA perspective, and, you know, at some point in time, if we end up having a population of 10 employees, or 20 employees, working inside the hub, they have to office somewhere, they have to have equipment, so it's not equipment to be used in the field, it's not equipment that we're going to run through the pipelines, it's office.

CHAIR BURMAN: Okay. Anybody else have any comments or questions? Okay. Thank you very much. With that, why don't we grab pizza and then we'll go to the next subcommittee in technology.

MR. WARNER: I have a hard stop at 1:30, so I can get to another call, so if we can grab pizza quick.

CHAIR BURMAN: Right. Yes. Very quick. Yes, this is the industry group, government people. Right. Government people.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 12:59 p.m. and resumed at 1:02 p.m.)

CHAIR BURMAN: Okay. We're going to get started. We're in the Technology
Subcommittee right now, reporting.

MR. WARNER: All right. So I'll try
to not eat and talk at the same time for this
presentation. I think it's going to be a quick
presentation on what we're doing, the meat, or
one of the key aspects of what we're doing is
going to be reported out later this afternoon.

Jason Cradit will give you a quick overview of
the work that he and others have done to look at
the architecture that they're considering for VIS
going forward, so that's going to be coming up
shortly.

So subcommittee if made up of the following people that you can see on the list there. Bryce is on vacation, so that's why I'm stepping in for Bryce to facilitate yesterday and then this report out.

Chris has done a great job supporting us and keeping us on track through these last few months.

I'm going to skip by the task statement. There's no changes to that. The important thing is the second bullet there, we've got three workgroups, a substance group, an architecture/IT, who you'll hear from, and then continuous improvement R&D group.

And in the last month, we've had a couple presentations in concert with other groups, but one that specifically was called for by our committee was from One Bridge Solutions, and presented by Robin Magleky.

One of the things we were interested in was, many of us have heard the terminology, data analysis and machine learning, but have no experience with it, and we heard of One Bridge's efforts on looking at ILI runs and datamining ILI runs.

So we had One Bridge make that presentation, so I asked them to give us a little

education around that as well.

Quick review of the different subgroups, the substance group, Bryce Brown is working with that reviewing the overlaps, and we continue to meet with the process sharing, like Mark mentioned, and finding continuous overlaps, but also, continuous opportunities to educate each other, and hep flesh-out our roles.

On the architecture side, Jason Cradit has been -- and is it Mark has been working with you?

MR. CRADIT: Mark, yes.

MR. WARNER: Have been the primary leaders in looking at the architecture and the IT. And they've actually teamed up with Microsoft, and that's what he's going to talk about here in his presentation, to come up with some ideas for different stages in IT architecture, so that'll be coming up here shortly.

Yesterday's meeting was primarily spent around looking at the documentation that

we've come up with so far to discuss what a continuous improvement process would look like, and then, several case studies around ECA and ILI to hopefully put a little bit more flesh and understanding as to what that might look like in a real-world context.

It was a lot more lively and energetic discussion than I anticipated it would be, and gave Michael and I a lot of food for thought; a lot of great input. We're going to go back and we got focused on how continuous improvement was going to improve technology, with the assumption that that would lead to improved public safety, but really got good input that that piece, from a public perspective, or someone outside the industry, may not take that -- make that link between the two, so we're going to strengthen that a little bit more in the document that we're putting together.

Quick overview of the document, it discusses the needs and benefits to key stakeholders of VIS in terms of continually

1 improving the way the stakeholders may have 2 information and be able to do their work, motivations for getting involved in it from a 3 4 continuous improvement perspective, and then, 5 some ideas that we have on how to encourage 6 participation and how what key KPIs, performance indicators, may be useful to show early successes 7 8 and early value to the VIS itself. 9 So you can see just from reading some of those things, a lot of different committees 10 11 have talked about those things and we're 12 wrestling with those too, so there's places to 13 cross-support each other. 14 And that's it. That's the committee 15 report out. Any questions from anybody? 16 CHAIR BURMAN: Any questions or 17 comments at the table? On the phone? In the 18 audience? No. Great. And we'll look forward to 19 the IT architecture discussion later, so thank 20 you.

Okay.

Thanks very much.

MR. WARNER:

CHAIR BURMAN:

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Now,

with that, we will go to the last subcommittee report, which is Reporting. Is that Sherry?

MS. RODRIGUEZ: Reporting was Sherry and I, but it was only she and I in the meeting, so there isn't much to report out on, from what I understand.

right now, we will just -- I know some people are -- we can start early with the -- if the folks are ready. Okay. So we're going to start early with Agenda Item 2, and we're going to do that in a minute, and just flag when the government pizza comes. It is here? No. That's the industry pizza. Yes.

So I will say just -- I once did a, when I was Chief Counsel in the New York State

Senate, we had a three-way agreement work -- we had three-way negotiations at, like, 2:00 in the morning, and the other -- the House, the

Assembly, and the Governor's Office wouldn't let us leave, so my staff had to stay, so I asked my staff, when I was sitting in the office, what do

you want me to -- what do you want to do? 1 2 They said, we need pizza, so I went and got pizza for my staff, which caused a 3 4 disruption to -- because apparently I should have 5 bought it for everybody, and we ended negotiations, but my staff got to eat pizza, so I 6 7 now understand why everyone else was so angry at me, but -- so all right. 8 9 MR. HERETH: Let the record show that 10 people being in great anticipation of food or 11 having their mouths stuffed got us through those 12 reports very quickly. 13 CHAIR BURMAN: Maybe we need to eat 14 earlier. DR. MURRAY: Well, I'll go ahead and 15 tee-up our next guest. We have Mr. John DeLeeuw 16 17 and Ms. Vickie Toman, who will be joining us from 18 American Airlines to talk about their experience 19 with aviation information sharing. 20 Primarily as it also relates to safety 21 management systems. If you remember, John, you

may remember his illustrious voice by phone from

1	our April meeting, he joined in and introduced
2	himself, and talked a little bit about his
3	background, but we're certainly interested in
4	hearing a lot more from his experience with
5	working with NTSB, safety management systems.
6	I think John has even dibbled a little
7	bit in the pipeline work, but he'll tell you
8	more. I don't want to steal his thunder. Thank
9	you.
10	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Well, good
11	afternoon, and thank you for the pizza, whoever
12	paid for it.
13	MR. HERETH: Can I just talk about one
14	thing, you guys want to trade, when your pizza's
15	like, eat some of these and then trade back
16	some of your pizza.
17	CHAIR BURMAN: That's all right. Too
18	complicated.
19	(Off microphone comments)
20	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Well, thank you.
21	I'm glad we got started early because it gives us
22	a chance to

DR. MURRAY: Our guest is speaking, you guys. Thank you.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: -- get started early because there's a lot of information, and so my name is John DeLeeuw. This is Vickie Toman, who will introduce herself a little bit better in a minute, but we did catch the tail end of some of the conversations you were having, which is the same conversations that we had in our industry 30 years ago.

So we'll talk a little bit about that.

We'll get to the presentation here, but if

somebody has a question, feel free to ask. I

don't want to lose anybody because we certainly

use acronyms, and you know how that is, so TLAs,

letter identifiers and acronyms.

So let's get started here, so ASAP, this is something that the airline's been using, and we're going to talk a little bit about it, and it kind of corresponds with what you're saying here, and I do this with my colleague, Vickie Toman, and I'll tell you a little bit

about Vickie.

So Vickie's background, and she started 30 years ago as a flight attendant with Air Midwest, I don't know if any of you ever heard or seen Air Midwest, fun time, so she did this for about ten years.

(Off microphone comments)

MS. TOMAN: I did work there for ten years, that is where I started.

and me worked together for years. After she was a flight attendant, she got into regulatory affairs, she's almost done everything you could do at American Airlines. Now, we don't represent American Airlines here, just so you know, but this is our background, so you know where we're coming from.

And besides regulatory affairs, and a number of things in American, I think that's real key, is that, when the ASAP program first started at American, she was very instrumental in getting it started, so all of the bad things, the good

things, the things that weren't working, we've seen them all, and we believe we can tell you that, we started in the pre-Kindergarten stage.

If you were to do something like this in the military, you'd be starting at a high school level, because all the bad mistakes and the lessons learned, we've already figured all that out, not because we're smart, we just learned them.

So this is Vickie's background, so Vickie?

MS. TOMAN: Yes. So this is John's background. John started out in the military and he was a C-130 pilot for the Air Force, and flew for the Air Force for 15 years, did a lot of different missions, and then came over to American Airlines and started on 727, I think, and now he flies our number one aircraft that we have, the 787, which flies to China, all international flights, and I think you work, what, maybe three days a month, something like that?

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, I work three days a month.

MS. TOMAN: I'm still in the trenches.

I'm the flight SMS manager for American Airlines,
so I'm responsible for our Safety Management

Program that we have for the flight operations.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So the 787, I show some pictures up here because I love flying this airplane. How many of you all been on a Dreamliner? It's great because it's -- man, you dream good on this airplane.

(Off microphone comments)

Yes, it's a great one. I love this airplane. It's a great airplane. I typically do fly it from Dallas to China. It's about a 16-hour flight. We have four crew members, or four pilots, so we take turns. Two guys fly three and a half hours, and then the other two pilots fly three and a half hours, so we keep doing that back and forth until we get to China.

And on your time off, we've got a crew facility to sleep in. I generally like to watch

a movie and eat an ice cream sundae, so it's not a bad life, I can tell you. It's great.

And so to go back there and back the 16 hours, so we layover less time than the entire flight goes over, so it's continual flying. This is looking out the window. We haul a lot of new technology, like the heads-up display unit. Both pilots have this available to them.

This is the cockpit of the 787, which
I'll talk a little bit about later, but you'll
see the instrumentation here, it's all glass
cockpit, there are no circuit breakers to pull,
it's all electronic. This is an electronic jet.
Most of those things you hear about in your world
about hazardous stuff, like bleed air systems,
people breathing in bad fumes, this airplane
doesn't exist. Everything's electric. Even the
brakes are electric.

The anti-icing's electric. So there's no bleed air that comes through this to get you sick. Max cabin altitude in this airplane is 6000 feet, and we typically cruise at 41,000 feet

when we fly to China. Great airplane; modern technology.

MS. TOMAN: So this is any normal day at any major airport in America, and you'll see planes lined up like this. Hopefully you don't sit in that line very long, unless there's weather, which, we had yesterday coming into D.C., but you can see all the different airlines, and then this is another given day. This is how many planes are up there flying.

environment. Probably very similar to the pipeline and hazardous material people, folks. Right? This is a hazardous environment. This is any typical day and everybody that's flying one of these blue little airplanes is a professional pilot, just like the folks that work for you. They're professionals.

Nobody wakes up in the morning and says, I'm going to do a bad job. Everybody wakes up because they're professionals.

MS. TOMAN: So what do we all have in

common? What keeps everything so safe in the airline business? It's our ASAP program. The FAA developed the ASAP program to prevent accidents and incidents, and encourage employees to voluntarily submit reports, so that's what we're here to talk to you about.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So we'll talk a little bit about it, so just so you know, because I heard some discussion here, interesting, this is an Advisory Circular that came out from the FAA, so when this started, that's how it got started, and it actually started with one airline, it just happened to be American Airlines, who we do not represent, but we work for, and they partnered with American Airlines, says, hey, we got this great program. We'd like to have somebody get involved.

So the idea behind it, as Vickie said, it's to create a culture where employees can voluntarily report a mistake they make.

When I was a pilot back in the early '90s at American, they mentioned this, I go,

there's no way I'm ever going to report my mistakes, because I don't want to get fired. So we'll talk about how it works and why does it work.

So the big thing is, even if you have a violation, we want to hear about it, which, for some people go, that just seems weird. So if you have a potential violation, or you have a potential safety concern, if you report this in ASAP, we're going to take a look at it.

MS. TOMAN: And another big thing is, you know, within ASAP, within our airline, if you submit that ASAP report, you're not going to get any disciplinary action from the company. So that's part of the agreement, the buy-in from the company, is we want -- I mean, why would anybody tell someone that, oh, yes, I screwed up? And especially a pilot, you know?

But we want them to submit those reports, so you're not going to get that disciplinary action, and we'll talk a little bit later too, that buy-in for the regulatory

authority, for the FAA, they're not going to be having any disciplinary action.

So that's where the buy-in for the actual employee to submit that ASAP report and tell on themselves.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: And the big thing behind it, which we all know, we do make mistakes, generally not intentional, we need to know why you made the mistake, because we want to do the deep dive, because maybe I need to go into the simulator and correct a bad habit pattern I may have.

For the maintenance world, it may be a little better understanding of how we do it and why we do it that way.

So, you know, when you get this kind of stuff, you get all this data that comes in, we'll talk about it here, all the data coming in, and when you use the data, you could go ahead and take a look at the data, because what we want to do is, one report might prevent a future accident that we get from employees. We've got lots of

examples of that, I'm going to show you, but that one report might make the difference to the industry.

industry was going fast and wild, they're building nuclear power plants, but the thing that was most concerning was, is, at that time, and most of you probably heard about those days, you know, if you made a mistake, particularly in the nuclear world, they just fired you. They ran you off, as they say on a rig, we're just going to run you off.

And they said, that's okay, because we'll go hire another nuclear engineer. Well, what happened is, they actually ran out of nuclear engineers, they fired everybody, because people make mistakes. So they said, we got to do a better program.

So they decided that, you know, if you have a nuclear engineer who's been there for 20 years and makes a mistake, inadvertent mistake, you fire that person, you hire a new kid out of

college who's got six month's experience, you think they're going to be safer? Probably not.

In fact, if the reason that the 20year employee made the mistake is because a
policy, or procedure, or work card was written
incorrectly, the kid that just came out of
college will make the same mistake, so the idea
is, let's keep our employees here, figure out why
they make mistakes.

So with the nuclear industry, that kind of got things started, and they saw the value of it, and the FAA saw the value of it, the industry that we're in, and so we started the same program, which we called ASAP, and we really want their concerns and potential violations.

Some of you might relate to this here. So we also do work with the petroleum industry, you know, like on old deep-oil rigs, about five years ago, they started going, man, we hurt a lot of people, and we kill people. We'd like to have something that aviation has, so it's actually up and coming. A lot of people supporting it and I

won't say who, where, when, but this program is coming to the Gulf of Mexico within the next year.

And all the oil companies are going to be getting onboard, so it's starting to come through the industry.

Well, take a look at this dial here, this is a perfect example. If you look at this gauge here, the employee in the petroleum industry had to read the gauge and report on the pressure. So on this one here, that looks about 370, maybe 350, does that look like to you guys, 350? That's what he wrote down. They later had a blowout, not a blow on the rig, but a blow on the pipe, because it's times 10. That's actually 3000.

So you go, all of us in the room get it, and go, well, that's just stupid, but this has been here forever, but you know what, the employees know it, and they all know, tribal knowledge, you know, don't forget, times 10.

You get a new employee out there and,

as you all know, our workforce is starting to retire, a lot of people, getting new kids in the industry, you think they'll make a mistake? You bet. We set them up big time, because who would build a gauge like this nowadays, right? We wouldn't.

So this is the kind of stuff that we find out in our aviation world. So I'll let Vickie tell you about some of the purpose here of ASAP here.

MS. TOMAN: Okay. So as we've already said, you know, we want to know that information from our employees. We ask for employees to report hazards, they can report it confidentiality through the ASAP program, and then also, if they are involved where they had a deviation from a regulation or a company police or procedure, they can submit an ASAP report.

They know it's going to be confidential, it's going to go to a certain group, which we'll talk about in just a second, but we are going to go and look at those reports

and try to identify the root cause, because again, the way our system is setup, we want to have a system that has layers where you're not going to get to that individual human error.

And so when we do have that human error, we need to look at whether it's policies or procedures that need to be changed, whether it's training, and also, if you've got something like this happening in Miami, you can probably be guaranteed you're going to see it in L.A., you may see it in New York, so we want to look at it from a systemic approach.

And then the other thing is, building the trust. John said that we started, when we first started the ASAP program, I was working in safety, and this was a hard thing, especially for our regulators, to kind of put their head around, because back then, in the '80s, the FAA had a badge, you know, we don't have badges, and that was what they used, you know, for corrective action against pilots.

So to go to the FAA and say, no, we're

going to review this report, we're going to accept it, and we're not going to do certificate action, was a little hard for that agency.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So let's get to the whole crux of this why ASAP works in the industry. So can you all see this sign here?

Okay. So let me give you an example that happened in our world. I'm a pilot, I'm driving down the back streets of -- back roads of Louisiana, and I realize I ran a stop sign.

As I'm driving by it I go, oh, crap, ran a stop sign. In our world, when we're driving down the road, the first police station we go to, I will turn myself in. You pull in, knock on the door, yes, listen, I'm a pilot with American. I ran the stop sign back there.

Police officer would say, okay, well, appreciate you coming in. I want you to fill out this form, which is critical. So in the form I'm going to fill out, it's going to ask the questions, was it daytime, nighttime? How fast were you driving? Did you have a passenger in

the seat? Were you on your phone? Were you texting? Did you have kids in the backseat? What kind of car were you driving, by the way? Was the windshield dirty?

We're going to ask all these questions. We don't want a big narrative, because we're going to ask a lot of questions, because we want to know. So when I walk out the door, I filled out -- as I walk out the door, and that in itself, you say, well, that's not a big door, but as I walk out the door, the police officer says, hey, don't feel too bad, because we had 43 other pilots in the last two weeks do the same thing you did. Really?

Well, I don't feel too bad, but I go,
I can't believe that. What happens, the police,
like the airlines, which you will do someday, is,
you're going to go, well, one report, get it, but
we got 43 reports. We got some noise out there,
right? What's going on?

The police will go back and go, yes, you made a mistake, but we kind of set you up,

because the stop sign's been turned, trees have overgrown the stop sign, in fact, the paint has faded on it, so yes, you shouldn't have run a stop sign, but we didn't help you out much.

So this, I'll let you take a second just to read it, is the crux of where we are now in our industry. This is very important. And the last sentence is most critical, the regulator, the industries, the airlines, the unions, they're not interested in catching employees making mistakes, but what they do want is they want reporting mistakes so we can get the trends and we can fix the problem. That's the key to the ASAP program.

So here's a typical case. You got

ASAP deviations, most of the time when you do air

and altitude, you know, hey, what was your

altitude? I'm correcting back to 30,000 feet.

Okay. We made an altitude error. Most of them,

the company would never know about, but now that

we report them, 98 percent of those altitude

deviations are reported through ASAP.

And that's helpful, because we want to know, okay, aggregate data, where are all these deviations happening? They happen at climb out? They happen on descend? So if I just ask the crowd here, if we have an altitude deviation from a crew, they're on the wrong altitude, they missed an altitude, do you think it happens on climb out, level flight, or descend? What do you think?

MS. MORGAN: Level flight.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Level flight. Yes, we would all think level flight. No, it's about 70 percent happen on the descend, because what's happening, both pilots are in the cockpit doing this on their programming, the runway change for the arrival, and then they miss an altitude. Now that we know that information, we can help the pilots say, be advised, this is what happens.

See, just a simple thing like that.

Vickie, why don't you tell them what happened

over here in Haiti.

MS. TOMAN: Okay. So this was in a

report that we got, and this was just one ASAP report, so that's -- you know, we've kind of talked about how you got the 43 different reports, all the noise, but also know that one report can be something significant, which you can enhance safety from.

So we had a Captain that had been flying to Haiti and he had gone there quite a bit, and he noticed this new tower that was put up on the side by the runway. And it was kind of like, you know, what's that? It's not listed in any of our company manuals that it should be there.

And so he submitted his ASAP report.

So you can see the tower off to the side.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: This tower is right here and the Captain was concerned. Now, we allow pictures in ASAP. They have to be appropriate, of course, but I mean, let's be fair, but if you have a picture, and you know, you can write a narrative and not really describe it. Putting a picture is worth a 1000 words, so

that's really critical.

So he has the 1st Officer take a picture of what happened. So got the picture right over here.

MS. TOMAN: So we looked at it and it's like, what the heck is that tower doing there, you know? This could be a hazard for an airplane taking off. And so, come to find out, it was, I think it was, the mayor of the town was like a big baseball fan, and I forget, was it the Yankees, and they were going to be in the playoffs, and so he decided to go put that tower up so he could see the baseball game.

And it's like, can we put it somewhere that's not near the airport, please? But we were able to work with the regulatory authority there and get that moved. Again, that was just one report from one pilot, which was a significant change for safety for everybody that was flying into that area.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So in that case, the regulator gets out and puts a little note, and we

call them, notice to airman, hey, be advised, a tower is being built. We're going to get it torn down. The companies, the unions, they all talk to each, and safety. Safety is not a secret in the airline business, and they call each other and go, hey, just be advise, there's a tower at Port-au-Prince now.

Oh, okay. Great. Thanks for letting us know. That's how it works.

So if I file a report the next time I fly to China, I make a mistake, my report goes to the corporation, where we have analysts who redact all the information. So if I'm flying with Vickie and I say, you know, I was flying with Vickie Toman, and we were flying to China, and something happened, well, it's a confidential report.

So they're going to take my name off, they'll take Vickie's name off, they might even take the city if that's not important enough.

They want to de-identify it, because they want the ERC, Event Review Committee, to look at the

report without the names in it because some of the guys might actually know me. You know, we don't want that.

We want this to be looked at exactly the way it is, free of anything, you know, who's there?

So you'll see that you have a company person, a regulator, in the airline world, it's typically unions, of course, but you could have an employee representative, because you got to balance it out. You need to have somebody that's there so that all three are there. Every decision made is unanimous.

MS. TOMAN: And we refer to this, the ERC, the Event Review Committee, as like a three-legged stool. It's all got to be even. If you have, the regulator has more power than the other two people, the stool's going to tip over, right? So everybody is working together as a team.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: It's all for safety.

So when you were -- and I've had a lot of folks

from the industry have gone to ERCs that me and

Vickie have been involved with, and they observed the ERC, because they're interested, like you folks might be. So I had Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, medical world, pipeline, Carnival Cruises, they all come out and want to see, what is this thing you're referring to?

There are some folks who come out, we've actually had universities come and look at this program, and they're listed in the ERC, get the safety reports, they're talking about the reports, talking about the event, after an hour, they'll come outside and I will ask them, so do you guys know who the FAA guy was?

They really don't know, because these three, unless the FAA guy is wearing a tie, you know, they like to wear ties, but you won't really know who these -- and it's not important to know. You've got three entities there. We're just going to look at safety. We're not looking at hammering somebody or running them off, we want to find safety programs.

MR. JENSEN: Hey, John?

1	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, sir.
2	MR. JENSEN: Leif Jensen, Sunoco
3	Pipeline.
4	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes.
5	MR. JENSEN: Backing up to one of your
6	earlier comments, you said, when you submit the
7	form, you send it to your operator, to your
8	company.
9	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Right.
10	MR. JENSEN: All right. So backing up
11	to that slide, that kind of implies that the
12	report's going directly to the ERC, but the
13	company's sending it to the ERC.
14	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Well, we go
15	ahead.
16	MS. TOMAN: It goes to an analyst, and
17	usually it's within the safety department, and so
18	there's an analyst that will receive that report,
19	they will de-identify that report, and then
20	they're going to send that to those three
21	representatives.
22	MR. JENSEN: Okay.

MS. TOMAN: Sometimes, you know, a reporter may not put all the information in the report, or the ERC may have questions and need more information, and in that case, we're going to go to that employee representative and let them know who submitted the report so that they can talk to them and get information, and bring it back to the ERC.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So in the oil and gas industry, like in the Gulf of Mexico, for instance, the regulator there is, well, let's see, you've got BSEE, you all heard of BSEE, you've also got OSHA, Coast Guard actually owns most of the Gulf of Mexico, so you've got regulators, you go, well, who's the actual regulator?

So a lot of the companies that are looking at this are not going to go and partner with the regulator yet. The regulators not ready to join in, let's say. That doesn't matter, you could still do it, because you could have a company person and an employee representative,

they don't have unions there, but the regulator isn't there yet, but this is what we do, so, you know, I don't work for American, not that we have our own company, but we do third parties where somebody would run this program for them.

So they would come in, the reports come in, because of what you said, people that are going to work on the rig, if they have to send their ASAP to something-something@chevron.com, they go, uh-uh, ain't doing that, and we know that. We absolutely know that.

The airline world has gotten the trust where we've gotten there in 30 years. If we had to start tomorrow, in the airline world, it'd be the same problem, because nobody would want to send the report there, but we've got the confidence built up now in our industry that they know that it's going to get sent to analyst, and they could have, quite frankly, been a union, could have been an FAA analyst.

It just worked out the company said,

1	we'll pay for it, just like a pizza, we'll do it.
2	I mean, it really doesn't matter who was to be
3	the analyst. And some airlines have actually
4	looked at outsourcing that piece of it. Getting
5	another company to do that for them, because that
6	way they save some money.
7	MR. JONES: I have a question to
8	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, sir.
9	MR. JONES: You've got an employee
10	representative there, unions are, what, about 90
11	percent of the working population these days.
12	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes.
13	MR. JONES: SO
14	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Actually, it's 8.7.
15	MR. JONES: and it's a term you
16	just don't see anymore because there's not a lot
17	of unions, so is there a suggestion of a
18	replacement there?
19	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Well, you have to
20	have an employee representative. It doesn't have
21	to be the unions. I mean, I'm in the airline
22	industry and everything's unionized there.

MR. JONES: Yes, I understand, but is 1 2 there -- what are you seeing other folks use, 3 lawyers, what? MS. TOMAN: Well, there's a lot of 4 5 airlines that don't have a union. CAPTAIN DELEEUW: 6 Yes. 7 MS. TOMAN: And so they usually have 8 some type -- some employee that kind of is, you 9 want up here, maybe somebody from that base, wherever, if you're going to be specific with 10 11 your reports on where the location is, but 12 usually it's a volunteer position, someone that 13 has experience, because the big thing is, you 14 know, if there's a policy or procedure deviation, we need to know, well, yes, nobody follows that 15 16 policy because it's crap, you know? 17 Everybody at that station knows that 18 it needs to be changed. Well, the company person 19 not realize that or the regulator may not realize 20 that. 21 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So here's what

happens in the real world out there, I'll give

you an example, so all of you fly airplanes, what happens when the 1st Officer does the walkaround and finds the tire is low on pressure? It's flat. Okay. We all, on time machine, right? So 50 years ago -- well, no, 20 years ago, when they had a janky tire, they'd say, hey, the boss would tell the AMT, aircraft maintenance technician, can you change the tire?

They jack it up, just like Indy 500, they get a tire on, they can have a tire on the airplane in about 10 to 15 minutes. Big old jacks. Okay. 10 or 15 minutes, but what we found over time is, when you rush like that, you make mistakes.

So what they've said, you know what?
We're going to build a work card, a checklist, to
tell you how to change a tire. It'd be like you
when you teach your kid how to change a tire, you
say, go in the glove compartment, get out the
manual, let's do step-by-step-by-step.

To change a tire now on an airplane takes an hour. So we know this. But imagine

now, you got an airplane full of people who are going to China, and you tell the guy, hey, go change the tire, and the guy says, well, it'll be about an hour, the boss goes, are you serious?

It's going to take you an hour? First mechanic says, I can do it in 20 minutes, and they'll change it in 20 minutes.

Bu then he makes a mistake. Who's to blame? The mechanic, the AMT? So the ERC gets this and they go, well, I don't understand why that mechanic would not follow that work card. We've been preaching it for ten years, you follow the work card. Why would you do it?

This guy here is going to say, well, let me tell you how it really happens on the line. We all know how to change a tire and we don't use the manual. What? You don't use the manual? The company guy will say, we spent hundreds of dollars writing new manuals for you guys, put plasticized sheets so it won't get wet.

But and the reality is, the whole organization has actually deviated off the norm

	because this work group, the employees, they know
2	how it really is. And so when you get these kind
3	of ERCs, you can fault the guy and say, he didn't
4	follow procedure, but then you find out that
5	nobody's following that procedure, and that's why
6	it's important to have some employee
7	representation there because, you need to have
8	find out you know, got to keep it real, quite
9	frankly.
10	And we're going to give you some
11	examples of that.
12	MS. TOMAN: She has a question.
13	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Oh, yes, ma'am. I'm
14	sorry.
15	MS. BLYSTONE: Before we get too far
16	from Haiti, we're discussing how stuffs comes out
17	of this voluntary system and it seemed like that
18	got picked up rather quickly from being just a
19	one-off, we're talking about trends here a lot,
20	but not these one-off things, how did it pick up
21	so quickly?
22	And maybe you use that

1 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: No, no, so every 2 report comes ---- because this is a 3 MS. BLYSTONE: 4 really good presentation. Well done. 5 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: You make a great -this is -- it's a great segue, we'll go into it, 6 7 but when Vickie started in this program, and to 8 be fair, I ran the ASAP program for American 9 Airlines for five years, which is a pilot ASAP, filth attendant ASAP, dispatch ASAP, maintenance 10 11 ASAP, so we had four ASAP programs, starting now 12 a ground ASAP program, actually. 13 But when they came in, when Vickie 14 started, she could almost run the whole thing 15 because they got two reports, maybe, a week. 16 MS. BLYSTONE: Oh, okay. 17 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Okay. At American 18 now, and Delta, we get 1000 ASAP reports a month. 19 We get 12,000 a year at just American. Delta, 20 Delta gets almost 15,000 reports a year. 21 Southwest gets the same, Alaska, Hawaiian, Jet Blue, you name it, they get -- United, same 22

thing.

We know all those guys and gals, we work them, so the volume of the reports is such that it's almost like a triage. So you all been talking to SMS, here's the SMS manager for American, we basically went through them, and some of them highlight right away, like, oh, we got to look at this right away, the analyst will go ahead and put it on like, kind of, a fast track.

If you get the ASAP report that says, you know, the lightbulbs are burned out at the VFW at the one ramp tower, okay. It's a big deal, but we'll get to that next week, and it's a very fast-paced environment a little bit when you find out. And almost every week we get a, uh-oh

MS. TOMAN: We'll risk rate them --

MS. BLYSTONE: Yes.

MS. TOMAN: -- so again, the higher the risk, we're going to have to take action immediately, and that's kind of -- that's built

into our SMS program on how quickly you got to act on what type of risk, but then also, those reports are going to those representatives every day. They're receiving it.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes.

MS. TOMAN: And if any one of them see something that goes, whoa, we need to talk about this immediately, they can take action that day.

MS. BLYSTONE: So that's what I was looking for is, and by the way, for the record,

Kate Blystone, Pipeline Safety Trust. So that's what I was looking for is, an analyst, hello, looks at every single one.

MS. TOMAN: Yes.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: And so what some companies do, they outsource that piece, because they don't want to pay for the analyst, the employees are like, I don't want to come to American Airlines or United, so they outsource it, so you have a company that will look at them, and that company then, of course -- I think it works even better because when the company looks

at it, they're there from 9:00 to 5:00, when you outsource it, they look at every report that comes in 24/7.

MS. BLYSTONE: Yes.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: And so when a report comes in it's like, uh-oh, we just brought -this is a moderate risk, it's get action fairly quickly, goes back to this group here.

MS. BLYSTONE: Yes.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So that's kind of an important thing to know that they do look at it fairly quickly. And, you know, right here, this slide here, that we showed a little bit earlier, I got something a little later, but let me just show you right here, this is what's important and this is what ASAP's about, because Vickie's the SMS manager, and when all these reports come in, that stop sign example I gave you, that's either going to pop-up, like, here, you see how each month --

MS. BLYSTONE: Yes.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, or each year,

1 in fact, that was the one we have, gets worse, 2 worse, and that's -- and why don't you tell them what we do every month. We have a --3 4 MS. TOMAN: So we have a data analysis 5 meeting. And one thing, to kind of go back to 6 ASAP, that the ERC meets once a week and it's an 7 eight-hour meeting, and they can mark reports if 8 they don't want to discuss them, and they have, 9 like, canned responses for certain type of 10 reports. 11 If it's a low risk, they can say, you 12 know, send response 43 to this pilot, or they may 13 say, we need to bring that pilot in because we 14 need to find more information from that pilot, 15 and actually do a debrief, but that meeting lasts 16 all day long. 17 MS. BLYSTONE: Every week. 18 MS. TOMAN: Every week. 19 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Every week. Oh, 20 yes. 21 MS. TOMAN: And some carriers have 22 that two days a week.

MS. BLYSTONE: Wow.

MS. TOMAN: And so this is a dedicated group that's trained and even, you know, the analyst goes through safety training, you know, in how to identify these risks. And every report that's submitted gets a response from this ERC group.

So there may be corrective action or it may just be a response, an email response, that goes back them. Once these reports are closed, we take that data and we have a safety data analysis meeting once a month where we look at all of the data source that comes into our SMS program.

So ASAP reports, we have other safety programs, and we bring all that data in and we look at it, and it's like, where are the trends at, what are the things that we need to be concerned about?

And then of course, it may not be a trending item, it may be one item, but because of the risk, we need to do something.

MS. BLYSTONE: Yes. Thank you so much.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: You bet. Safetyrelated are volunteered by employees. So let's
just make sure that we cover everything here. So
I can model it -- I can follow my ASAP if I have
a potential, we call it, CFR violation, or a
general safety concern.

Now, if my boss yells at me for being late to work, I can't file an ASAP. I can file it, but it's not going to be part of the program. If there's a security issue, actually, unless it's safety, but a security issue, that's not part of ASAP. ASAP is very clear. You know, if you have work-related issues, you do something inappropriate at work, you think, oh, ASAP's got me covered, it does not.

So only CFR violations, potentially, and for safety concerns. And of that, in a perfect world, you get the majority of your reports are for safety reasons versus violations, right? And that's where most of the airlines are

now.

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So They're all reported, like we just mentioned here, the members reach consensus on every decision, which is important to have, you know, non-punitive corrective action, so if I go the wrong direction holding, and I have to file an ASAP report, so I said I went left in holding, I should have gone right, because we don't really hold much anymore, actually, I do that, and they go -- I go to the ERC, and I put my report in, and they might want to even talk to me, which is fine, so that's a telephone interview, sometimes it's, you get brought in and talk to the ERC, but at the end of the day, they go, well, you know, John, you went the wrong direction in holding, and when you should know better, you've been an experienced pilot, and I go, I just made a mistake.

They may tell me to go to the simulator for an hour. And I got to go to the simulator and I got to go holding for an hour. When I'm done, I'll be the best holder at

American, right?

But they want to make sure I don't make that mistake again, because what's the value of the program to the corporation if you tell somebody you did something wrong and then they do it again next week, right?

MS. TOMAN: Right. It's not a get out of jail free card.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: No.

MS. TOMAN: So they are held accountable and also, you know, the training that they may suggest an employee does, that's non-punitive as well. It's not going to go in your training file, your boss isn't going to know, oh, my gosh, John had to go into the sim for a holding pattern, you know, training, so it's all kept confidential.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: This is important, so I told you, we work together at American, American is the largest airline in the world, we have 15,000 pilots, 1000 airplanes, and for 3 years, this was the entire accident investigation

team right here. Two of us. Because we don't have any accidents.

Now, we have a huge team that does ASAP because we want to prevent the accidents. That's the big key to ASAP. So you can do it. So let me give you some examples I think you'll find entertaining and helpful.

This is in Memphis, Tennessee, and this is what a standard instrument arrival may look at. So what do you guys think? What's the name of this arrival here? How would you call that? Remember, Memphis, Tennessee.

The Blues, right? Because Barbecue, Elvis, and, the blues, right? So here comes a crew, they're coming at night, and you can see this, it's not complicated necessarily to a pilot, but it's a lot of information, and here's the point, it's kind of the corner post, called Blues.

Cap is looking at the arrival, and the 1st Officer's flying, and they're going to land to the south in Memphis. The controller says,

you're clear direct to blues. Here's blues. The 1st Officer is looking at the approach. Look at the first point of the approach. How do you say that? Blues.

This is blues, this is blues, no intentional mate, the pilot's made a mistake, because guess where they went to, this blues.

You know, FedEx is doing the bomb burst everywhere, we went right through the middle of a bunch of FedEx airplanes going to Memphis. Well, we did land first. I can say that.

The point is, we didn't have an accident, but this crew reported it very quickly, and when we talked to Southwest, they had a similar report, because the change in the chart just came out.

So shortly after that -- oh, by the way, Elvis still in the building, so the next approach plate that came out, which was two weeks later, they changed the name to McVey, still kept Elvis, of course, but the point is, is this was a change.

So if we had not done this change, some time in the next 50 years someone would probably bend some metal. See where we're going? So we go, okay, we get it now.

So these are the highlights. I'll let Vickie kind of go over the highlights here a minute. This is kind of what we talked about.

MS. TOMAN: Yes, so 24 hours requirement. You can't wait to file an ASAP report until your supervisor says, hey, John, weren't you on that flight the other day that had that error? And then you're like, oh, I got to file my ASAP report. No, you file it within 24 hours of the event happening.

The only exception we have on that is if you're flying international, it's once you get back to the United States, you've got the 24 hours to file.

Again, we talked about it's got to be a safety concern or a deviation from an FAR, and again, this doesn't necessarily mean that that employee had that deviation, it may be ATC made a

mistake, but they could still file that ASAP report.

We talked about de-identifying, the ERC will go in and score that report, they may want to talk to the crew member, have a debrief, they can -- we don't call it coaching and counseling, but they may coach the employee, but that could be done on the phone or in person, and then every report will be closed, and again, you may have corrective action.

If the ERC decides to give an employee corrective action, that employee has to complete that corrective action, satisfy the ERC with the corrective action. If they take you out to do simulator training, and you fail the simulator training, then you're going to get more training.

If you decide you don't want to do the corrective action, then you're no longer going to be protected under ASAP.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So you asked -- let me just say, so a pilot, why would he do this?

Vickie mentioned earlier, if I was a pilot, I

filed the report and it's accepted by the ERC, no 1 2 certificate action by the FAA, which means I lose my job if I lost that, and the company doesn't 3 discipline me, so, I mean, why would I not file? 4 That's why we have 1000 reports a 5 month, because every pilot makes a mistake, even 6 7 if they turned the wrong direction on the taxiway, they write an ASAP right away. 8 9 We've got it, now, they can do it on their app so that when they're in flight, they 10 can file their ASAP before they even landed. 11 12 MS. TOMAN: And one thing too is, both 13 crew members, or if you have a crew that's a 14 four-pilot crew, all four pilots have to submit 15 an ASAP. 16 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Right. 17 MS. TOMAN: It can't just be the 18 Captain submitting it on behalf of the crew. 19 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, sir. 20 DR. WHITE: So one question about 21 coordination, so that's a chart, right, a landing 22 chart, or something, I guess, for the industry,

1	right?
2	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes.
3	DR. WHITE: So the pilots file the
4	ASAP report, but it's an air traffic control
5	issue of correction. How do you coordinate that
6	between the two entities?
7	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Well, that's it.
8	That's the beautiful thing. In the world of the
9	ERC, you've got a company person, you've got a
10	regulator, and an employer.
11	DR. WHITE: Okay.
12	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So in this case, the
13	union and the company, they can make the they
14	can call somebody and leave a message, but the
15	regulator can get on the phone and talk yes,
16	the chart goes
17	DR. WHITE: Okay. So there's the
18	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes.
19	DR. WHITE: So they write it to who is
20	the appropriate party.
21	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, in your world
22	here, and I'm being kind of general, but you

would want something like this, you need somebody from regulation, from PHMSA, who can affect change and when you find mistakes, they don't, you know, write a letter to somebody and three weeks later go, yes, we'll look at it. That's not appropriate. You need to have the change because if the employees don't feel that this process works, they'll go back to, once again --

MS. TOMAN: Not tell anything.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: -- not tell
anything. And if they see this and this crew
that writes this report, and this came out, I
guarantee you, these pilots told everybody for
the next year, man, you won't believe what I got
changed, because they like to brag, right?

MS. TOMAN: And that's part of our safety promotion too, is that, we're getting that information back out to our employees, like, these are our corrective actions that we did that we discovered through ASAP, which encourages the employees to report more as well.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, that's a real

critical piece is to broadcast your successes, because then the people go, hey, I want to be part of this deal. Yes, sir.

MALE PARTICIPANT: With your broadcasting the successes and getting the information out, are you getting the information out to all the industry?

MS. TOMAN: Yes, so we actually have, twice a year, what we call the Asias Information Share, and that's when everybody from all the airlines, the FAA, ATC, we actually have military people come now, and we talk about the top items that's been reported in our safety programs, and ASAP, and we share lessons learned.

The only people that are not allowed to come to that meeting are attorneys and reporters, because everything's confidential, so if you're not going to have that confidential, you know, statement out front for everybody, nobody's going to share anything, because they don't want to show up on the news, oh, wow, look what happened to Delta.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, I think I saw that Vivek was on your list, was Vivek here yesterday?

Okay. So they talk a lot about the Asias Information Share and a lot of it's a different data source. This is part -- this is the same idea, where you're sharing the ASAP data, but it's the highlight ones. I think me and Vickie have briefed at every infoshare in the last four or five years.

We briefed some significant events in the industry that we discovered or that our team has, but when we first started in infoshare, it was less than 100 people. Now it's 1000 people show up, so it's a lot of people, and it's almost

MS. TOMAN: And it's a great meeting.
Well, it's like usually four days, and so you'll
have, like, a general meeting at the first day,
but then you're going to break out into your
sessions, the rest of it will be, like, flight
ops will all be in this group, you'll have cabin

in this group, but you'll have FAA people there,
you'll have labor unions there --

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: And that's great.

This segues to this. You can see that these are other areas at ASAP, you got dispatch, you got maintenance, they call it tech ops now, so at this infoshare, they'll break out and talk about things.

So here's one from the cabin one, which is important, because the flight attendant shows up and there's a preflight, and you'll see this armrest, looks kind of goofy. It looks like it's a little too far forward, well, she wrote it up and told the Captain, hey, I think the armrest is wrong, and the Captain goes, we got to go.

Come on. Get everybody on. Let's leave.

Well, she was a little upset about that, first of all, but number two, she took some pictures, filed her ASAP report, and when you do this, you go, okay, well, now we start looking at, what happened to this?

So get the AMT to come out, we're part

of all the same program, the tech ops, the ASAP manager, sends -- his folks come out there, and it turns out, these were pre-positioned in the wrong place.

Now, what the Captain didn't realize is that, when a flight attendant is trained, if this airplane ran off into the woods with a bunch of passengers in the middle of night, no lights onboard, flight attendant is going to find the over-wing exit.

She does it because she's going to find this armrest and put her hand and look for the handle here. Well, if she does it this way, there's no handle. If you look at the right way it is, put her hand here, find the handle. So was it a safety concern? You bet it was a safety -- huge safety concern.

So when this happens, what will we do next?

MS. TOMAN: So we're going to reach out to that other department, so maintenance was involved with this. Maintenance has an ASAP

program. So the cabin ASAP manager is going to reach out to the maintenance ASAP manager and say, hey, look what was reported on our program. Do you have any reports or can you solicit reports?

Again, we're not trying to get anybody in trouble, what we're wanting to look at was the documents that they use to reinstall this exit door, was it followed correctly, does it need to be fixed?

And so that's where we're able to all work and share the reports from each different group, maintenance, dispatch, flight, et cetera.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So we found this here, you think this was the only airplane? Of course not, right? We know this. Everybody in the just knows it. So that's the beautiful of ASAP. You start going, hey, we better go look at all the airplanes, which they did, and they found five more like that.

MALE PARTICIPANT: Was it a mistake that was on their step list, like, the changing

the tire?

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: It was mistake made. The root of this, which is always important, they went back to the place that puts these armrests, because people first thought, oh, I think they put it on the wrong door. No, no, they had personally put it in the wrong place. The template they used, instead of this way, it was this way, so this way, so, you know, the old thing that says, this side up, we see this a lot, okay?

When you don't mark things appropriately, people show up, their late, they're used to old time, turn it one time, get new one, new people involved, so this was really important to ASAP now because we got a lot of old folks who are my age who are retiring in the next ten years, and all the new kids are coming up, the Millennials, and we need to help them by being very good at how we do things and mark stuff.

No offense to any Millennials, by the

way. Look at this one here, Mobil grease. Some airlines like the big one in Dallas, might pack their own brakes; the bearings in them.

See how it says, Mobil aviation grease, SHC 100, I think American, you know, they go to the Costco and they buy a million of these things. Well, it ran out, they ran out, they had to order a new one.

Well, if you look real close, it says, Mobil aviation grease, SHC 100. Here comes the new one, Mobilith SHC 100. Hey, it's a lithium complex, it's even better. Woo-hoo. They're busy doing the brakes, and one day the mechanic's looking down, and he looks at the can, and to his amazement, it says on the can here, not for aviation use.

He's thinking, oh, one of my buddies probably wrote that. No, it was true, and so he files an ASAP. So he files the ASAP report and he tells his manager, of course, the whole department filed ASAP reports right away, because they all missed it, and not that they were

responsible 100 percent, but they're supposed to 1 2 look at the label too. And so with that, now we've got 3 4 airplanes that have got -- running around with 5 not for aviation use wheel bearing grease, right? 6 So how do we solve that? Do we still keep 7 flying? 8 MS. TOMAN: Yes. 9 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: How do we tell the 10 FAA we keep flying? 11 MS. TOMAN: We've got to the notify 12 the FAA. CAPTAIN DELEEUW: And then do we do 13 14 anything with it, like a risk analysis and --15 MS. TOMAN: Yes, we do a risk analysis 16 and look at it, and that's part of our SMS 17 program, so this event's happened, we've got to 18 look and identify what the hazards are, can they 19 be mitigated or are we going to have to ground this fleet? And then that would be a concurrence 20 21 with all the three groups. 22 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: And as it turns out,

1	it was a better grease, it just never made it to
2	the paperwork yet, and you've all seen that,
3	right? So here's who benefits from this, the FAA
4	benefits, because they're the FAA, in the
5	past, didn't really know what was going on, and
6	it's impossible for the FAA, no offense to the
7	FAA in the room, but you cannot regulate a large
8	airline like American Airlines unless you have
9	you got to have ten times the amount of employees
10	you have, so they can't really regulate much
11	anymore, but now they're part of the process.
12	They're completely transparent,
13	they're working for the airline, and everything
14	that we find that's bad, they know about it.
15	They're there with us. They're partners with us
16	on everything that we do.
17	The airline benefits, the employee
18	benefits, of course, they benefit, but
19	MS. TOMAN: And you benefit the flying
20	public.
21	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: right here,

that's who benefits; the flying public.

MS. TOMAN: And, you know, when we started ASAP, we were not required to have a safety management system for airlines. So that's only -- that requirement only became effective in March for all -- 121 carriers have to have a safety management system, and that safety management system includes ASAP.

so you have to have the confidential reporting program, so that's where we used ASAP and we have the safety hotline that, when we first started this program, there was no SMS, nothing communicated about that, we didn't even have day talks (phonetic) yet, but that's where we get that feed for all of our employees.

MR. NGUYEN: But you said you had a hotline? Is that an ASAP hotline?

MS. TOMAN: We have to. So we have a fixed hotline, because we still have frontline employees that don't have an ASAP program, they don't have a certificate, so for them, we have the confidential reporting program, and that goes to the safety department, but then we also have

the ASAP hotline, because say, you know, we talked about, you got to file your report within 24 hours, well, what if you live in Montana, and you don't have Internet, and you got to drive an hour to get your report submitted?

You can actually call and say, I'm marking the time now, I will submit the report as soon as I get to Internet.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So one thing that's important on ASAP is, and what Vickie says there is very important, because you file your ASAP report, but it's not like this. So I go up and I'm ready to go fly, and they de-ice my airplane incorrectly. They told me I'm de-iced. I taxi out, the flight attendant goes, we still got ice on the wings, Captain.

Go back, and look, sure enough, we've got ice still on the wing, so I was improperly de-iced. Well, I could file an ASAP report when I come home from my trip, and it might get action in a couple days, but in the meantime I'm reading the paper the next day that an airplane crashed

because of ice on the wings. It'd be a little tough to swallow that.

So we don't do that. You could file your ASAP report, but you've got to belly up to the bar pretty quick and say, hey, this plane was not properly de-iced, I filed my ASAP report, you got to still tell your boss. You got to let everybody know.

So like Vickie said, you can call the hotline and say, I'm filing my ASAP report, but if it's a safety of flight issue, or something, you need to tell somebody. ASAP's not your only -- you just don't file an ASAP and go home. You got to tell somebody, if it's critical, right?

So this is the thing that I thought might be interesting. One of the things that we have in the airline world, as you all know, is checklists, but checklists can be cumbersome, sometimes they don't seem like -- so this is the 7A, some new changes because of technology, and a lot of because it's based on ASAP reports, people actually will miss items on a checklist.

God, I can't believe it. Well, that's what happens. So in this airplane here, it's a lot of the electric switches are tied to the checklist. So in this case here it says, transponder has to be set. When I turn the transponder here to the TARA, the checklist closes automatically. It's called a closed-loop checklist.

So as you flip electrical switches, it completes checklist items for you automatically because it knows you did it. If I was to go to the next checklist, it will tell me, you missed something. So the checklist philosophy and the way we're doing checklists, it's called an ECL, electronical checklist, basically, it's going to help safety, because these are all from ASAP reports, because you go, how could you miss a checklist item? Well, you can. Yes, go ahead.

DR. BORENER: Is that considered a safety critical system? Like, did it have to go through a certification process by training?

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: The Memphis one?

1	DR. BORENER: No, the
2	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: No, no, what happens
3	is, see, we get data.
4	MS. TOMAN: It does have to be
5	certified by the manufacturer.
6	DR. BORENER: So it had to go through
7	that certification process?
8	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes.
9	DR. BORENER: How long did it take to
LO	get to that?
L1	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Oh, talk to our
L2	friends at Boeing, they built it, but this is
L3	in ten years from now, this is going to be fairly
L 4	standard for all airplanes being built, I'm
L5	pretty sure.
L6	DR. BORENER: So now, is that
L7	reporting out data so that you could check to see
L8	how the
L9	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: You know, all
20	civilian airplanes, it's got so many black boxes,
21	it knows, you know, everything you do, basically,
22	but in this case here, the reason this comes into

ASAP is because people would write ASAP reports, 1 2 and over time, if somebody asks Vickie, hey, do you have any reports about people missing 3 4 checklist items? Yes, I got boxes full. 5 MS. TOMAN: And we still have them on our older aircraft, a little paper that you just, 6 7 you know, check, check, --8 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: And you get 9 distracted, the flight attendant says, you want 10 your coffee this morning? You go, oh, yes, I 11 missed an item. You missed the item, could be 12 critical to flight. So with that in mind, we 13 give information, we feedback to the 14 manufacturers, they want to hear from us, they 15 go, hey, did you know this? They go, oh, had no 16 idea. 17 MS. TOMAN: But we do have a FOOA 18 program, not to get all into that, but that does 19 report off the aircraft. 20 DR. BORENER: And that reports on to 21 -- that's the question I had. 22 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes.

MS. TOMAN: So that will show if 1 2 there's flap overspeeds --3 DR. BORENER: Okay. 4 MS. TOMAN: -- or, you know, certain 5 things. We always talk about ASAP is the employee telling you what happened, where FOQA is 6 the airplane telling you what happened, and 7 8 hopefully they mirror together, but that data is 9 reviewed in that monthly safety data meeting that I talked about earlier. 10 11 DR. BORENER: Okay. 12 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So I know -- I bet 13 he talked about FOQA, didn't he? A little bit 14 yesterday? If he didn't, that's good, but FOQA stands Flight Operations Quality Assurance. 15 16 friends at Southwest, they call it FDM, flight 17 data monitoring, same idea, but that's also a 18 voluntary program. 19 In Europe, it's a mandatory program, 20 but in the United States, it's a voluntary 21 program, so it's much more accepted by everybody,

quite frankly, and like Vickie said, it's just

another part of safety assurance in the SMS world; another program. We have other programs out there too, like IEP, LOSA, stuff like that.

So all these items here on the checklist, they're all completed electronically. When the crew does the switches and they do them properly and correctly, that checklist item will close. That's the beautiful thing of things like ASAP. Yes, sir.

MR. HERETH: When you have an electronic checklist, how can the checklist let you miss an item?

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: It won't. That's why we've gone to this. That's what I'm saying, the ASAP reports, we go to the manufacturer and go, you know, I know you're not going to believe it, but pilots miss checklist items. Really? Yes, so the manufacturer goes, hey, you know, I got an idea. Why don't we just tie it so that every time you take the four hydraulic switches, you know, close the hydraulic pumps, they're all off.

MS. THEBERT: So the plane won't go if 1 2 something's not checked. CAPTAIN DELEEUW: You'll get a notice 3 4 that it says, hey, it's almost like Siri telling 5 you, you forgot something. MS. TOMAN: But I think the good thing 6 7 is, though, after, you know, over 20 years in the 8 industry with ASAP for airlines, we're actually 9 seeing corrective action by the manufacturers of things that we've been reporting that we had 10 11 These are major safety enhancements issues with. 12 for the whole industry. 13 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So one thing we 14 talked about was the Millennials, and we're also talking about older generation, but we're also 15 16 talking about new technology. I guarantee you 17 all see the same new technology we do. 18 So five years ago when I used to go to 19 work, flying, I'd have a kit bag with me, you 20 probably saw pilots carry them, the kit bag 21 weighed, how much did kit bags weigh? 22 It was like 50 --MS. TOMAN:

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Fifty pounds.

2 MS. TOMAN: -- pounds.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Forty or fifty pounds. If you fly to China, you got to carry even manual loads, it was like 60 pounds.

MS. TOMAN: And we talked about some manuals, that was our number one cause of injury to pilots, was the kit bag, because when you get in the cockpit, you got to whip it around, put it behind your seat, and they'd have shoulder injuries.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, I was on injury duty for ten years. That's why I'm doing this now. I'm just kidding you. But I mean, a lot of pilots were injured on duty doing this.

So now we came up with the iPad. They started selling iPads in April of 2010. It's the fastest selling product ever for mankind, by the way, kind of a side note, but here is how we look at it on approach plate like this. And this is how we've always looked at it. And even at nighttime, we had our light up on the overhead.

This is how we looked at them. This was it.

Well, now, we have a crew that was flying to Las Vegas at night, they're flying at night, and it's Las Vegas, so if you all been ever to Las Vegas, it's the only thing out in the desert, big, bright lights, you cannot miss them, and the crew was basically clear for a visual approach. They were sitting over here and they were clear to come fly the visual approach.

Now, all of you can see that this is the water here, here are the mountains, it's pretty obvious, tells you peak elevation is 3300 feet, 3338, actually, so you can see the mountains and the water, so they're flying to Vegas, and while flying to Vegas, they look ahead, and all of a sudden, all the lights went away.

So I used to fly low levels in the military, if all the lights go away, they only go away for two reasons, massive power outage, or there's a mountain between you and the lights.

Las Vegas hasn't had a power outage in years,

because that's what makes the city glimmer at night.

So the crew do not recognize it and by the time they got the terrain pull up, which, we have safety features, they climbed, and hey, the lights came back, so the point is, we go, well, they filed an ASAP on this, which was good. We actually brought the crew in because we were a little concerned, started looking a little better, deep dive, and one of the questions in the investigation, they go, well, did you not see the mountain there?

And they said, actually, we missed the mountain. How could you do that? Well, they're Millennials, and they flew it at the nighttime mode, and look what happens when you fly the nighttime mode. The mountain goes away because they didn't build this for pilots. This is an iPad. You all have a nighttime feature on your iPad. You ever notice it before?

Wow, who would have known about that?

So then we looked at another jet manual we have,

same thing, look what happens when you do that procedure, you can inverse it, so now that mountain just became a big old lake.

So this is not about the Millennials,

I use it loosely, but a crew goes there for the

first time and they made it black this way here,

iPad's not going to know they changed theirs.

This is it. You can see very clearly how this

can be an accident in our industry in the next 30

years. Very clearly.

I'm telling you, this is a big thing.

So we can't change iPads, so we have an SMS

program, ASAP came in, the crew was accepted,

they didn't intentionally make a mistake, and we

give it to the SMS folks, so what did we do?

MS. TOMAN: We put out notification immediately to all pilots that they have to, during their briefing, ensure that they're not using the nighttime mode, and for the guidance in the manuals, which, that took a little bit longer, because that was a revision, we briefed this at infoshare, we sent messages out to other

carriers, and then also to Jefferson, so if they're the ones that are responsible for these charts, so they can notify other companies that may be using these charts.

But it's important, like what John said, we talked about that kit with all those manuals, that iPad, that's all the pilots have now. So they've got, like, a little purse, murse, that they put their little iPad in to go to work.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: It's a purse. Come on.

MS. TOMAN: They don't have shoulder injuries anymore, but like he said, the iPad wasn't built for airlines, so this is a new technology the airlines are using, and that's where we get this information. We can't sit on it. We've got to send it out to the industry.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: And I don't know if you picked up what Vickie said, the procedure change at our airline, and most airlines, when you brief the approach now, you have to brief it

in the daytime mode.

If you want to fly it this way when you actually do the approach, that's fine, but when you brief it, you have to brief it in the daytime mode, because otherwise you will miss the granularity of the technical stuff that's there, so that was a big change there. Good change for us.

So couple things, because nobody's asked me the question yet, because everybody gets accepted, right? Not so fast. So they have to be in 24 hours, as Vickie mentioned, you can't just wait until the FAA sends you a notice three weeks later. That's a little late. Doesn't work that way. Violations have to be inadvertent and not a potential disregard for safety.

So, Vickie, tell us on what we call the big five.

MS. TOMAN: So the big five, you can't have drugs involved, substance abuse, you can't lie, you can't intentionally, you know, go against a procedure or violation, because you're

1	not going to be (inaudible).
2	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Right. So
3	substance, alcohol, drug use
4	MS. TOMAN: Falsification, lying on
5	your report.
6	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Right. We don't get
7	many of those, actually, in the airline industry,
8	believe it or not, they're out there still, I get
9	it, but that just isn't really I cannot tell
10	you the last time that somebody was excluded from
11	ASAP for those three items; drugs, alcohol,
12	substance abuse. That just really doesn't
13	happen, because we're subject to random drug
14	testing, just like you folks are in the pipeline
15	industry. Doesn't happen much.
16	Lying, don't get too much lying,
17	because people know, you lie, you're done, so
18	might as well tell us the truth, because we want
19	to know everything, warts and all.
20	The last one is, intentional disregard
21	for safety, and that's kind of a big deal.
22	MS. TOMAN: It can be tricky too.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: That's tricky,
because what's intentional disregard for safety?
So the mechanic story I gave you, did he
intentionally disregard safety by not following a
work chart? Yes, he kind of did, but that's
where the ERC talks about it, and that's where
you get a, you know, let's keep it real, that's
what everybody's doing, so now we have to fix the
system, not so much that individual mechanic.

And that's where you really get your good safety lessons from. That is a really big thing there. So, you know, it can't be inadvertent, like I mentioned, they're accepted in here, and the employee doesn't complete the corrective actions.

Vickie mentioned earlier, you go in the holding and I can't hold, and they go, okay, you go to the simulator again. I still can't hold. If I can't complete the corrective actions, I'm not accepted.

MS. TOMAN: If you're not accepted, then you get -- you can open up for company

discipline, the company can investigate the event, discipline the employee. If it's non-sole source, the FAA is aware of it, they can discipline the employee. They can go after certificate action.

So it's a big thing that if you file this ASAP, you want to make sure you get accepted.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: And it remains confidential, so if a pilot or a mechanic, or any of the four workgroups, file an ASAP and they were excluded, doesn't mean they get fired right away, a lot of times they're not, they're just excluded. They just don't get the protections that ASAP gave them.

So that ASAP confidential report, the company, the union, they don't get that report.

If that report's excluded, that ASAP, they shred the ASAP and the company, or the FAA, has to do their own independent investigation. We don't give them, here's what we found out. That's not — but that so rarely happens.

1	I think last year, at American, it's
2	typical most airlines, there might have been five
3	exclusions of pilots, and none of those guys were
4	terminated, or gals, they just they were
5	excluded because of other extenuating
6	circumstances, typically.
7	MS. THEBERT: But, I guess, privacy-
8	wise, like, if you were on the simulator,
9	someone's going to know you messed up or do you
LO	go regularly?
L1	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Well, we do, but we
L2	kind of do that.
L3	MS. TOMAN: Like, in corrective action
L 4	
L5	MS. THEBERT: Right.
L6	MS. TOMAN: we have what we call a
L7	check airman, who does the simulator training,
L8	they have an agreement that they have to sign
L9	with the ASAP ERC that they will maintain the
20	confidentiality.
21	MS. THEBERT: Okay. So you could be
22	there for corrective action or you're just there
	II

to do --

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, if people don't see you go on the sim, they wouldn't necessarily know if you were on the sim for training or for corrective action, and we don't have that many.

MS. TOMAN: It doesn't go in your training record or anything like that.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Right.

MS. THEBERT: Okay.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: And for the maintenance world, sometimes it's as simple as, okay, this mechanic made a mistake and now he has to brief it at the next meeting of the mechanics. When they're having pizza and beer and he's got to go standup and, you know, confess his sins. That's pretty successful too.

MS. TOMAN: I think one of my favorite ones, and this was actually an infoshare for a ground ASAP program, one of the employees loaded hazmat in a cargo compartment that also had a dog in it, which is a big no-no, of course, the dog was okay, nothing happened, but the ERC made that

employee go volunteer at a local animal shelter for, like, two days and come back and show that they did to accept that as corrective. We thought that was pretty cool.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, it's kind of like Judge Wapner, you know, they have some strange ways of making you pay for your sins, I guess.

So now, one thing I want to tell you too is that, each one of these that we get is really good. So one of the things that we briefed at infoshare two years ago was, we had two mechanics working on a triple 7 at the maintenance facility at Chicago.

They fixed what they had to do, it's pretty simple, and now, in a lot of airlines, the AMTs, the mechanics, can actually taxi airplanes. They don't fly them, but they can taxi them. So if they have -- they're not going to call a pilot, you know, taxi the airplane from the hangar to the terminal, but we can get mechanics to do it. They're trained in it. Everything's

fine.

These two mechanics get down on the deck, get in this triple 7, they're going to taxi it to the hangar -- I mean, from the hangar to the terminal, beautiful, clear day. Not a cloud in the sky. They taxi out, they don't maybe 50 feet and they hit an engine stand that was sitting on the right-hand side of the airplane.

So they hit this engine stand. It's like, we got the video, right? There's a video of everything anywhere in the world now. You got the video and you look at the video and go, these guys, they need drug and alcohol testing, because how could you miss this engine stand?

So they came in there, the ERC was meeting, and, you know, they were kind of debating, and just, they couldn't get their hands wrapped around this thing.

Well, my background as a pilot, and I went to talk to the guy, because he worked for me, the tech ops guy, and he's telling me the story, and I said, well, were they wearing

sunglasses?

I don't know. I'll find out. Well, if they wore sunglasses, have them send them back. They both wore sunglasses. Does anybody know why that's a big deal? If you have polarized sunglasses, you cannot look at a cockpit window, because the cockpit windows are polarized.

Now, you'll still look through it, but you'll have blindspots. And people that are pilots, from the first day of pilot training, they tell you, don't wear polarized sunglasses.

But we never told the mechanics this.

MS. TOMAN: And there's actually an FAA alert for the pilots stating, you cannot wear those, because also, the instrument panel, if you look at the instrument panel, things blank out on it, or change colors.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes. We have some great -- we did a similar -- I'll tell, it's probably one of the better briefings ever given there, not because I gave it, but because this

was a thing that every mechanic there goes, wow,
I had no idea. We had one mechanic come up to me
and goes, it makes sense to me. When I ride my
motorcycle with the big glare shield upfront, I
noticed I was missing things because I was
wearing my polarized sunglasses, because it's the
same thing if you got a big shield in front of
your motorcycle.

So this was a really big alert item and that got sent to the entire industry, and that's all because these two mechanics, who looked like they were being clowns, they actually just didn't see the stand, because some airplanes, you actually have -- I mean, you actually will have blindspots; you cannot see out the window.

So that's why we don't wear polarized glasses.

MS. THEBERT: When you say, industry, do you mean, like, worldwide or just --

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Pretty much, U.S.,

I mean, actually, we do -- there are ways that

the international community finds out, but it's 1 2 more -- it doesn't always get disseminated international. 3 4 MS. THEBERT: Okay. 5 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: We're not there yet. 6 Some day we will, but, you know, we share, in our 7 industry in the United States, safety's not a 8 secret, so we share quite readily. Other 9 carriers, particularly South America, it's not a 10 voluntary program, it's a required program, and 11 they can fire you. 12 MS. THEBERT: So what if you're 13 landing in America, wouldn't you think they'd 14 have to --No, if they have a 15 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: 16 program, like, when we go to China, and I make a 17 mistake in China, I may have an ASAP coverage for

MS. TOMAN: Because you have a different regulatory authority.

want to talk to you.

the U.S. for my certificate and the company, but

the Chinese Government can still say, hey, we

18

19

20

21

1	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Right.
2	MS. TOMAN: So our program is, we have
3	a memorandum of understanding signed with the
4	FAA, so, you know, if you go to China, they're
5	not going to really care, oh, yes, hey, I have
6	ASAP.
7	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: They go, good, as
8	they take you to jail. You tell them, I got an
9	ASAP.
10	MS. THEBERT: You can go to jail over
11	there?
12	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Oh, yes.
13	MS. THEBERT: Oh.
14	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: There's a lot of
15	places, it's called criminalization of pilots.
16	If you have an accident, you go to jail. In
17	Brazil, if you get an accident, you go to jail.
18	Most of the places, the police do the
19	investigation, and they're police officers, so
20	you go to jail.
21	MS. THEBERT: I would just fly
22	national

1	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: You just stay in the
2	United States. Don't be going out of the
3	country.
4	MR. NGUYEN: Real quick, with that
5	example, is that protocol to drug test, that
6	example that you
7	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes.
8	MR. NGUYEN: So they have to drug test
9	them.
LO	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Well, each airline's
L1	different, but generally, in the business, and
L2	actually, a lot of this is DOT testing, just so
L3	you know, it's driven by the DOT, but most
L 4	airlines have one, but usually if there's
L5	aircraft damage in any way, they usually will do
L6	a drug and alcohol test, and
L7	MS. TOMAN: Except that the actual
L8	damage, it would count as an accident.
L9	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Right.
20	MS. TOMAN: So there's, like, specific
21	rules.
22	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: But we have specific

DOT rules for drug testing, and we also have specific company rules for testing, and sometimes they don't always marry up, and the company, most companies, you damage their airplane, you bend metal, you're going to get a drug and alcohol test.

But pilots don't care because they pay them to do it. They go, ah, I get paid to do it.

I'm just saying, it's not that big of a deal.

So since 2009, because everybody has to ask, this ASAP program you're spending money on, does this thing really work? Unfortunately, we all know the one passenger who recently passed away, that's with another carrier, but since 2009, we've had no passenger fatalities.

We fly millions and millions of
flights a year in the United States, and in the
United States, there's only been Asiana, and
there was a UPS crash, but no passenger
fatalities. So we've really made the change, and
I give a huge amount of credit to the ASAP
program, because we're fixing things before they

become accidents.

So I want to put that out there, but you all do a little SMS, I'm not going to do SMS training, but Vickie will tell you, this ASAP program, where does it fit in this world of SMS?

MS. TOMAN: It actually fits in two places. Mainly it's our safety assurance. Are the policies and procedures that we're putting out for our employees to follow, are they working? Because if they're not working, I can guarantee you, we're going to find out in ASAP, because that's where the reports are going to be coming through.

But also, as we talked about, if
there's a safety concern that an employee has,
they can file an ASAP, and that's where our
safety risk management, that's going to be
identifying new hazards in the system that we're
not aware of, similar to that jet card, the
blues, that was something that we weren't aware
of.

And then the safety promotion, that's

another big part of ASAP is, if an employee takes the time to submit a concern to you, you've got to answer that report, but then also, you got to let everybody know what's going on. We have, like, a safety preflight newsletter that we put out every month that has all the closed de-identified reports.

If it's an open report, you can't put it in there, but if it's closed, we put it in there, and that goes to all the employees.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Because I love why you say that, because pilots don't like to make change. And so Vickie puts out the promotion to tell them why we're making the change, because if you don't tell people why you're making the change, they think, oh, Vickie, she's got another idea in her head. No, no.

They got to tell us why we're making the change. That's important. So I always like to put this up, you know, each year, I change it, you know, 2017, by the way, was the safest year in history for passengers, because the ASAP

concept is spreading through the world.

They all kind of get it, you start -if you want to start hammering and thumping
employees for reporting mistakes they might have
made that are inadvertent, they're not going to
tell you anything. It's just, they won't tell
you. And it's just like kids, right? Dad and
mom don't know I broke it, maybe they won't find
out who did it, and that's what happens.

So this is the aviation safety action program. It's starting to get -- it's really starting to go into the petroleum industry, we're calling it the petroleum safety action program, but, you know what? Maybe one of these days we'll have a pipeline safety action program, because it would work in your industry.

It's the same type of industry.

Hazards, competent employees, people that are subject -- they know they got a certificate or at least they're subject to drug and alcohol testing, so we got to thank you for your attention and now it's time for questions and I

will leave this up. You can take a picture, obviously, and if you need to call us, or work, just send me -- you know, it's Christie here, but one thing is, this report, like, Christie asked, can I have your presentation, I will have some of the presentation for you, but some I can't, because I told you, it's a confidential program.

So all the examples I gave you, those are confidential, so I can't give those to you, but you got the benefit of listening to them, and I'll be glad to tell, or call Vickie, but that -- this is what we do.

And I'll leave you one last thing,
there was a report that came in, me and Vickie
both also teach, ironically, at the University of
Southern California, we teach in the aviation
safety department there, so it's kind of a
prestigious place to get a certificate in safety,
and the example we always bring up, takes an hour
to go through it, so I won't do that now, but we
had a crew make a report about an issue, about a
performance issue on a 73 leaving St. Croix.

And the reason that the performance was there was because the airplane had input in the data, because we do it -- download it, and instead of being 28 degrees, it got inputted as - 28 degrees.

So the airplane thinks it's minus 28 degrees, and so the throttle won't go up as far, they roll down the runway, and they get airborne, and the trees are, like, really big. Okay.

So what happens, we do this big deep dive, talk to Boeing, went through it, we found out some system issues in the industry, but at the end of the day what really surprised us was, a modern airplane like that, if you put in minus 28 degrees, are you telling me the airplane doesn't got, no, it's 28 degree, John.

Every airplane in the world that

Boeing makes, the new ones, it does that. If I

put the wrong temperature in, and the outside

temperature is different, you get a little alert

that says, hey, check the temperature, dude.

It's not right.

The 73's been around a long time, so that technology was never put in the 73, and so what happened, this one event we had, we had this thing that's important, so we talked to Boeing about it, and Boeing goes, yes, wow, that -- well, let's see if that's a big deal. Well, they came back and said, yes, that's a big deal. We get it now.

So we briefed it at Infoshare and after Infoshare, we briefed it, we said, you know, if any other operators have seen this before, why don't you come forward and tell us? And it was like, you know, Baptist church with altar call. Everybody jumped right up.

So we got it forwarded, Boeing recognized it, so Boeing does two things, they sent out a safety alert to 178 operators in the world, with the minus 28 degree example, which was an ASAP report from one of the pilots that we know, and then they made a technological change to their airplane.

So one ASAP report made a change to

1	every airline in the world, a notice of it, and
2	they're changing new airplanes. So the new 73s
3	that come out have this technology so it will
4	change your temperature if you put the wrong one
5	in. There's a lot of history behind it, but
6	that's kind of our ASAP, you know, the best of
7	the best, I guess. Yes, ma'am.
8	MS. BLYSTONE: Kate Blystone, HHS
9	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Oh, yes, I heard you
10	before. We were warned.
11	MS. BLYSTONE: Good grief. That was,
12	like, the most exciting thing we've heard in the
13	last year and a half. Thank you so much.
14	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Are you being
15	serious?
16	MS. BLYSTONE: I'm both more terrified
17	and more excited about flying than I was before,
18	so
19	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: You should be.
20	MS. BLYSTONE: Yes, this is a good
21	thing. So one of the things that we've discussed
22	a little bit is some sort of public interface and

it seems like the only public aspect of this that 1 2 I've seen is at the very end when you showed that 2017 was the best year ever. 3 Yes, that one. 4 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes. Is there anything else 5 MS. BLYSTONE: that you do? I mean, did I miss it? 6 7 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: No. 8 It's really a high-MS. BLYSTONE: 9 energy presentation and it's easy to like lose the thread a little bit, but it was amazing. 10 there something that you do to kind of let the 11 12 public know that, we have this awesome program and it leads to this? 13 14 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: You know, we don't 15 really, it's not because we don't want to, but 16 you know, when Vickie started ASAP, there was 17 posters put up at all the airlines, hey, if you 18 find a general safety concern, file an ASAP. 19 MS. BLYSTONE: Right. 20 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Do that stuff. You 21 go on the airlines now, there's no posters for

ASAP because business is good. You know, we

don't need to advertise it, but --

MS. TOMAN: In the DOT, you know, they put out the rankings of all the airlines, and on time, safety records, so I mean, that may not necessarily point that that airline has an ASAP program, but they -- you know, the public is looking at the safety, you know, reputation of each one of those airlines, but we really don't.

We have, a lot of times, we'll have, like, our insurance groups will come in and we'll give a presentation showing how our safety program's, you know, corrective action, safety enhancements that we've done, but that's --

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: But you have a point, because after -- this has almost been around for 30 years. It'll be 27 years. There's a reason why the last two, three years, people are calling on, hey, like, a couple of large oil manufacturers in the Gulf of Mexico go, can we kind of observe what you all are doing? Because it sounds pretty interesting.

This is why the medical goes --

medical world's going, I wonder if we can do that 1 2 because we have a lot of debts in the industry in It's only 300,000 people a year are 3 medical. killed accidentally in the hospitals. Only. 4 5 that's the low end. And those are mistakes that are, many 6 times, may have been prevented, but we're not re-7 8 learning the lessons and keep making the same 9 mistakes, so we don't want to do that in our world, because if we crash an airplane, you might 10 survive it, you do two, your airlines gone. 11 12 MS. BLYSTONE: So a follow-up on that 13 question, is there any way that the public can 14 give you an ASAP? So, like, if they see something weird on a place, like, I don't know. 15 16 MS. TOMAN: Yes, they can call the FAA 17 hotline --18 MS. BLYSTONE: Yes, so that's --19 MS. TOMAN: -- and they can also call 20 the company. 21 MS. BLYSTONE: Okay. 22 MS. TOMAN: And we have a hotline

where they can call and that group will reach out directly to the operating department to get information.

is, though, and this is why this program works, you're right, the public can see something, maybe the manager can see something, but the people who know what's wrong are the employees themselves. They know the mistake they made, they usually know why they made the mistake, maybe they're being rushed, maybe they said, this was written wrong, we see that every week.

In the maintenance world, if the diagram and instructions are written incorrectly and poorly, somebody's going to make a mistake someday, and we can't afford those mistakes.

So I used to tell the mechanics, there'd be a meeting of 100 mechanics, hey, listen, any of you guys file an ASAP reports?

No. Okay. How many of you guys know of a work card, a policy, a procedure, or instructions that you follow that are wrong? Because mechanics are

smart. They know how to do a workaround. Don't work, we got another way to do it.

And they all raise their hand. I said, well, if you all just give me one ASAP a year, we get 25,000 ASAPs next year. You keep your company so busy, they won't know what to do, right? I mean, that's the reality.

So in your world, you have a lot of people who probably work remotely and independently, out by themselves in the middle of, you know? I looked at this picture this morning, and, you know, in the middle of, probably, the Tundra somewhere, right?

So like this, you make a mistake, you want that employee who made a mistake out here where nobody saw it, you want him to feel free, like, I'm going to make a report, because if he writes that report, you're going to find that other people will start making reports, and you - to Vickie's point about the promotion, you tell them why you made the change, you get buy-in pretty quick, and next thing you know, you won't

be advertising ASAP, because they're going to 1 2 give you the reports, particularly if they get protection. 3 4 MS. BLYSTONE: Thank you so much. 5 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: I hope that -- yes, sir. 6 7 MR. HERETH: Do you put -- do 8 maintenance reports go into this process or can 9 they go into this process? 10 MS. TOMAN: Maintenance reports as far as the ASAP reports from the mechanics? 11 12 MR. HERETH: Yes. Yes, it's all in the same. 13 MS. TOMAN: 14 The way we've described the system, it's run the 15 same way for the flight attendants, for the 16 mechanics, for our dispatchers, those are all our 17 certified workgroups. Some people also have a 18 ground ASAP program. The FAA, we used to, you 19 know, send reports all the time to ATC, it's 20 like, hey, what's going on with this controller, 21 the way they gave this direction to the pilot. 22 So there's now an ACSAP program, so

the controllers also have an ASAP program, and we work with them a lot because if it's recorded in a flight ASAP report, chances are if it's dealing with ATC, they're probably going to have an ACSAP, so we can work together and get both sides of the story.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes. And let me make some -- so you know, sometimes I don't always say this because I just think it's obvious, but it's obvious to me, probably, but that tech ops ASAP, the company guy is an AMT. The union guy is an AMT. The FAA guy, he's not a pilot, he's an FAA maintenance guy.

So there's no pilots or flight attendants involved in that whole process. It's a mechanic's world and you couldn't --

MS. TOMAN: And that's an important part, because when we first started ASAP 25 years ago, you would have the pilot, FAA guy, or maybe even from the company think that they would manage all the ASAP programs, and you can't do that. You've got to have people that have the

1	experience to be in that group.
2	MR. HERETH: So actually well
3	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Go ahead.
4	MR. HERETH: So why wouldn't you have
5	a pilot involved in that program?
6	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Well, I can tell you
7	why. If I'm going to be judged on the report I
8	flew, on a descent from China, and I missed the
9	final approach, 6200 feet, because EGBWS was
10	going off, you think the mechanic's going to be
11	able to say, yes, that was dumb.
12	MR. HERETH: I understand that.
13	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, so but the
14	mechanic wouldn't want a pilot judging him
15	because I don't go out and turn wrenches, and I
16	go
17	MS. TOMAN: But yet, we share so in
18	those ASAP managers, they all they're not in
19	different buildings, different locations, they
20	all set in the same row. Their offices are in a
21	line. So if it's going to involve another
22	operational group that has an ASAP, you have to

share that ASAP with them. 1 2 MR. HERETH: Yes, actually, my question was a little bit different concept. 3 4 MS. TOMAN: Oh, okay. So it's a maintenance-5 MR. HERETH: related event, if it's all maintenance people, 6 7 don't you have a confirmation bias; a tendency 8 towards confirmation bias? Why wouldn't you have 9 pilots? Why wouldn't you have people who are users of the equipment involved in that process? 10 11 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Well, you could, in 12 a perfect world, and get some input, but, you 13 know, then they'd say, well, why do we have a 14 flight attendant as being part of that to that, 15 and they --16 MR. HERETH: I guess I would suggest 17 you should have a customer. 18 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Well, you could, but

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Well, you could, but you're talking about, most of the ASAP reports that come in there from the maintenance world are actually fairly technical, and I do sit through them. I actually sat through a tech ops ERC

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about three, four weeks ago, and I was -- learned a lot. I'm always -- I learned a tremendous amount.

But, you know, it's really, I know this doesn't seem fair, but it's really not my wheelhouse, and I don't really get in there much, now, if there's something that comes out of that ERC that's appropriate for the pilots to know, you bet. That does get communicated, but I get your point, and maybe in 30 years we'll be there, but we're not quite there yet.

We keep evolving, so Vickie made a point that I don't know was caught by everybody, we used to have ASAP managers for the different programs at different locations. We finally figured out one day, you know what? This is not pretty bright. So we actually, when I was there, we put all four ASAP managers in cubicles or offices right next to each other, so instead of making a phone call, you know how that is, or an email, they walked out their door and go, hey, did you know about this here? It really improved

the communication process. Yes, sir.

MR. COTE: Two questions related.

Number one, does all of the ASAP flow directly
into the Asias program or are those two separate
programs, and if so, what is the division?

MS. TOMAN: So that does -- for it to flow into Asias, that's got to be an agreement between the company and the pilots. And so some airlines may feed some information in there, but again, those are going to be closed reports.

Once the ERC has done their thing, the company has done their thing, all the corrective actions have been done, there's an agreement that they can dump that data in there.

And so I --

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: We all do, but here's the thing, and this is something, so for American Airlines and Delta, for instance, they get 12,000 ASAP reports. They get all the reports and we have such a high statistical sample that if there's a trend developing, we can probably figure it out just on our own.

But then you've got, let's say, Sun 1 2 Country, who's got three airplanes, they don't have enough data coming in to know what it is. 3 So they benefit more out of Asias, probably, than 4 5 the major airlines. Now, the major airlines are contributing to it because they're part of the 6 safety system, but if American Airlines was to 7 pull out of Asias, the dataset's so large that 8 9 the trends are still going to be identified, regardless whether we're in it or not. 10 11 So that's a great question to ask, 12 but, you know, the Asias thing, it's got to start 13 somewhere. Now there's 43 airlines, I believe, 14 or entities, that feed into Asias, so, you know, 15 the numbers are staggering. The question is --16 MS. TOMAN: It's a great data source 17 for information. 18 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: It is. MS. TOMAN: Especially if you think 19 20 you see something trending in your airline, you 21 can look at that and say, oh, hey --

CAPTAIN DELEEUW:

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But see, we learned

the lesson the hard way. That's why, if you all were to start this tomorrow, you're going to want to hire us, and I'll tell you why, because you learn things the hard way. So that example you had, so what if you decide and said, I've got access to Asias, that's pretty cool, let me see what kind of -- let's see what approaches we have at Memphis from midnight to 5:00 in the morning, who are you checking? FedEx, right?

What if we said, we want to see all the unstable approaches at Love Field in Dallas. We all know that's Southwest, right? We have the rule of three. Has to be three carriers, basically, the same operation, because we don't want anybody, including the FAA, not to even be tempted to find out, because they can't.

We have the rule of threes, and that's what Asias will manage. So if you're going to play the game, which you are, there are certain caveats and rules you have to follow. That's a whole other discussion, but that's where I'm kind of getting on that. Okay. Yes.

MR. COTE: I understand. Thank you.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, sir. Go ahead.

MALE PARTICIPANT: Your safety
management system, you had touched on that, how
does that all tie-in with this and is it the same
safety management system throughout the industry
or do you guys have your own?

MS. TOMAN: Well, each person can kind of tailor it different for their airline, but we have the -- well, originally, it was advisory circular, but Part 5, the final rule that came out from the FAA, that's all the four pillars and then they added the documentation and record keeping at the end, but we all have to make commitments within this.

But most airlines, for that confidential reporting piece, that's where they're looking at ASAP or a confidential hotline to get that information.

And most airlines, we already had this process in place, we just didn't really have it documented on how we did it. But the ASAP, that

identifies hazards, that's our safety assurance, is things that we're doing. When we make a new policy or procedure change, we go through a risk management process where we identify what potential hazards could be there, that, if we make this change, but then also for monitoring, after we've made that change, that's where we rely on all that safety data coming in, because we'll look at that for maybe six months and say, okay, we made this huge procedure change on an aircraft, we want to see, are we getting ASAP reports on that? Are we getting the FOQA reports? Is anything -- is it working or do we need to go back and re-look at it?

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So yes, and you asked a question -- somebody asked me when I was on a phone call a while back, a couple months ago, about ASAP, SMS, and, you know, how do they fall exactly? I don't know which is which. So SMS is the guiding principle of safety in the airlines. That's how we manager our safety programs.

ASAP is a tool in this, primarily, safety assurance bucket, but clearly, it falls in different areas, but if you tell the FAA, I don't want to do ASAP, the FAA says, fine, you better have another voluntary confidential program that works as good as ASAP.

You can call it something else, but if you don't have one, you're not going to management system because you're not managing your safety.

MS. TOMAN: And when the -- prior to the final rule coming out for SMS for airlines, it was stated that every airline has to have an ASAP program. That's SMS. Well, it's not SMS. I mean, they prefer an ASAP program, because that's where you're going to get your best information, but you have to have a non-punitive safety confidential reporting program for your employees.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, sir.

MR. MAYBERRY: I have a couple questions. On the maintenance side, do you have

a counterpart that promotes ASAP on the maintenance side?

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, so Vickie's actually the flight SMS manager. There's also what they call a tech ops, it's a new buzzword, SMS manager, and they have a tech ops ASAP manager, so everything I've talked about here, the mechanics and AMTs could give you the same brief, it would just be much more oriented towards them.

MR. MAYBERRY: So the lifting and briefs example you had, that came out of that program, I imagine, not the pilot program.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: No, pilot program.

MR. MAYBERRY: And also, has it changed -- one of the questions in mind as far as your relationship with your FAA --

MS. TOMAN: Well, I think overall, the whole Federal Administration, if you think of the compliance philosophy, I don't know if you guys have heard that term, but that's kind of the new term within the FAA that, you know, they're

looking to us to manage our system, and we're reporting those hazards.

When I talked about the data analysis

-- the safety data meetings that we have every

month, we have, the FAA is there. So they're

hearing everything. We're sharing everything

with them, and, you know, working together with

them to make sure that we are in compliance.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So the check part I get from the FAA, it's the same idea, if I do something that's dumb, different, or dangerous on the check, right, I potentially could, you know, get a bust. That is separate from ASAP. I can't file an ASAP going, I made a mistake. Woo-hoo. You still bus the ride. We don't have any guys bust anymore, quite frankly, because the training's really good, but if you can't show confidence in what you're doing, the traveling public is expecting the FAA to say, John's not going to get to fly because he hasn't proven his proficiency here.

But in the flying of the airplane

itself, are not necessarily checked right, if you make a mistake, the FAA is also expecting me to raise my hand and go, hey, I screwed this up.

And to your earlier question, to be clear, if you know a little bit about this, if I'm getting a check ride in flight, so there's an FAA guy sitting in the jump seat, and I made a mistake, that guy's probably going to do, he's going to say, ah, you made a mistake. Yes, I know. He goes, are you going to file an ASAP? Yes. Thank you.

He would prefer I file the ASAP versus him giving me a little ticket and saying, you're done. I mean, do you agree?

MS. TOMAN: Yes.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: That's pretty much how we do it. Most of the FAA guys and gals, even if they're walking around the ramp and they see a mistake by an AMT, they're going to put their arm around and go, yes, you know you screwed that up? Yes. You're going to file an ASAP, right? Yes. File an ASAP.

The FAA wants you to file the ASAP, 1 2 because if you don't tell them, there's no data And the one mistake you make might change 3 feed. 4 the entire system, so they want the data. CHAIR BURMAN: Any questions from the 5 audience? 6 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: One right behind 7 8 you. Yes, ma'am. 9 CHAIR BURMAN: She delivers our pizza. 10 MS. PUGH: Thank you. My question, I 11 thought I heard you state that the short-lived 12 rules, we will see some of this be used by parts 13 of the oil, perhaps an offshore oil industry, and 14 perhaps you were being funny, but maybe some sort of suggestion that some hospitals were 15 16 approaching you, could you elaborate on that and 17 explain, what is the relationship? Does the FAA 18 offer any guidance to other agencies or is this 19 all done through the two of you? Might you tell 20 us what that industry? 21 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So that's a great So when the Gulf of Mexico folks like 22 question.

Chevrons, Exxons, Mobil, said, hey, this thing sounds pretty cool. I wonder how we can do this, you know, because we've got a regulator called BSEE. I said, well, BSEE is about four blocks away from the FAA, tell them to go walk and ask them.

The FAA can tell you everything about this program that I can. In fact, they should be the experts at it, and they are. If you talk to -- but other government agencies are slow to go call -- pick up the phone and call their friends at the FAA going, hey, what is this ASAP thing anyway?

I mean, there are folks inside the DOT who don't talk to the FAA, who are looking at it. So when you look at that oil and gas industry, that's a concept, you got to bring the regulator, drag along going, hey, this is how it works. And they go, well, no, it doesn't work. You go, FAA's been doing it for 30 years. Really? They didn't even know that.

So that part is different, that part's

a little different, but like, in the medical world, you know, they really have a OSHA, but in the medical world, they want to just fix the problem, so there's really not a regulator so much, but that's where the hospital's going to step up with the management and with the employees saying, we're going to have an ASAP-type program. Does that make sense?

MS. TOMAN: I think both industries have been looking at something similar to this because we've had people reach out to us so they can see what our process is and how it works. So it's just kind of, who's going to take that first step to do it.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Right. Yes, sir.

MR. TU: I guess this is more of a prospect question about, just for the benefit of some of the folks in the audience, this type of program does exist in the natural gas industry. If you look up corrective action programs, and they call it something different, you will see that often, so it is out there, I thought, but

not necessarily regulator-enforced, regulator-1 2 promoted, but it's something that's out there. CAPTAIN DELEEUW: And you said this 3 4 was the natural gas industry? MR. TU: That's right. 5 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Okay. 6 And I know 7 there's other people who do it. They don't call It's a beautiful 8 It's a similar thing. it ASAP. 9 thing if you can get the regulator to play with 10 you on the game, right? Because now the 11 regulator's involved. The regulator works well 12 in our world because most of us are certificate 13 employees. So they own our certificates, so we 14 want them to play the game. If you're in an industry that's not 15 16 certificated, this same program could work, but 17 you're going to not normally have the regulator. 18 If the regulator wants to join in, man, that's 19 powerful. The employees get it. It's a good 20 thing to do. 21 I know I'm probably cutting into your pizza time. Well, I hope you all found this 22

interesting. We love doing this. This is, you know, we preach the gospel, because we believe this stuff, because I know it works. I live it, she lives it, we know this stuff works.

My recommendation, if you're interested in this, you got to be careful starting it because here's the thing we've seen, an organization hears us speak and they go, oh, yes, this is great. We're going to get started. Well, if they don't know how the mistakes were in the past, they'll start the program up, somebody didn't get the word, somebody in senior management fired an employee and filed a report, or an employee does something and he basically got fired for it, so they make a misstep.

And what happens now, the ASAP program that you started and thought would work well, doesn't work, it'll take you three years to recover. It takes you three or four years to get the thing working, it takes one mistake to set you back three years.

So I would encourage, if you think

something like this could work, you really have to reach out to people with expertise to say, you know, that won't work.

The last example I give you is, in the maintenance world, we had ASAP, it was in the hangars, so back when this started, I mean, we didn't have any laptops hanging around, there certainly wasn't an iPad, so a lot of the mechanics didn't have laptops at home, so what we did, we said, hey, well, we'll just give you a laptop at work.

So in the middle of the hangar, we put a laptop on the table with a big arrow that says, file your ASAP here. So everybody's working in the dock, and here comes some lowly mechanic, he gets a chair out, sits on the computer, and he hadn't even started typing, and about 30 of his buddies come up and going, dude, why are you doing this? What mistake did you make?

So if you don't have a private thing, now, we've changed that because everybody's got iPads, so we fixed that piece, but those are the

lessons learned because, we couldn't figure out why we weren't getting ASAPs in the maintenance world.

You know, we just couldn't figure it out. It never dawned on us. It was like, well, it's not very confidential if you're the guy in the middle of the hangar, because they all know, you're the man that just turned everybody in for a mistake, right?

So my advice is, make sure if you do it, this program will work in almost every industry, it's just a culture of change, it requires buy-in from the leadership, and buy-in from the employees to say, yes, we want your reports, and you're going to trust us not to fire us if we give it to you.

MS. THEBERT: Which group are the most reports? Like, pilots, or mechanics?

MS. TOMAN: I would say, probably pilots. That was actually the first ASAP program we started, was for the pilots, and then we started -- the other operational groups started

adding on programs for them. And then, you know, 1 2 we have an agreement on each one of those with, you know, their labor person, as well as with the 3 4 FAA, and the company. There's an MOU, what I 5 called earlier, agreement that's signed, and 6 that's a separate agreement for the flight, a 7 separate one for cabin, et cetera. 8 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Yes, sir. 9 MR. ROBERTI: I may have missed this, 10 because I late two minutes when the presentation 11 started, but what is the end stage for the 12 request? 13 CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Well, the FAA's aware of all -- I think Vickie mentioned it 14 earlier, the FAA, they go to all our data 15 16 analysis meetings once a month, so they have 17 complete -- we don't give it out to the public. 18 MS. TOMAN: Are you talking about 19 enforcement to the employee? 20 MR. ROBERTI: Enforcement to the 21 company. 22 MS. TOMAN: To the company. I mean,

the company still has to follow the rules. We have a voluntary self-disclosure program where if we see something that we have to disclose to the FAA, but -- and then the company's responsible if something's reported and is that part of that safety policy, that our senior leadership, if someone reports a hazard to you, it's your responsibility that you have to fix it, or reach out to somebody.

CAPTAIN DELEEUW: So there is, kind of, a mechanism, so that's kind of what Vickie's role is now. If the company knows a systemic mistake that's been going on, the company can do a VSD. And that's like an ASAP report. It's not the same, but it's the same and if the VSD is -- the FAA goes, yes, we get it, you guys didn't intentionally do it, fix it in two weeks. Let us know you guys fixed the problem.

Now, if you don't fix it, then you're looking at civil penalties, but that's the out from the corporation. They have a mechanism, and I don't know if you want to say any more about

1	it, but that's, really, essentially it, right?
2	MS. TOMAN: Yes.
3	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Okay. It's just,
4	they don't call it ASAP, but it's a voluntary
5	MS. TOMAN: The company, I mean, you
6	can't ASAP it, so we still have a responsibility,
7	even though an employee may be involved, and they
8	have these the company, they haven't changed a
9	lot.
LO	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: It's all part of the
L1	DOT. I think you all know who they are.
L2	CHAIR BURMAN: Well, thank you very,
L3	very much. This was
L 4	CAPTAIN DELEEUW: Thank you.
L5	CHAIR BURMAN: Next, we're going to
L6	have Agenda Item 3, which is the Inline
L7	Inspection System, but I do just want to
L8	recognize that Paul Roberti is in the house, so
L9	very nice to see you. Thank you very much for
20	being here. For those of you who don't know,
21	he's General Counsel now at PHMSA, but he was a
22	former state regulator and we're lucky to have

him, so thank you.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 2:44 p.m. and resumed at 2:50 p.m.)

CHAIR BURMAN: All right. We're ready to get started. We're going to try to make up some time also. And I do want to say we are almost out of pizza. So if you're looking for your third slice, now is the time to get it.

MR. HEVLE: Well, thank you so much for opportunity to talk to the work group again.

I want to, first of all, assure everybody that

I'm just as excited about my material as John and Vickie were about theirs. I think you can tell from my expression.

I'm a Corrosion Engineer and this really is exciting, but it is a little dry. But the reason why I'm going to talk about API-1163 today is that there are a lot of components of API-63 that apply directly to the type of things that we're talking about.

We're talking about information.

We're talking about self-audits. We're talking about things like that. And there's components already being applied within the ILI process as part of 1163.

And so, that's why Mark had asked me to make a presentation to the Process Sharing Group. And we did that over the phone. And they felt like there was enough information here to talk about to the big group. What I did was, for this presentation, I pulled out every kind of mention of information sharing in the standard.

I'm not going to dive deep into the details of this. There are examples that would apply to, I think, almost every sub-committee and almost every topic within this. So I'm going to skip over some stuff.

But my main purpose is to show you there's a wealth of data sharing already going on. Although it's not as comprehensive as the scope that we're talking about for this committee, there's a lot of data sharing that's already going on.

So API-1163, already has a lot of process requiring data sharing. Most of these data sharing processes relate to data shared between the customer, or the potential customer, and the vendor in developing the performance specification.

The performance specification is like the master contract between the customer, the pipeline operator, and the vendor, the ILI service provider, in how the whole thing is going to work, both from providing information about your system, providing information about the tool and the accuracies, establishing common goals, you know, what are you trying to find.

Different tools have different capabilities. Accuracy evaluating the quality of the results, and all of that, are part of the performance spec. The data is shared in both directions. The vendor provides data to the customer. The customer provides data to the vendor.

API-1163 also incorporates a number of

other standards, including ASNT, ILI-PQ, which is qualifications, and NASAS PO 102, inline inspection by reference. These sub-standards also have some data sharing components.

So there's a wealth of data sharing that's already going on. Here's just kind of a visual of data sharing, this data sharing process, as it relates to Kinder Morgan's natural gas pipeline procedures.

I work -- I'm Drew Hevle. Sorry -Drew Hevle. I work for Kinder Morgan. I'm

Manager of Corrosion Control in our natural gas
pipeline system. So this is the scope of API
1163 which is called inline inspection systems
qualification.

We had an API representative here earlier. And when I gave this presentation on the phone, he gave us a little update about the status of this standard. It's presently being updated. There's a committee actively working on it. So there may be changes.

There likely will be some changes. I

don't know how significant. I don't know the time-line because these things are -- as you know, committee work products take time and aren't always amenable to going to a particular schedule.

So the emphasis here is mine. I identified some key points -- close cooperating and interaction between the service provider and the customer or pipeline operator.

The standard provides requirements that will enable service providers and operators to clearly define the areas of cooperation required and ensure the satisfactory outcome of the inspection process. And that's -- ultimately, our goal here is to increase cooperation to provide a more satisfactory outcome, which is safety.

The scope of this document is amendable to the scope of what we've been talking about with relation to ILI. It includes feather tools, self-propelled tools, or free-flowing systems, over a wide variety of different threats

and can be applied to both existing and developing technology.

So if you have a new technology, that doesn't immediately make 1163 out of date. The standard's an umbrella document that provides performance-based requirements.

It includes procedures, personnel, equipment, associated software. The standard also includes MACE SP-0102 inline inspection of pipelines and ASNT ILI-PQ, which relates to inline inspection personnel qualification and certification.

All of it developed enabling service providers and operators to provide rigorous processes that consistently qualify the equipment, et cetera. In the inline inspection industry, that's a little redundant. So it's not technology-specific. It's performance-based and provides requirements for qualification processes. One objective is to foster continual improvement.

And that's a goal of integrity

management systems. That's a goal of safety
management systems. And continuous improvement
is a key driver to continue to reach the goal,
which is a little asymptotal. Is that the right
word?

But, ultimately, trying to reach that goal of -- in our department, we call it zero failure/full compliance, trying to get to that perfect result. I mentioned ILI-PQ here, incorporated by reference and the MACE SP-0102.

This was mentioned, this data was mentioned in another presentation as well. Here is the scope of ILI-PQ. Really, minimum requirements for qualification and certification of inline inspection personnel. And it includes three different levels of qualifications.

Here is, essentially, the scope. It's really the outline of SP-0102. It includes sections on tool selection, compatibility, logistical guidelines, scheduling, planning, data analysis, data management. And then, it also includes a sample Pipeline Inspection

Questionnaire, which is, by definition, a mechanism for information sharing between the customer and the vendor.

So when you're trying to select an ILI tool, it's important that both the capabilities of the ILI tool and the characteristics of the pipeline are considered, in addition to the goals and objectives of that ILI.

If you have a tool that is capable of detecting small cracks, but the goal of your assessment is to detect metal loss of corrosion, those two may not be compatible and vice versa.

If you're trying to detect cracks and you have a tool that's designed to detect general metal loss, it's not going to be as accurate or may not meet the goals that you're trying to accomplish at all.

So this information is shared through a pipeline questionnaire. This is some -- this is an example of data versus information. So this would be data related to the characteristics of the pipeline that a pipeline operator would

share with the vendor. Hey, we're operating at this temperature and this pressure. That would go to, you know, is the tool compatible with that?

Can it run reliably in those conditions? How clean is the pipeline? Are there characteristics of the product? What's inside the pipeline that would limit a successful inspection?

And I'm not going to go through all of these details. But, they talk about things. Is the tool capable of being reliably -- passing through with bend radius and flow velocities?

Are there things that are going to cause a tool to get stuck? Are there things that are going to prevent the tool from measuring accurately what it's intending to measure?

And so, the selection of the ILI system is based on the goals and objectives with a number of considerations here. And all of these considerations would involve a discussion between the ILI tool provider and the operator.

And then, the operator selects the one or more appropriate ILI systems that meet the goals and objectives established. And oftentimes, an ILI assessment involves running a number of tools. It involves -- it might involve running a tool to assess whether the instrumented pig can pass safely through.

It involves a gauge tool to measure for dents. And then, it might involve running an instrumented tool or multiple tools in a chain of tools, that would provide location information as well as measure wall thickness and look for other types of defects.

So the performance spec, as I mentioned, is the contract, the bible, the agreement, between the operator and the vendor, as to whether the tool can meet the requirements of the performance specification.

We are looking for this type of thread. We want this type of accuracy. Here are the operating conditions. And if -- both parties have to agree, that those things will be met.

And then, you establish things about what type of data are you going to report. What type of thresholds, lower limit thresholds, are you going to report? You have a know a little bit about what you expect to find in order to make those kind of decisions.

Is this an older pipeline which has a marginal maintenance history or is this a brand new line where you would want to see every little thing?

And so, there's a requirement for performance specs to define through statistically valid methods, the ability of the ILI system to run in a specific pipeline to detect, locate, identify in size, pipeline anomalies, components, and features.

So not only do you have to, in the performance spec, assert that you're going to meet these requirements, you have to say, within a statistical range, how you're going to meet those.

And then, the performance of that tool

can be evaluated after the fact to determine, did you meet this statistical approach.

And, because an ILI tool may be designed to assess more than one type of anomaly, you may need to have a number of different types of anomalies or characteristics spelled out as far as accuracy. So, if a tool measures both internal, external, and crack-like indications, then you would have separate specs for those assessments.

So this is defining the difference between detection, sizing, identifying, and characterizing anomalies. And some more detail about some information in the performance spec. You know, how you're going to measure distance.

Are you going to use the footage from the initial assessment or maybe they'll use a different unit. Maybe they use meters. Or are you going to use GPS coordinates or you're going to use company stationing or some other method.

Because this is important when the company has to go back out and relocate areas to

excavate and assess or assess and repair. So, more information about all of the types of things that you would include in the performance spec.

Here's some examples of why what is reported from an ILI tool might differ from what you see when you excavate it. There are limitations to the physics of the tool and therefore, you're going to see differences between what the tool reports and what you would see when you excavate the pipeline.

And there are things that would either increase or decrease that accuracy of detection.

For example, as the wall or the pipeline gets thicker, it becomes more difficult to assess accurately with the same magnetic field.

And if you have speed outside of the range, if the tool is going too fast, you have a reduction in accuracy. All of these things are defined within the performance spec, based on the conditions of the particular pipeline.

And they would all affect the probability of detection and the accuracy of the

tool. And where consequences justify the effort, an operator may consider a review of the service provider's quality management procedures regarding tool assembly, component sourcing, and traceability, in considerations of unusual loading regimes.

So we do reviews of our service providers' quality management systems. We do that on an annual basis. We go out and visit each one of the major ILI service providers that we work with. And we interact on their processes.

This goes both to reliability of a run

-- if you put a tool in a pipeline and you spend

all of the effort to run it and you don't get

back accurate data, you've spent quite a bit of

money really, for not getting the value that you

want.

So you want to have an accurate run each time. Even if the vendor doesn't charge you a nickel, you still have downtime and you still have operational costs associated to that. So

execution, quality of execution, is important.

But it also goes to the accuracy. If you lose a sensor off of a tool, that is a reduced level of accuracy than what you could have accomplished. And so, the quality of the building and the maintaining of the tool is important as well.

So the performance spec has to be qualified by the service provider using some kind of methodology defined by the service provider.

And the methodology and data used to qualify that performance spec has to be fully documented and available for review.

And so, this is an example of a big data share between a vendor and a customer or a potential customer where they say, we've run this tool in these conditions this many times.

And the results that we have, based on operator's feedback of excavations and measurements is this probability of detection, this probability -- this level of accuracy.

And the qualification methodology is

reviewed on annual basis to ensure that it's 1 2 still valid. And significant errors in detection, identification, and sizing have to be 3 4 investigated, including -- we require root cause 5 analysis. And they define significant errors as 6 7 those being outside of the performance 8 specification, root cause. Exciting material, 9 for a corrosion engineer. I just want to second your comments about the dynamic presentation of 10 Vickie and John. 11 12 That was really an interesting one 13 with the back and forth. I don't have anybody to 14 throw to. 15 MR. STOODY: You were great. 16 MR. HEVLE: Thanks. Thanks. I 17 appreciate that. Anyway, pre-inspection, this is 18 my wheelhouse, so I'm enjoying this, as I 19 I assure you, I have as much mentioned. 20 excitement as they do, inside. 21 MR. STOODY: All right. Drew, back to

you.

MR. HEVLE: So, pre-inspection, they talk about, here are the things that you need to do as part of a pre-inspection -- inline inspection, before you run the tool.

And most of this does involve data sharing back and forth, between the operator and the vendor. There are some other things, testing, mechanical checks, laying out above-ground markers.

The inspection itself, you load the tool in a launcher, you launch it. You monitor the progress of the tool and make sure it's not going too fast. You adjust the flow of the product in the pipeline to ensure that the tool runs within its speed.

And then, you have markers that are indicated as the tool runs by. So you put a magnet on the ground and the tool will detect that magnet so you can tie above-ground location to a feature on the pipeline.

That's becoming less and less important with really our very accurate GPS

systems and geometric tool capabilities to measure very precisely, direction and distance. Back in the day, it was just a, and still is, a wheel turning.

And they measured how many times the wheel -- you know, how big around the wheel is.

And so, that measures the distance. But there are other methods to determine where you are in time and space.

And then, finally, receiving the tool, getting the tool out, making sure that it doesn't get stuck, and it comes out and it comes out in one piece. That's always a good sign.

And then, finally, post-inspection, you do some functional tests as soon as you get the tool out, just to make sure everything is working. You want to know right away. Then you do some initial checks on the data.

You do some direct measurement to evaluate, hey, what did the tool record as tool speed throughout the run, you know, temperatures, et cetera? Did we get a good run? Look for data

completeness. Back in the day, tools recorded on magnetic tape.

And you could break the tape and the tool ran the whole distance without recording anything and you had to do it again. Nowadays, it's all on solid state discs. And finally, you'd look at data quality.

So here's kind of a flow chart of the verification process. There are a number of different -- there are three levels defined within 1163 for how you validate the data.

And Level 1 is the lowest, the least rigorous application of the verification, where you can use historical data. For example, I ran this tool in the same line just upstream and downstream the prior year, and we got good results and we validated those.

And therefore, I don't necessarily need to do a rigorous evaluation with field measurements. And I'm going to accept the performance based on the checks that we did at the end of the run.

Or, a Level 2, where you use some field measurements to check your performance against the stated tool specs. So you'll do some prove-up digs and compare the results of what you get in the ditch versus what the tool said.

And if those meet the spec, you can say, well, I'm validating the data. Or if that doesn't work out, then you can go to a Level 3 where you have to have a statistically significant number of data points in order to validate that.

And that would be, probably, only used for a brand-new technology, for example, or a really unusual application of an existing technology where there's not a good history of application for that.

So it's not very common to require the Level 3 validation in order to have a confidence in your data set. So there's a number of characteristics to the evaluation of the results, the process of verification or quality control, comparison with historical discrepancy analysis

of pipeline components records.

So if you run the tool and it says, hey, you've got a T here, a T here, a T here and then you look at your drawings and you don't have any of those, you're like, well, what's going on here? Are my drawings wrong or is the tool wrong?

Enhanced data integration -oftentimes, nowadays especially, we'll take data
and combine it in order to do effective analysis.
We'll overlay the ILI data with pipe information,
with geographical information, with data like
cathodic protection data, close level survey
data.

And that will tell you a lot about the information that you're seeing and will allow you to do some kind of initial root cause analysis to identify, oh, we've got lower levels of cathodic protection here.

And we have higher levels of external corrosion metal loss. They may be correlated.

Using validation measurements, inclusions on

1 using validation measurements' assessment of 2 inline spectral performance. Oh, insufficient data for an image. 3 I've never seen that one before. That was not 4 5 I'm trying to remember what the image intended. 6 was. 7 MR. HERETH: Maybe it was sense 8 contact? 9 MR. HEVLE: Yes. Can you open the --We're okay without it. I think it was just 10 no. a big -- a flow diagram of the process. 11 12 then, reporting is important. I mean, you're running this tool and 13 the results of the tool, the deliverable, is the 14 report. And so, it really is important to be on 15 16 the same page with the vendor on what and how 17 you're going to report these data. 18 Because that is the ultimate data 19 That's the fundamental data sharing sharing. 20 that happens with inline inspection, is the 21 vendor shares the data with you. And then you

evaluate it and take action on it.

So, as part of the report, the performance spec is always included as part of the report so that you know the basis for all of this data. Where did this data come from? What were the goals and objectives?

What were the conditions?

Qualification method, Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, and then all of the data associated with that.

Equipment specs, these tools evolve and their capabilities evolve. And even if you run the same tool from the same vendor, our ILI cycle for high-consequence areas under IMP is seven years.

Seven years later, imagine how much a computer changes in seven years.

Does anybody else have a seven-yearold laptop? I do. Our replacement cycle is
seven years on our laptops. I assure you, my
laptop is not the same as the new laptops.

So there's quite a -- for the same tool, the same vendor, there's quite a different in capabilities between assessment cycles. And so, it's important to capture that because you're

looking at these results historically.

We're wrapping up the second cycle of assessment in the gas industry. On hazard/slick, we're in the third cycle, I think, or maybe a little beyond the third cycle? I'm a gas guy. So, sorry.

MR. HERETH: '04 and '08 were baselines. Yes.

MR. HEVLE: Yes. So first baseline assessment is what do I got out there? The second assessment is oh, why did it change? Did it change? Why did it change? And so, we're going to rely more on comparing data today from data from seven years ago and 14 years ago as part of this.

And you need to capture all of the conditions and assumptions that were built into those assessments in order to give them a proper evaluation.

Report contents -- generally you want some kind of summary. You want your spectral results. You want reporting formats for

particular processes within your company.

And one of the things that this committee, I think, needs to consider is developing a data format for ILI data that vendors or that operators could include in their basic spec as a separate line-item to say, give us the data in this format for information sharing.

And that would prevent you from having to reinvent the wheel every time you need to import data from this vendor or that vendor. We, at Kinder Morgan, establish a consistent reporting format across all of the vendors.

So we get the same format of data and same format of report, regardless of who's doing the assessment. Because we do between 120 and 150 segments a year, we have to automate some of those processes.

We have to get everything in a consistent format and I think there's some opportunity here to define a format for information sharing and automate this process.

And finally, quality management system is required as part of 1163. And there's a lot of details here about procedures and work instructions. That goes to the comment that John had made about aging out of people in the industry and capturing that knowledge.

If you have detailed work instructions, well, I don't need work instructions. But the guy who comes in behind me would really find those work instructions to be beneficial, at least initially, for sure.

Good record-keeping, document revision control. Again, this stuff is important when you're looking at something in a historical context.

Design change control, qualifications of personnel, calibrations and standardization of the equipment, traceability of the materials, and then, continuous improvement.

And this is the last slide. API-1153 includes most of the components of a safety management system. And so, I captured, from an

SMS standard, the general topics that were included in that, that are also included in API-1163.

There's a huge overlap. API-1163 is not sufficient for a safety management system and not sufficient for an information sharing for what this group is trying to accomplish.

But a lot of it is still there and in place. API-1163 is incorporated by reference into the Hazardous Liquids -- you can tell I'm a gas guy -- Hazardous Liquids Pipeline 195 requirements.

And it's proposed to be included in the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Standards as part of the Notice of Proposed Rule-making. And so, this is being done out there. And it's being done by a lot of operators.

It's required to be done on the hazardous liquids side. It's going to be done and is already being done by a lot of operators on the gas side.

So I think there's opportunities to

1 mine these processes for data sharing and things 2 that are already going on and use this as a baseline for what is already happening. 3 4 Maybe we need to expand that into 5 other areas to make it comprehensive. But as far as ILI data, there's a lot of sharing going on 6 Thus concludes my presentation. 7 right now. 8 That was riveting. CHAIR BURMAN: 9 Thank you. Do we have MR. HEVLE: 10 time for --11 MR. WARNER: Drew, I wanted to see if 12 I understood correctly. You mentioned a 13 standardized reporting format as maybe a 14 solution. Were you recommending that this group 15 16 include that in whatever our final 17 recommendations are? 18 MR. HEVLE: If you want to get raw ILI 19 data as part of this for -- and I don't know that 20 that is within the scope of what you're talking 21 about. 22 But if you do, creating a format for

that and then asking operators who are participating to include that in their performance spec as a recording option -- say, hey, also give us the data in this format, would allow you to automate that process. Make it super easy to just say, hey, send this.

And the way it works in our company, send this report to this guy, and then, send this data in this format to this email address or through this share point or some delivery mechanism.

And then, the RGIS people, for example, take that ILI and import it and then it's available for analysis by not just the ILI analysis guys at our company, but everybody in the company can access that GIS system and look at the data on the GIS system. Yes?

MR. JONES: You said this is widely used. I want to understand that a little better. So when you said sharing, are you saying sharing between vendor and customer or are you saying between competitors or between the regulators?

1	Like, when you say it's widely done?
2	MR. HEVLE: Yes.
3	MR. JONES: That's a big statement.
4	MR. HEVLE: Right.
5	MR. JONES: But it's not clear to me,
6	based on two-and-a-half years of
7	MR. HEVLE: Okay. Applying 1163 is
8	mostly between vendor and a pipeline operator.
9	Most of the data sharing is there. That could be
10	
11	MR. JONES: So vendor and customer?
12	MR. HEVLE: Yes. Exactly right.
13	MR. JONES: Okay.
14	MR. HEVLE: There are some components
15	where, for validation, for the vendor qualifying
16	in their tool, they use data from other
17	operators. But they scrub it.
18	And they'll say, okay, this tool has
19	run 10,000 miles in 24-H pipeline, natural gas
20	pipelines. And here's the statistical results
21	that we got from the digs that we've done on
22	those pipelines.

1 But, for the most part, MR. JONES: 2 when you say vendor sharing, you're just saying between customer and --3 4 MR. HEVLE: Yes. Correct. 5 All right. MR. JONES: But, because it's already 6 MR. HEVLE: 7 happening, that's an opportunity to use for -- to 8 make it broader by this committee. 9 MR. JONES: Yes. I agree. 10 MR. HEVLE: But these processes -- I 11 mean, it's easy to take a process that's in place 12 and say, oh well, let's expand that to do other 13 things with that, than it is to create a new 14 process and say, hey, everybody do this new 15 thing. 16 MR. JONES: Agreed. 17 DR. DENG: I have a full-out comment 18 on this format. I think that's a great thing to 19 But I think that's probably only going to 20 apply to limited data and ILI data, definitely we should do that. 21

But if you look at the complexity of

the data, including like, historic data, expert's 1 2 opinions, model, face data, official data, it's really challenging to do this kind of --3 something about data normalization. 4 MR. HEVLE: 5 Yes. For that -- right? 6 DR. DENG: So --7 MR. HEVLE: Yes. That's going to be 8 the huge challenge of this committee is how do 9 you -- the data that we get is pretty specific to both pipeline conditions and to the tool which 10 11 would include who the vendor is. 12 DR. DENG: Right. 13 MR. HEVLE: Sometimes, the assessment 14 technologies re completely different and 15 identifiable by very basic things. 16 DR. DENG: Yes. So that's where 17 datamatics is very important because maybe all 18 this kind of normalization or fusion should be 19 done at an informational level instead of a data level. 20 21 So maybe like a future level, fusion of information, that's something we should do,

not just on a data level. That's very difficult 1 2 to normalize. I agree one hundred 3 MR. HEVLE: Yes. 4 I mean, that was, I think, pretty clear percent. 5 at the beginning of this. It's not the same kind of data that we're dealing with, as in the 6 7 airline industry. 8 It's not the same kind of data that 9 we're dealing with as in some other fields which may be easier to make a generic and applicable 10 11 across other systems and conditions. 12 CHAIR BURMAN: Any other questions or 13 comments at the table. 14 MR. BELLAMY: Yes. Michael Bellamy. 15 So, Drew, we know that Kinder Morgan has 16 definitely taken API-1163 very seriously, 17 implemented some very robust programs around 18 that. 19 Can you talk to the notion of the 20 unity plot? Because the real gold dust from a 21 technology improvement point of view is -- at

least ILI -- is that comparison between what was

culled in the report and what you found in the ditch.

MR. HEVLE: Yes. So that may be, in the kind of narrowest view of the scope of this committee, that may be the -- one of the opportunities is to look at the accuracy of the results.

And by accuracy, I'm saying comparing what the tool called versus what you actually measure in the ditch. And, in a perfect world, those would be one-to-one. With a perfectly accurate tool, you would have the same call.

It would say, this is a 100 mill depth defect that's one-inch long and one-inch wide.

And then you go out and measure it and it's exactly that.

And so, if you plot depth of what the tool calls on one axis versus what you measure in the ditch versus what the tool called, you should have a straight line.

And anything that you deviate from that line is a level of inaccuracy. And you can

-- that's called a unity plot.

And that's usually -- one of the almost always included methods of evaluating the accuracy of the tool is you plot this out. And very quickly you can see what are the trends.

Do I see a skewed in deeper defects to either under-call or over-call and smaller defects, either under-call or over-call.

And so, by the shotgun scatter that you see at these points around the line, you can glean some information about how accurate this tool is.

One of the opportunities might be to identify how to improve that accuracy or to get a better understanding of that accuracy across all tools by this committee.

That would improve safety. But the results are dependent on, well, how accurate was your measurement in the ditch? Typically or often, it's not a high-tech thing.

You have a guy with a pit gauge that has a little poker. And it measures down to the

1	bottom and you measure on a ruler. That's old-
2	school technology.
3	But you because this is a
4	measurement by a person, a human being, there are
5	opportunities for making mistakes.
6	And certainly, that gauge measurement
7	example that they used was striking, about how
8	human error is part of this. So I don't know if
9	that's what you were looking for when you asked
10	the question.
11	DR. DENG: Yes. Exactly. And, if I
12	might also follow on?
13	MR. HEVLE: Yes.
14	DR. DENG: We can do a double act
15	here, if you like?
16	MR. HEVLE: All right.
17	DR. DENG: So you don't feel
18	completely alone. There is also that notion that
19	when you see an outlier, then it becomes worthy
20	of investigation.
21	If something is close, is within the
22	performance specification, close to that unity

1 line, within the margin of error, you can feel 2 fairly comfortable. MR. HEVLE: 3 Yes. Those outliers are the ones 4 DR. DENG: 5 that -- and should attract our attention -provide the opportunities for improvement. 6 I should've 7 MR. HEVLE: Yes. 8 mentioned, as part of the performance spec, you 9 identify statistically a plus or minus. And then you typically draw those plus or minus lines 10 along with the unity line. 11 12 And you expect that a certain 13 percentage, statistically, of those points, will 14 fall within those acceptable ranges. And that's a visual way of calculating the statistical 15 16 effectiveness. 17 Are you meeting that spec? You can 18 look at the docs and count the ones that fall 19 outside and calculate that percentage. And it's 20 a very easy way of doing that. Yes. 21 DR. DENG: So I know you've also --

just as you've been very rigorous with inline

inspection vendors in your qualification process, 1 2 using API-1163, I know you've also been -- Kinder Morgan has been very rigorous in your 3 4 qualification program for the in-ditch technologies and providers. So you've got both. 5 Well, that's just as 6 MR. HEVLE: 7 important. That's just as important as the 8 accuracy of the tool. 9 If you're not properly evaluating what 10 you see in the ditch, then you're not properly 11 evaluating the quality of the data of the ILI. 12 And you're not properly evaluating the fitness 13 for service of the pipeline. That's number one. 14 Number two, we do a full root cause analysis of every excavation. And because of 15 16 that, we need a broader data set. We measure AC 17 potential, VC fire protection levels. 18 We measure soil resistivity so we can 19 calculate AC density so we can determine, was 20 this potentially AC corrosion versus corrosion 21 because we didn't have adequate levels of CP.

We do a wide variety of things in the

1 And so we need our NDE guys who are doing ditch. 2 those inspections to be consistent in how they do that, to be qualified in how they do that. 3 4 And we hand-pick the people who does 5 this for us. And it's a pretty big scope. 6 have a school once a year and train these guys in 7 how we want our data obtained. 8 Thanks. I have one more. DR. DENG: 9 Just this -- so now I've lost it. Sherry, you take it now. 10 11 This is Sherry Borener. DR. BORENER: I actually thank you again. 12 I've done it twice. 13 I've heard your presentation twice. So one 14 question I have now, and it has to do with 15 outcomes. 16 So you seem to have collected a set of data which is the outcome of the inline 17 18 inspection through the outcome of the in-ditch 19 inspection? 20 MR. HEVLE: Yes. 21 DR. BORENER: Do you have a database, then, of what you call an event which would be a 22

corrosion event or something like that that says, 1 2 I've got this place on this -- you know, this is the thing I've found. 3 And here are all the data observations 4 5 I had up until the moment that I heard that that 6 is a --7 MR. HEVLE: We don't have a 8 comprehensive database yet. That's one thing 9 that we're working on, is to have all of our anomaly information in one data set, so that we 10 11 can do broad analysis and querying. And right now, it's a data set for a 12 13 tool run and it lives by itself. 14 But, at some point, you DR. BORENER: 15 would be able to register this all to a single 16 lat-long? Is that possible? I mean, to a 17 particular --18 MR. HEVLE: Oh, absolutely. And our 19 GIS system is going to be the hub for that. So all of this information is going to load into an 20 21 anomaly database.

That anomaly database is linked to our

GIS as a layer. You can just click a button and you look at this pipeline and you can see every excavation, every anomaly, everything you wanted to know.

DR. BORENER: So would that also then
-- could you relate that, in the end, to
incidents and accidents? So, in my mind, you
want to be able to say, this is actionable
because 80 percent of the time, that thing,
within the next year, turns into something that
requires remediation.

So, you know what I mean? You're trying to create a database of likelihoods and outcomes and an association with a bunch of data that you've collected since you started.

MR. HEVLE: We have the piece. Right now, many of our assessments, we're able to compare to the prior assessment and calculate a growth rate and project that out to insure that, not only do we fix the things that we need to fix today, but we fix everything that needs to be fixed before we run the tool again. So we --

So that's kind of your 1 DR. BORENER: 2 expected goal? 3 MR. HEVLE: Yes. 4 DR. BORENER: Okay. 5 We do that. MR. HEVLE: Yes. And we're working on processes to flag particular 6 7 types of defects for more mitigation. I mean, we 8 have mitigation processes. 9 We have inspection processes to insure our mitigation is effective. But ILI is -- our 10 11 integrity assessment is kind of cutting the cards 12 after you've done all this thing, just to make 13 sure that you've got the results you expect. 14 And sometimes you see corrosion where everything else is telling you you shouldn't have 15 16 seen corrosion. And so, we're looking at, hey, what do we need to do to address that? 17 18 Sometimes, if the pipe's sitting on a 19 rock, the only thing you can do is dig it up and 20 move the rock. And so, there's nothing really 21 outside you can do.

But sometimes, you can add some

protection or do a close little survey and make 1 2 sure you have all of the levels addressed or do you a little bit of recoding and save yourself 3 4 future digs. 5 And so, that's the component that we're working right now, to enhance our system. 6 Does that answer your question? 7 8 It does. DR. BORENER: Yes. 9 MR. HEVLE: Okay. Alan, yes? 10 MR. MAYBERRY: Hey, Drew. I really 11 enjoyed your presentation. I was wondering --- I 12 have a question. I also thought about that. But isn't there -- I mean, there's 13 14 pretty good quality and I know there's a standard technique, like you said. 15 16 But, wouldn't it be a case of like, I 17 might trust yours more than I trust like, another 18 operator's? Because the variables that go into 19 it, you know, with the cleaning. I mean, there's 20 so many variables. 21 MR. HEVLE: Yes. It's really going to be a huge challenge for this committee to do 22

that. I mean, the vendors are doing that internally.

But, it would be difficult to mix technologies and to mix different types of tools in order to do that.

The analogy I use is if you have one watch, you always know what time it is. If you have two watches, you never know what time it is. Because you're never quite sure which one is right.

You can get into, well, this is more accurate and I calibrated it more recently and what have you. But it's really difficult to use that type of information, the unity plot information, if you don't have access to all of the data behind it. You know?

Who did the measurement? How did they do it? What was the speed of the tool at this location, at the time it was assessed? And, you know, all of that stuff in here, it's difficult to make a judgment without that.

MR. MAYBERRY: Yes. So we're going to

have to start somewhere and see how this is going. And then I thought also about the future level, as far as comparing that or, in other words, all of the data, I guess, coming off of the tool.

But then, you know, I've seen issues where really the tool may have detected it, but ultimately, the indications are culled. So --

MR. HEVLE: The analyst process within the tool vendor is just as important as the capability of the tool because it is -- there is a lot of expertise required in there.

And there are programs and technologies that are much, much more mature than others. And so, we're seeing new technologies come out.

And the physics is there and the electronics is there, but we don't have the experience of assessing those new things in a new way. And that's the limitation, in a lot of cases.

MR. HERETH: Can I just clarify or add

to what your response was? So, Alan, one of the things that this standard does is it requires that you look at the data when you get it back.

It gives your initial performance specifications. So if you're finding data that's outside, either by speed, by size, by whatever, whatever your performance specs are, then that -- you can't take that data forward without doing additional work.

And so, then when you go to make a unity plot, you screen for quality of data on the front end before you go and make that assessment of that data.

Again, recognizing that you have to understand the uncertainty in the tool measurement, as well as the individual readings and all of the sources of the those.

But, that's really what you do in the performance specification process, which needs to be done with the in-the-ditch technology, just as much as it needs to be done with the tool itself.

MR. MAYBERRY: Right. So that creates

the uniformity, sort of a normalization, if you 1 2 will. But then, also I guess that thing that was referred to earlier, the in-the-ditch tool 3 measurement, you know, some very good --4 5 MR. HERETH: Yes. And I think Michael referred to it. It's the uncertainty of the 6 tool, but it's uncertainty on the human side, the 7 qualifications of the person doing the work, 8 9 their knowledge of the tool, their experience with that tool, whether it's phased or ready or 10 11 whatever their using. Part of all this is the 12 tightening of all of it up. MR. HEVLE: And there's new 13 14 technology, laser measurement of profiles, that will remove some of that error band and ensure 15 16 that you have much more precision in those 17 assessments. 18 So I think that there are 19 opportunities there for getting better here. 20 But, I mean, there's opportunities for getting 21 better everywhere.

But, you're right, Alan, that this is

going to be a challenge. It's a key performance requirement for an operator and a vendor. But, it's hard to apply across an information sharing approach.

MR. BELLAMY: I remember my third question. So Drew, you talked about how API-1163 can encourage that bilateral information sharing between operator and vendor.

MR. HEVLE: Yes.

MR. BELLAMY: But how much are you sharing what you're finding with other operators, gas, liquid, or otherwise? And what do you wish you could get from other operators to help you with your findings?

MR. HEVLE: I think that's a great question. And I think the answer is, on a data level, we're not sharing with anybody, at least outside of the vendors using our scrub data for qualification purposes.

We really don't share that type of information on a data set-wise, with other vendors, with other operators, with regulators,

unless there's a specific --1 2 MR. BELLAMY: Right. MR. HEVLE: But it's unusual. 3 There 4 are informal processes now to share experiences, close calls, things like that, that I think 5 everybody in the industry here has been aware of. 6 7 We've had some notifications, notice 8 to operators, alert bulletins, related to capabilities of ILI. But I think there are 9 opportunities not only to share understanding. 10 11 And Eric called it important learnings 12 -- to share those types of things across the industry. I think that is what I would be 13 14 looking for, not only on close calls, but we 15 oftentimes don't get all the details in actual 16 hits, actual incidents. 17 So if there was an opportunity to 18 really understand the lessons learned across the 19 whole industry for those types of things, I think it would be beneficial. 20 21 MR. BELLAMY: Thank you. 22 MR. HEVLE: Make me a better corrosion

1	engineer.
2	MR. BELLAMY: How could you be better?
3	MR. HEVLE: I lied. I'm not going to
4	make you up any time.
5	CHAIR BURMAN: That's okay. This was
6	very helpful. Does anyone else have any other
7	questions or comments?
8	MR. HEVLE: Thank you.
9	CHAIR BURMAN: This really was very
10	helpful. Now, just a time check. We do have a
11	hard stop at 5:00.
12	So we now Agenda Item 4, which is
13	discussing a bit of IT architecture, and then,
14	Agenda Item 5, which is really just a reporting
15	out of the Reports Committee.
16	We can do that which is then really
17	leading into the next steps. And that's with
18	keeping in mind at least three of the
19	subcommittees will be meeting July 2 and fleshing
20	out things.
21	So, I think we will have a good
22	handle. Agenda Item 5 should go relatively

1	quickly. And so, I think we can get it done
2	before the next hour and ten minutes. So we're
3	now going to turn to Michael.
4	DR. MURRAY: It actually will be for
5	the IT conversation.
6	CHAIR BURMAN: Oh, yes. I'm sorry.
7	Yes, Jason.
8	MR. BELLAMY: I wish I could talk
9	during that. Jason will do a much better job.
10	MR. CRADIT: We'll see.
11	CHAIR BURMAN: Great. Thank you,
12	Jason.
13	MR. CRADIT: All right. Hello. My
14	name is Jason Cradit. Many of you know me. I'm
15	sure you're really excited to talk about IT at
16	the end of the day.
17	I suspect that may or may not be true.
18	But we're going to get through it anyway. So, my
19	name's Jason Cradit, Senior Director of
20	Technology for a company called TRC.
21	Behind me here is Pete Veenstra. He
22	is Principal Data Architect, at also TRC. But,

of course, the slide behind me says Pivot, not TRC.

And that's just a recent venture that TRC is off-shooting, so just to avoid any confusion. We call ourselves Pivot.

Part of this conversation, as Eric may have mentioned is, well -- I'm sorry, not Eric,

Chris Warner mentioned -- has been built with

Mark Zuniga, people from Microsoft and people

from Amazon as well.

So there's a lot of contributors to go into this. This was certainly just not my labor. We want to talk today about IT architecture and what the potentials could look like for a system like this.

We've learned a lot from Dan and Mark and Wen's conversation earlier from AGA. But, really, what we want to do, is educate and gain a common vocabulary vernacular around some of these things and talk about how we think.

And we'll talk about that from data management, Pete will, and how we can process

large data sets like this and how we can visualize.

And then, also we've talked a lot of de-identification and some of the cyber security requirements. And I'll speak to those things.

But one of the important things we wanted to make sure and mention was that, if you're not familiar, we're geeks. And this movie is -- there's a movie called Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy.

And in this movie, they go and they build Deep Thought. And it's supposed to help solve the world's problems. And they throw all of this data into it and all this processing power.

And they go, tell us the meaning of life, the world, and everything. And then they get back an answer, after years of waiting, and the answer is 42.

And I think it's a really important observation in that movie to think about how you think about what are the questions you're asking.

What data are you using and how are 1 2 you getting to an answer? We'll touch more on that later. I thought it was really important 3 4 and I'm sorry Dan's not in the room. 5 But this is the official mission of 6 the VIS. That Dan Cote's team, subcommittee, came up with. And I bolded and I looks horrible 7 8 here, but some words like secure information 9 sharing systems, collection and analysis. for me, being a geek, that's all I really about. 10 11 Mark, you're worried about the how or 12 the what. We're thinking about well, what do we 13 need to do to put all of this together to make it 14 useful. So we looked at that mission. 15 16 then, also, with the mission, is task statement. 17 Pete? 18 MR. VEENSTRA: And if you look at this 19 -- I'm not going to read it because it's at the 20 end of the day. These tasks are fairly high-21 complex objects.

And you look at them and there's a lot

of details. And if you go to the next slide, what I tried to do was parse it down to this. And I still ended up with a ton of stuff.

And then, as a data person, I wanted to look at one more step further and I ended up with that. And that was just off the cuff.

That's just looking at things from a conceptual standpoint.

So here, we're talking about IT and databases and data management. And, at some point, this group is going to have to break it down into these parts.

Because going back to what Jason's talking about, every time I look at the proceedings and the documents from here, I'm saying, what are the questions? What are the questions?

Because the questions that you want to ask of this system will really drive how the system is architectured. From this, we can go very, very, very at the next level and say, well, here's the start of a model that describes this

process.

And again, the questions will drive the model. And Drew's presentation was awesome. Drew's the only guy I know that could pull off that much words in a PowerPoint, and still keep people riveted.

But what the bottom line comes down to is every ILI system's going to be different.

Every field verification's going to be different.

Conceptually, they're the same thing and they relate to each other.

But, how we're going to resolve those things and ask the questions to get meaningful results is everything.

MR. CRADIT: So one of the things I brought, I put together, it's really a derivative from Mark's work or maybe it was Eric's, around all of these different data sets.

We've got that great graphic with the VIS in the center. I changed those to different icons and I may have added some. And then, by no means, is this meant to be a comprehensive list.

But it was meant to illustrate a couple of points. All these data sources have different artifacts. Some are structured and unstructured data sets. Some could be really quantitative in nature, like ILI reports.

They're taking measurements and things like that. But then, more could be qualitative, like safety meetings, like what we saw from ASAP.

Those are more qualitative measures.

And you store these things
differently, depending on the data types. And as
Drew pointed out, some have standards. And some
are proprietary to a vendor or technology, in
their native format.

And I think as Sherry mentioned, some
-- or, I'm sorry, doctor, I don't know. As you
move up in doing information, that's when it's
probably more useful to share.

And then some are really complete and some are really not. You know, some of you may not have all of the attributed information or it may not be available to you.

And all of that's an important point, because this is the world we live in. You have to start to look at how you combine non-structured and structured data together in quantitative and qualitative, to get to an end result. To get to something that might be meaningful beyond 42.

MR. VEENSTRA: So when you look at just the idea of data architecture and management, there's lots of ways to look at it.

But there's many facets to the picture.

So if you've got five blind men describing an elephant, they're all going to say there's a different part of it that is the most important or most relevant, because that's what they're touching.

That's what they're dealing with. All right? So, for us, we sort of broke it down into, when we look at IT data management, relevant to this problem, we came up with the following things.

It's going to probably more than

likely, absolutely, positively, need to be, possibly, in the Cloud. All right? We're going to have different data types, as Jason said, static, dynamic and stringing.

We're going to have a variety of database storage technologies that are available to us. And I would even say we could even take out the word database and just say storage technologies.

We're going to have different data transfer protocols, different ways to visualize it. And we don't spend a lot of time talking about that, but we do the other parts.

There are different repository modes, how this data works in the environment and how you access it and design it, and then, how you do your analytics.

For those who attended the presentation, they talked a lot about how do we go beyond just the information and drive more information out of it. And then, of course, security roles and privacy are going to be big

parts of that whole process.

So that is how we're going to talk the remainder of our presentation and focus on those things. And as Jason said, mostly, it's an education. It's a background.

Here are some of our thoughts around how to do that and we'll wrap up that way. So, right now, at least from our opinion, the Cloud is really the accepted paradigm for implementing technology at a large scale, for managing a lot of data, and for really high-level computing.

We could go through just the past years, how many different organizations within the Federal government have started to move their stuff up to the Cloud.

The real benefits are, it's scalable. So you can add, compute and storage on demand. All right? You can scale up to add as many computers as you need and have the budget, and the app will tell you four.

It's elastic, which means it can scale up and add additional processors, in terms of

power, but also scale out, in terms of adding additional processes in terms of parallel processing.

And if you take the problem of raw ILI data and you wanted to analyze it, let's just say, magically, we found a format that every single ILI vendor could provide us their raw data and we really wanted to crunch some numbers on that.

We could do that in either bigger computers or more computers in parallel. It's secure. I mean, the Cloud vendors have skin in the game. They're not going to want to have a breach on their watch, in their system and they're in deadlock competition with each other.

And so, they're very, very keen on security. There's ideas of where the data centers are being stored. I think Microsoft is now going to store a Sub-C data center.

That's about as secure as it's going to get. I'd like to see how they're going to pull it off. But they're very keen on it. The

idea of storing pieces of information in
different computers at the same time and
recombining it as you need it.

And then, the ideally of having

absolute redundancy and backup. And then, it's cheap. It's typically run from your op-ex budget, not your cap-ex budget.

And you've got a reduced IT footprint.

We use a lot of Cloud computing power in our

business. And we have three people running that.

So it's been very effective.

If you look at Amazon, if you look at IBM, if you look at Google, just as sort of the big three Cloud players, off the top of my head, they're offering more consumer-driven analytical tools.

You could set up your own machinelearning environment on the Cloud with any one of
those vendors, Microsoft as well. Very, very
potent tools for doing all of the things that
you're probably going to need to do.

And the other thing is is it's

managed, which is nice. Because they're taking care of a lot of the work that we have traditional done, as organizations, as entities, had to hire people to do.

And what I like about it is, it's fairly agnostic. They just provide the environment. We choose the one that we want to use. And there's nothing to say that you can't choose one or more otherwise. So it's a very flexible, consumer-driven environment.

That, I think, is the big takeaway from that, is as a consumer, as an agency, as a group, moving down this, you have a lot of choice ahead of you.

And I'm sure any one of those Cloud providers would be very interested in working with this group to do what they need to do. When you look at data, data is either fixed, it's either being updated, or it's continuous.

And the only reason I bring that up is because it's obvious, but it is how we look at data. Static data is a snapshot of data in time

and space.

An inline inspection run is a snapshot of that pipeline at that time. That data will not likely be updated. That attic data is created, it's updated, it changes, it's tracked historically, and it's retired.

So, for me, from a data management standpoint, I look at a pipeline as being dynamic data. I install it. I start operating it. I replace portions of it as they cease to be fit for service. And then, eventually, it reaches the span of its design life and I retire it.

And then, streaming data is the new thing. Every time you use your phone and get in your car and drive, your location is being tracked, especially with the Google interface.

If you have a Google account and they're looking at where you're driving and that gives you that really cool traffic pattern on your Google maps. All right?

So that's streaming data which, in essence, is static, but now, we're getting it at

such a volume that we're not able to keep up. I mean, there's some really good statistics on the amounts of data that is being generated within the last year.

It surpasses everything that's been generated prior to this year. And we're looking at maybe five percent of it, if we're lucky. All right.

Data transfer, the old way of looking at it was we queried something from a database and we got results. The problem with the database is, while there's lots of advantages to a database, but at the same token, the model is very fixes.

So it's a very fit-for-purpose type of environment. A little more flexibility is this idea of an application programming interface.

And I'm not going to go into the huge details of this.

But, if you've consumed a map service, if you're a GIS user and you consume a backdrop map, you are consuming, through an API, that map

service into your map.

And both the client and the server know how to talk to each other. And I think this is going to be a big part of your system.

You're going to have different databases, different functionalities, talking to each other through that. How that data is exchanged, the two common formats now are really Javascript Objection Notation, which is JSON or Extended Markup Language, which is XML.

And then, that's great. This is all just technology. But how it is handed, in a mechanism that is understood by your system, by your databases, by your interfaces, by your users, has to have some sort of idea of a standard around it to say, let's package this information in a coherent fashion that these systems understand and in a standard fashion.

Drew talked about that in his presentation. It's always great having someone really bring up a presentation before you do yours so you can use it as examples.

But, delivery of data in a common format, is absolutely critical to any kind of understanding and processing within a system.

Because if you don't do that, if you don't deliver, here's my list of defects and here are the tolerances by which they were collected and how they were validated in the field, you can do anything with that data, effectively.

So one of the examples of that is like the pipeline open data standard. They're developing a data exchange specification, which is going to codify how data is transferred between systems using JSON or XML.

So, simple graphics on how this works, and that's -- keep hitting them. So I need to have security to get to a database. I execute an SQL query. It goes to the database and it returns me some tables, row and columns is standard. Keep going on.

I've got two different databases. And
I want to take data that's collected here and it
doesn't really fit the way I want to view it

here.

So what I do is I have security to both databases and I do something known as an ETL, an extract, a transform, and a load. And now, I put it into this system, which could fall into this paradigm where I could pull out information in a common format.

In very secure, encrypted systems, I want a way to talk in between those two systems. And it's usually not SQL or ETL, but it is a way to go to another system where I have security in both.

And I've got an encrypted message that goes between. And I think that this is going to be very important to how you load information into your system and how you pull back that information.

Because the idea of privacy,
obfuscation, and anonymity, all come into play
around how the data is passed back and forth.

And again, as I said prior to this, the typical
machine, human-readable formats, are JSON and

XML.

And, of course, with 128-bit encryption, they can be passed where very few people on the face of the earth can read them an decipher them.

And the data transfer, at large, from systems, would typically not just be an API call, but a transfer of a coherent file that describes something.

And, as I said before -- and in full disclosure, I'm on the PODS Board of Directors.

But we are building these standards for the ability to exchange pipeline information between systems.

And we're doing that deliberately because we think the data model isn't necessarily as important as the ability to share and transfer information between the two systems.

MR. CRADIT: So through the past ten years -- and this is from Gartner. It's their standard sort of data grid and their magic quadrants. Where you want to be is over here,

where you're innovating and exploring beyond just the doing.

Here is the stuff that you know it can do really well. So people who have a GIS system managing pipeline data are fully in this quadrant.

And if you start clicking through, you can start seeing that we have data warehouses, where's there's a bunch of things there.

So I've got a real-time data warehouse which is looking at my data and presenting it to me in a way that makes sense, in terms of graphs and reports.

And then, if I keep going -- you've heard this term recently called a data lake, where I don't have a single warehouse, but I have multiple warehouses.

And I'm throwing it into an environment and giving people the ability to just go out and query this. If you go back, which I don't want you to, but to those slides where I did that very simple, conceptual model, the idea

of, I have a pipeline. 1 2 I have an inline inspection. I have the data that came from that. I have field 3 4 verification. They may come from different 5 systems. And we would like to put them in this 6 7 lake where I can stir it all up and then, get 8 analytics out of it. The traditional data 9 warehouse sticks formally into what I know. It's very, very rigid. The data lake 10 is a lot more flexible and allows for some 11 12 exploration. And then, this is the next level. 13 This is where, not only are we putting 14 data out there, but we're wrapping software around it where we can start understanding the 15 16 patterns. 17 So, there's three more. This would be 18 the very simple. This is my PODS system of 19 record where I'm keeping my GIS center-lined in 20 all of the assets. 21 It's very fixed in space, literally. 22 And then, as I start looking at things like

tableau and exploring data with visualization tools in a different fashion, I can start possibly slicing and dicing and merging things together.

But the real gold dust, which was a great term, comes from a higher level of analytics. Go ahead. Two more. Right there. Where we're using the machine to start looking at the data and evaluating the trends.

Voluntary information sharing group, you have a lot of hurdles. You have standardization and normalization and you have to get people to come to the table to share it.

You have to put the data in a way that people can look at it. But I think one of the things you probably need to consider is, how do I find the trends and correlations that are hidden in the data way beyond just what I think is going to happen in my simple user interface.

So the idea of a unity plot that takes an ILI dig and compares it to the vendor, we want to develop unity plots for the things that we

never, ever thought possible before.

And that's where the next level of analytics goes. Go ahead one more. And the big part of that is, we want to turn it into natural language query.

Show me this or find me that. And start exploring beyond just the simple stuff.

MR. VEENSTRA: Now, it's the end of the day. We've been going at this for a good 15 minutes so far and this is a lot of stuff. But Jason and I really struggled -- how do we present all of these things?

But these are the things that we think about. These are the things that people are asking us to think about. These are the things that we're seeing in a data management paradigm, constantly, continually.

And this is really where it's heading.

If read any tech articles right now, AI, Machine

Learning, blah, blah, blah. If you're not doing

it, you're not doing it.

But I think there is some validity in

that. So data storage technology, we know the standard relational database model. We've heard about the no-sequel big data model.

I can describe those for you afterwards at a local pub, over a beer, if you want all the details on that. There are other types of databases, network graph and hierarchal databases which are amazing for incredibly fast retrieval.

They were implemented in the mainframe systems, but they're making a resurgence in terms of how to organize data. There's this idea of block storage, where I'm not going to structure my data.

I'm not going to have these text files, but I'm just going to dump it in a container and wrap some meta data around it and then query it and have it come up when I need it.

And you'll hear of the Amazon S3
storage where you can just dump whatever you want
in there. It's like a file folder on your
computer, literally, and the ability to quickly

search and do that.

So don't just think when you're going through the systems, looking at the technologies, that it's all about rows and columns in a table, because it isn't anymore.

And then, you've also, probably, if you've read any of the tech stuff, heard the block chain story.

And what I find very fascinating about that and how it's applicable to this is, when someone loads data into the system, we can use the block chain mechanism to A, encrypt that data and definitely say who submitted it, but hide that information from the general user, but still make it part of the data itself

It's very advanced, but it's got a huge amount of applicability to what this group is doing.

MR. CRADIT: So Pete talked a lot about these high-level concepts. And, at the end of the day, the working group we're part of and the subcommittee we're in, or I'm in, is it has

to eventually boil down to a recommendation.

So it has to be useful and that's what we're after. And one of the things we started looking at, he mentioned, Pete mentioned a lot of different types of databases, structures, and data storage formats.

And this is from some of the major vendors like Amazon Dynamo DB is a NoSQL database. And that's very different that SQL server and incredibly different than Hadoop, HDFS, or Redshift.

And you don't need to worry about what those logos do or the actual technologies behind them. But I'll tell you the point I'm trying to make is, each one of them, you implement for a reason.

And that reason could be because you want to minimize costs, like the Amazon S3 example. You could store a terabyte for around a penny. That's pretty cheap. But you're never going to run analytics on it because it's incredibly slow.

And that's an important point.

However, it's incredibly scalable. You could have petabytes and zetabytes and all of those kinds of things.

But you're not going to do anything meaningful from it. So there comes a point where you want to look at and put the right mechanism in, regardless of the brand.

It doesn't necessarily matter. But, put the right technology in the right spot to make it most useful for the outcomes. And that comes with integration.

So the paradigms that Pete introduced earlier, this idea of vertical scaling. And the idea is that once you have all of your data in the right data location, like a database or an S3 or something like that, that you're going to want to process it.

You're going to want to use it to turn it into an analytical outcome or to ask questions from it. The historical way of doing that is the vertical way. I need more RAM. I need more CPU

power. Luckily, we don't have seven-year-old laptops in our organization, but I feel for you, Drew.

But that's not how things really work anymore. Instead, now, you really focus on horizontal. And this idea of adding compute power when you need it and then, turning it off when you don't.

And it's a really important point in data science and analytics because this is really expensive hardware. If you need hundreds of thousands of CPU cores working on a problem, you want to not pay for that, except for the hour you're using.

So you minimize that. So once you get into data processing, you really want an environment that focuses on horizontal scaling and not vertical scaling.

Don't just add it, buy it, you don't want to rent it kind of thing. So this is an Amazon example. This is one of the Amazon examples that I show.

And Pete introduced a lot of these concepts. So I'll quickly go through it. S3 has this idea of a bucket. And these buckets could be ILI data, safety records, and I don't know. Throw one out.

It could be anything. It could be incident -- PHMSA's incident database. Really the point is that these are in a data lake. Non-similar data types, more or less and I want to pause for a second.

Mark Hereth actually wrote this stuff.

And I say that -- he didn't do it intentionally

or meaningfully. But, I think -- no. I'm very

serious.

Two meetings ago, he said what started this whole conversation about why I'm up here right now. Is he said, isn't there technology out there where you don't have to worry about a standard database and worrying about all of this stuff?

This is the answer. Of course there is. One of those is S3. This is the Amazon

example. Microsoft has one. Google has one.

But, to your point, we don't necessarily have to know the end to start.

And that's what I want to make sure we all understand. We could just have one bucket and do this processing before we have the other buckets established. And that's an important piece.

Once we add that bucket though and it's in here, we start using this MapReduce function. And MapReduce, we don't have to use it. It's just an example.

But MapReduce is an opportunity to scale horizontally, as a I mentioned before, to analyze the data. And MapReduce means map first. This master node says, look, all of these other slave nodes, go out and process some data.

But I'm going to map the data and how we join it to you. And then, after you're done, I'll reduce it back to one common format. And then, at the end, it goes into a sequel database or the like or similar.

So the point is, you've taken dissimilar data sets. You've run some algorithm. It doesn't matter if it's MapReduce. But you've done some algorithm on it and some analytics on it.

And you've got an information set over here that you can then report off of. And it's an important point that Sherry and the good doctor's name I can't remember, was talking about. That there's a difference between storing raw data in its raw form and what you potentially present at the end.

It's incredibly different, potentially very different. It's important to think about that because we'll talk about cyber security and privacy in a little bit.

But I want to make sure we understand that raw data eventually gets processed and ends up in something that you then report to the public, to operators, to ILI vendors or whoever needs to know.

It's an important concept. And, at

the end of the day, as we all said, if we could just simplify it, what we want is to create actionable insights.

We want to be able to get some insight so we can then use them to save lives or protect the environment or all of those things. Right now, we're kind of in this descriptive box here.

Right now, we get a report. We understand it tells us what happened. It doesn't necessarily why it happened. It just says, this failure occurred. And that's where we're at kind of today. But as we mature, we want to get into diagnostics.

Well, why did that happen? What happened to -- you know, what are all of those variables that led to this outcome.

Well, as we get eventually to that point, so that we can say all of these variables ended up in this outcome, that's really where machine learning kind of comes into.

So we can start to predict, well, if these features happen again, then this will be

the outcome. And that's a predictive -- so a very normal, linear aggression model that many of you may have seen.

But that's predictive analytics. And eventually, you might want to move to the next step of saying, if you do this, then this will happen. Did you have something you want to add?

MR. VEENSTRA: No.

MR. CRADIT: No? You're good? But eventually, you want to be able to get to this point. And I feel like that's kind of where ASAP is at now, where they can say, if we do this, we know we're going to reduce this, whatever the X and the Y are there.

Right now, though, I think this industry and where we're at is really in the description phase. We saw this. Now we have this.

And we want to mature our industry into -- to use more intelligence and analytics to solve those problems. But, of course, cyber security has to come up and it's 4:15.

So I want to briefly go over cyber security. And I think I want to do this because I want to make sure we have a common vernacular as we talk about it.

But really, cyber security and really my background as a geek, I'm a special kind of geek, is in cyber security.

I worked for -- before I was in oil and gas for a defense contractor for a number of years, running a cyber security program and helping inform the organization on how to handle their environment.

But it gets really cryptic and people get scared. And I want to break all of that down. And there's really just three facets, the three-legged stool. I mean, this is cyber security. The first is confidentiality. And that's what everybody thinks about.

Am I going to get hacked and how do I control access to only the people who should have access? And I think that's what everybody stops and thinks about.

Because the other two -- the next is integrity. And that's -- only the people who should the opportunity to change the data, can.

And that's an important point.

One is, only those that should have access do. And that's kind of a read on I don't want to share my information with you or you.

It's mine.

And then there's availability. And this is a denial of service kind of thing. It needs to be up and usable when I need it. That's the entire world of cyber security in less than three minutes.

But that's the idea. I mean, we make it really hard and we make it really confusing for the common people. But this is things like encryption and this is things like -- well, the block change is really more of an integrity solution because it makes every atomic change its own unit and it never changes again. And that's an important point.

So the last thing that is kind of

wrapping all of this is making sure those things are true. We want to make sure that only the people who should have access do.

But we also want to know that that's the case. So there's a second or kind of other circulating thing around auditing and accreditation.

And it's an important component too, in cyber security programming. But none of that, did I really talk about privacy. And privacy is a lot different.

And that gets around the question of who should have access and to what data? And one of the things we heard yesterday -- and I wasn't here, but I heard we heard yesterday, is that this question of should we store the raw data or not?

And should we store all of the location information or not? And we get really close into this question of de-identification.

And de-identification's really important because, as we all know, there's only a certain number of

people who run a pipeline through Tennessee.

And only a certain number of people with an MFL 1.5 tool. And those certain things could help identify people, whether they're in aggregate or even just by themselves.

So it's really important to think about though. If you're running a pipeline through Tennessee and you use an MFL 1.5 tool against it, like, let's just say, there could be meaningful information about that.

There could be some meaningful information around soil types, around who the operator and the ILI technicians or the analysts that looked at the data, that could be relevant to safety.

But certainly not something that you want to expose to the rest of the world. So there's this idea of roles-based authentication.

And certainly, these people aren't meant to encapsulate all of the people.

There's going to be other subgroups, but I ran out of space in the circle. So this is

it. These are the different groups. And I would suppose a research organization is going to want all of the data they can get to.

This is a group like Mitre or somebody like that, like the FAA uses, that they use the data and they discover interesting trends.

But they're not necessarily going to share that, I think as ASAP has said, share that with other people, like service providers or the public. Because there's a conflict there.

It's not of interest, but it could help save people. So the key questions, I think, when we ask about the roles, is what data are we actually talking about?

What's the source format versus the delivery? Remember, the source was in this bucket over here and the delivery format -- it could just be a KPI that shows we're going to improve safety by this much or these are the logos of the people who are contributing to the system and providing information to the public.

And it's still meaningful information

to researchers and operators. But, as Wen said, earlier today, earlier today, through HDA, there needs to be governance. And this question of who decides who gets access to what and when they get access, will need to be addressed.

I think part of the IT architecture should come up with that. But I think we also need help with who should decide what gets addressed and when.

And we want to talk about, just really briefly here, information and privacy. And we've talked about obfuscation. So I want to make sure -- de-identification and obfuscation are kind of the same thing.

But the different processes from a cyber security professional that you might run through. PII stands for Personally Identifiable Information, Mike.

And you're all used to that. Your credit card or your social security and your healthcare records. You all have those things and you want to keep them private and to

yourself.

And that's the idea of Personally

Identifiable Information. So one of the things
that happens when you start do to data deidentification or obfuscation is these are five
of the normal practices. So, first is
substitution, where you take a number and you
say, Kinder Morgan, you're a four and Sunoco,
you're a three.

And that's really helpful. Because now, it doesn't say Kinder Morgan or Sunoco. But the problem is very obvious. We can all kind of infer, in a small community, who's three and who's four.

And so, that may not work. The other option, and this is a real one, is shuffling. So while Kinder Morgan may have submitted something to the system like this, we just shuffle the deck and say, well, now it says Sunoco.

Because there may or may not be a point where that matters, that you can't undo that. But that's a real-life example of what

1 happens in shuffling for de-identification 2 purposes. Again, there might be some interesting 3 4 artifact that says Kinder Morgan, in this area, 5 with this vendor. That could be interesting. And you've immediately broken that 6 7 capability of understanding the data behind it. 8 Obviously, encryption is one a lot of people 9 point to. If we just had strong encryption and 10 we just make so nobody can read it unless you 11 have a key. 12 The problem with that is people have 13 keys. I mean, eventually, at some point, 14 somebody has the key and they can read the data. 15 And that is what it is. 16 It doesn't add a whole lot of cost to 17 the system. But people will have the ability to 18 read the data at some point. So what did you 19 actually accomplish? 20 Encryption would go back into this 21 idea of the role space and who can access what 22 level. And so, having a good, governed structure

around it makes sense.

I think we're all familiar with masking as a technique. And that's -- I think when you fill out your credit card information online, it gives you the little stars or the X's and you get the last four and that's all you get.

That's a masking technique. And then, there's nulling which is just don't keep the data, which is similar to what we heard from, I think, ASAP and others, is that you just don't store personally identifiable information, for the company.

So we would just never say, Kinder Morgan, or -- I keep picking on Kinder Morgan.

But we would just never say that. We would just never have that information in there or Baker Hughes or Rosen or whoever.

Or whatever we deem as personally identifiable information that we don't want to or want to de-identify, we just never store it.

Obviously, the problem becomes, what if there is something interesting about that data?

But really, you can Google it. I

swear. This is kind of the main ways of de
identifying data. And I've obviously trivialized

it.

We can get very scientific into these

things. But these are the basic ways of doing it. And we will need to come up with what is the one we choose or maybe we use different types for some.

You know, maybe for an operator or an ILI vendor, we just use substitution. But, for nulling, there's certain things we just do not maintain. And we eventually want to come up with that taxonomy and make that recommendation.

MR. VEENSTRA: And this goes back to the whole, what questions are you asking thing.

Because that will determine how all of this stuff rolls, especially this part here, this slide.

MR. CRADIT: Yes. That's right. So this is the absolute, one of the byproducts of a meeting between Mark Zuniga, myself, and Microsoft. Obviously, it's got the logo -- of

how a complete system could work.

And as we heard earlier in the budget stuff, this would be really, really expensive to go into. But it encapsulates everything we talked about, data storage, and what are the types Pete brought up about pods and ILI vendors and specialties.

And then we pump it into a data storage routine. And this is the real time versus the static data that Pete introduced. And then, we're running some analytics on it at some point.

And then we have an analytical data store which has the information in it. And then, we present out to somebody. You know, the KDIs or the Safety Records and hopefully that improves.

And obviously, there's a circle that goes around. This is an IT picture, not a process flow. But you understand what I'm saying.

That would be really expensive to use

and likely very, very difficult to put in place anytime soon for any organization. So I wanted to say we would -- oops.

I pressed the wrong button. You can absolutely start, and this is just a rudimentary look, of saying A data source goes into A SQL server warehouse, does some amount of analytical processing.

And this might be ASAP, in a lot of ways. I mean, they're taking anecdotal and story-telling kind of data, qualitative date, holding it somewhere, analyzing it.

It sounded like the analyzation may have been more human. In this case, I had a computer icon there. But it sounded like they were more in a, let's review it and see.

And, oh, we do have 40 of those types of things in our database. And then, present it out to people who need to know. We could do that. And that's really, really trivial.

But, it really, Mark, I think it shifts the ball into your court. Well, what do

we want to start with that would be meaningful to get back.

And maybe I would suggest qualitative data would make a lot of sense. Whereas, quantitative ILI data, it takes a different level of processing and a different level of standards that the industry doesn't currently have.

And so, I might suggest something like a roadmap approach. And then, you start introducing other things. One of things that -- I know I see Amy back there.

In our subgroup, we talked a lot about this idea. And Pete mentioned the idea of an API, to where we might take a bunch of systems that are data storage mechanisms and wire them together.

So then, if you have a system of record like pods or a system of record like NPMS or a system of record like the HEI-1163, where you do have all of the ILI runs put together, well then, maybe that record, we should decentralize it and have all of those be where

they live.

But then, we run some batch processing and we have our information stored. It's a different way to approach. This is a centralized approach, not the API or decentralized approach we talked about.

But we could do that, if there's too many hurdles to people thinking about submitting.

I would suggest, if we're going in that direction, or if we wanted to start with just qualitative safety information, we would start with a system very similar to this.

And this is the last slide. IT is on time. I just to make sure that's in the record somewhere. But really, one of the things, and it's the punch-line in that movie where Deep Thought said the answer is 42.

And it all comes down to this point that they quickly decide that their question was wrong. What they were trying to solve for was not the right answer. They had all of this data and they had all of the processing power anybody

could ever ask.

They had great IT systems architecture, but they were asking the wrong questions. And I want to make sure we understand.

There's a lot of hurdles to getting this done, politically and socially. And I don't see IT as being a problem to executing it, but we need to come up with the right questions to ask and then go from there. So, the end.

DR. MURRAY: It's more of a comment.

Thank you both for the presentation. And that,

your last point, underscores what I wanted to

reference earlier about taking it through some

sort of a life-cycle process.

Because earlier on in those phases is where you flush out some of those critical pieces, what the user's really asking for or in need of, to help determine what's feasible.

Coming up with different alternatives, back-loading in the costs and other resource implications. And then, using those things to

1	help drive what you're system development, IT
2	architecture looks like. So, good point.
3	MR. CRADIT: Thank you, Christie.
4	CHAIR BURMAN: Does anybody else have
5	any comments or questions?
6	MR. CRADIT: I think Mark.
7	MR. HERETH: I just have one quick
8	one. First of all, thank you guys. In fact,
9	when he says, we do before you do, that means we
10	rode in the long way. What do we need to do to
11	get the right questions?
12	MR. CRADIT: Right.
13	MR. HERETH: I think that's what I've
14	got to is that something you guys are going to
15	do in the technology section and the rest of us
16	don't need to worry about it? Wishful thinking.
17	MR. VEENSTRA: So, I'm not on the
18	committee. I think I've been invited on one of
19	the subcommittees.
20	But just sitting back and reading
21	through the materials, this became patently
22	evident to me, is you don't know what your

1	questions are. We want and that's why we put
2	that up there.
3	MR. HERETH: So you don't know what
4	are questions are.
5	MR. VEENSTRA: Well, do you?
6	MR. HERETH: We don't know either.
7	MR. VEENSTRA: Right. No. I'm dead
8	serious.
9	MR. HERETH: How do we what are the
10	steps that we need to take to get to where we
11	understand what the questions are?
12	MR. VEENSTRA: Typically, when there's
13	an existing set of processes, we would just do an
14	assessment workshop, where you ask the questions,
15	who's doing it, what are they doing, who do they
16	talk to, and where do they hand the data off to?
17	It's not necessarily going to be
18	applicable here. But I think you could draw some
19	corollaries around that. You have all of these
20	working groups.
21	I think one of the suggested things is
22	that they all need to start providing the list of

literally-used cases. And Jason and I have been sort of working this slide deck separately.

There was a slide that was not included. But a big part of it, and Drew mentioned it, one of the use cases is absolutely normalization of data. We must have the data in a standard playing field so that we can do something with it. And that's esoteric use case.

Now, when somebody goes there -- at the start of the presentation, we talked about improving pipeline safety and reducing incidents.

Well, I think just taking those statements and saying, how do we do that?

Improving pipeline safety, well, this needs to respond quickly.

But what's it providing to help somebody make an assessment? Just because we load 450,000 ILI instructions with 900 million field verifications -- is the question, should I use this ILI vendor for my pipeline in Tennessee?

I think getting down to those types of questions is where you need to go. And you've

1 got working groups and you probably don't want to 2 school one up. So I think all of the working groups 3 4 need to be looking at a discussion around the 5 questions. So I guess my question is 6 MR. HERETH: 7 8 MR. VEENSTRA: You have a question 9 about the questions? And we don't need to 10 MR. HERETH: 11 solve it right now, but it seems like that's a 12 series of steps we need to go through relatively 13 soon. 14 I might add, if I may, MR. CRADIT: that there's -- understanding the difference 15 16 between qualitative and quantitative data is 17 really important. 18 Because if we just start with 19 qualitative, which is kind of what ASAP was, 20 well, you already know the questions. I mean, 21 you're say that this went wrong and just hold it. 22 And then, eventually, you get enough

of those and you're like, there's something there. If you're going to address those kinds of questions, we could start immediately, collect data, and just keep trend information.

And that was clearly the role of a data scientist or a miter or somebody like that, or somebody who was just focused on the data. If you're focused on quantitative -- and Sherry started the point on this earlier when she was asking the questions to Drew, do you put this all in the same database and the idea of the run after run after run.

And the idea of her question, I think

-- yes. She's gone. Would be that, if we have

this outcome with these attributes, it's a

standard linear aggression model to look at,

these attributes come out with that result.

But that's a quantitative problem.

And the lack of standards between vendors, if

we're -- but idea is, if we're only looking at

ILI data and looking to correlate that towards

incidents, you can get a whole lot of data and

you need a standard to do it.

And you're a long ways away. So I do think there's the low-hanging fruit as a way to improve safety, the qualitative kind of questioning, very similar to ASAP and growing into a location. I think it inherently needs your questions.

MR. VEENSTRA: And I'm going to say what I don't know. I'm not necessarily sure, but I certainly will sit down and think about it over the next couple of weeks or so.

And it will come to me and say, here's the way that you can find your questions. And I think part of it is just going to be problem decomposition and some focus on what you're actually trying to answer.

Because there's cool tasks and there's a great statement. But there's a lot of details that are not just how we're going to do it, but what is the system supposed to deliver. So --

MR. ROBERTI: And I'm thinking out loud here. Because it just seemed to be, in the

presentation like what FMA does about all of this ILI data.

And you've got trend line against a particular pipeline. Well, what's important here in sharing across the industry, is knowing is there another pipeline of the same age, material, and characteristics, where the fact that the assumption that the corrosion rate was X.

And it turns out the corrosion rate was 2X. So a particular pipeline had wall strength that was far thinner than what we expected. The ILI data points that out.

What we really need to do is to make sure that that data and that trend line or the differential gets in the hands of other operators of pipes or pipelines of the same vintage. Is that, I mean, is that a thing?

MR. VEENSTRA: But I think you need to go further. I think it becomes a function of geography just as much as everything else.

Corrosion rates are absolutely driven by geography.

Low parts of the pipeline for internal 1 2 corrosion and alkaline soils for the external corrosion. So you're right. If you solve this, 3 4 here's the other examples of where that happened. 5 But this is just to verify then, what you saw was right. Because now we're not just 6 7 looking at your examples. We're looking at 8 everybody's examples. 9 But then, to find some root cause for that would involve using the geography at some 10 11 level. All right? So I think you're on the right track, absolutely. 12 13 I'm not disagreeing with you. 14 think you go further than just the trends. 15 MR. ROBERTI: Right. But my point is 16 is that a major data dump is not going to get us 17 where we need to be. 18 MR. CRADIT: Not by itself. You're 19 right. And I want to make sure we're clear. Ι 20 think you're absolutely on the right -- that's a 21 great start. You get all of that. You said

there were characteristics.

Inevitably, characteristics like geography could lead you to identifiable information when you put those things together.

And that's just the elephant.

I mean, we need to talk about it and say, at the base level, is that okay, if the researchers find it? But the role-based idea that not everybody gets to see that information, it needs to be clear.

MR. VEENSTRA: And maybe this is the way that I think, but if I had a 50 percent wall loss, and I verified that fifty percent wall loss against 25 other inspections for 25 other pipelines with the same technology, well, I think I could put some confidence in that 50 percent wall loss.

Now, I want to sit down and say, where else do I have the potential for that situation, not just the validation of 50 percent wall loss.

So I think there's one of the question marks. Is -- sorry. You're not a question mark.

There's one of the questions, Mark,

1	that comes out of the system that's identified.
2	If I have this result from an ILI inspection with
3	this technology and this vintage of pipe, how
4	much truth can I take or how much stock can I
5	take in the truth of that assessment?
6	And I think that that's one of your
7	premier questions for the system to start.
8	MR. PARKER: Guys, I want to add too,
9	before we start putting IT dollars out, it's good
10	to understand the technology.
11	But your advancing toward a school of
12	hard knocks until we've really nailed down direct
13	questions, nailed down the business approach,
14	before we've started developing.
15	And try to put rigid boundaries here.
16	I mean, that's not to say you can't modify it as
17	needed if for a good reason.
18	But I would like to establish a good
19	business case before we start developing. Would
20	you agree?
21	MR. CRADIT: Absolutely.
22	MR. VEENSTRA: Oh, yes. One hundred

I mean, I think -- please take 1 percent. Yes. 2 that away from our presentation. There's all sorts of amazing 3 4 technology and Jason summed it up amazingly well 5 at the end. We're not worried that the technology can do what you need to do. 6 7 It's just out there and it's evolving. 8 The seven-year laptop story's not going to be 9 part of the vernacular of this group. 10 MR. HEVLE: Thank you. 11 MR. VEENSTRA: Yes. Dude, you're 12 immortalized now. 13 MR. HEVLE: This is my eighth year. 14 It's getting replaced this year. Joking aside, Alan, 15 MR. VEENSTRA: 16 it's a lot cheaper to produce stuff on paper than 17 it is to start actually implementing it in 18 computer systems. 19 And I think what our big plea, I guess 20 is, is have your business case, have your use 21 cases, have your questions and explore. I think part of your discussions within this team really 22

need to be exploring what are the questions. If

I went to this -- you know, maybe that's a

challenge to everybody on this committee.

If I went to this system when we had the system that I think we need, I would ask it this. And everyone come up with three or four questions and then, start filtering it together and make part of your discussions around that.

And you'd be amazed. Maybe you'd get 30 questions that everybody needs to ask. Well, I would say that that's one that is of real importance.

And then you'd get some of the outliers that you're like, I never thought of that. All right? So maybe you all will sit down in this committee and say, if I had this system the way I would want it, what would I be able to get out of it?

And I think that that -- and it's discussion. It's group workshops. But all of your different subcommittees could start formulating that and roll it up. And send them

all to Alan. He'll tabulate them. 1 2 MS. WHETSEL: Can't you get some of that from your smart pick data? Some of the 3 4 questions that they're asking are paced to begin with, as a part of the groundwork release 5 I'm just throwing it out there. 6 questions. 7 MR. MAYBERRY: I'm sorry. I couldn't 8 hear you. 9 MS. WHETSEL: I just want to -- can't 10 you utilize smart picks? You know one of the questions they're asking is smart picks. Don't 11 12 you have sort of a groundwork for a start? 13 And I don't want to interrupt your 14 chain of thought here, but I do want to -administratively, I want to tell you that it does 15 16 take more than three minutes to get an Uber here. 17 It takes 30 minutes. 18 So if you have to get to the airport, 19 call an Uber or a taxi right now. 20 MR. BELLAMY: Can I just say 21 something? If anybody's going with American

Airlines, you'd better check your flights,

because I just had two cancels. I can't get a 1 2 flight out of here until tomorrow. 3 MS. WHETSEL: Oh, yes. There's some 4 political issues going on. I'm sorry. I just 5 really wanted to get this straight. I wanted to Thank you. Mike, did you have a 6 warn you. 7 question? 8 MR. BELLAMY: Well, yes. I regret 9 this afternoon has built to a crescendo. Michael 10 Bellamy, I regret that we left the best presentation for the last. 11 12 Sorry, Drew. And I reason I say that 13 is that simple notion of what question are we 14 asking, is extraordinarily powerful. And it might be heretical for me to 15 16 say this, but I think we've made -- we've 17 confused ourselves by allowing us to drift away 18 from the central question that started this 19 committee in coming into being in the first 20 place, which came from questioning about, why are 21 there so many incidents following an ILI run?

That's what lawmakers were thinking

about when they called me in to ask me questions about that. We didn't drive it. What you said earlier today is not correct. GE didn't drive this.

Lawmakers were already asking questions because they saw that incidents were happening after ILI runs. So something was missing in the ILI process. Got it.

So that's where we started. That's what raised this whole thing. The core of charter is -- was about ILI until we tinkered with it.

All right. We've tinkered with it.

We're now at a different place. I get it. So

now I suggest we've got maybe two or three or

maybe four different paradigms of questions that

we're going to have to define.

And, unfortunately, it's now ten until 5:00. American Airlines is cancelling flights.

Everyone's probably not ready to do this. But that's the reason I regret we've left the best until last, in a sense.

MR. VEENSTRA: And I want to go back to your question. Sorry. But your question of that comparison, why I immediately jumped onto geography, is because it's a question of integration.

Why are there so many incidences immediately after I run ILI? And inevitably, it is the occurrence and interaction of different forces on the pipeline that weren't being accounted for.

So that's where we go back to the whole questions and what's driving it. And it's not meant to derail it. But again, walking into the committee and reading the materials from the outside, this is the -- I said it to Jason when we were putting this together.

I said, what questions are being asked? And, I'm sorry, I don't know the background, so I take a risk getting up here and looking foolish.

MR. BELLAMY: No. You reverseengineered the question perfectly. You deduced

1 it exactly right. 2 MR. VEENSTRA: All right. Well, anyway, I appreciate it. Both of us do. 3 Thank you very much for letting us be here. 4 5 CHAIR BURMAN: I think that was really I think it also shows that we do need to 6 good. 7 have the technology subcommittee with the 8 different subcommittees too, to help fluff out 9 that. Because I do think that the 10 11 integration of that is very key and we're at the 12 point of needing that. And I also do think, 13 looking now, going forward, as we're on agenda, 14 my Item 5. 15 And so, that the next focus, which is 16 the subcommittee's meeting fleshing out some of 17 the core, substantive issues that we've 18 identified from the subcommittee meetings 19 yesterday and then, today. 20 But also looking at our August 21 meeting, I do think that we need to -- and I'm

looking for feedback. I do think that we need to

have more time for core discussion, especially 1 2 because we'll be looking at language. So we're going to need to look at the 3 4 language ahead of time to be able to flesh out 5 some of the core issues and then have time for our collaborative discussion. 6 7 And then, seeing -- if we only had one 8 or two presenters, what is the substance that we 9 need to help facilitate our committee discussions as well. 10 Kate? 11 MS. BLYSTONE: Kate Blystone. I think 12 we should also plan to have an all-committee 13 conference all between now and then, potentially. 14 Right. For a planning? CHAIR BURMAN: 15 MS. BLYSTONE: Yes. For planning, 16 just for planning. Yes. 17 CHAIR BURMAN: For planning purposes. 18 I think that is important. And I do think that 19 the subcommittee chairs need to have a meeting as 20 well, a conference call discussion to flesh out 21 some of the interconnections that we need to look 22 at.

1	DR. MURRAY: Who's your all committee,
2	the parent committee or
3	MS. BLYSTONE: Yes. The big
4	committee, all of us.
5	CHAIR BURMAN: Yes.
6	DR. MURRAY: Okay. So that would be
7	more like an administrative meeting that we've
8	had in the past.
9	MS. BLYSTONE: Yes. When we've had
10	some of those in the past, it just seems like we
11	can nail some of the those presentations down.
12	CHAIR BURMAN: And I think it should
13	be held after the July 2nd meeting, with the
14	three subcommittees. Because that will help us
15	in knowing exactly what we're missing and what
16	needs to be fleshed out more.
17	MS. BLYSTONE: Okay.
18	CHAIR BURMAN: Okay. Does anybody
19	else have any other comments or thoughts? Dr.
20	Murray is there anything that we're forgetting to
21	add?
22	DR. MURRAY: Just, I want to remind

everybody that we will be sending out information 1 2 regarding the next meeting, hotels. We want to do that earlier than we've been able to do for 3 4 this past one. 5 I want to thank everybody for their patience and cooperation. I thought the last two 6 7 days was extremely beneficial and insightful. 8 Thanks for working with us. Karen? 9 MS. LYNCH: I just wanted to reiterate 10 that the reporting committee is going to schedule a conference call and provide an overview of the 11 12 guidance documents that we signed. 13 So I'll try to schedule something for 14 the next week, week-and-a-half. I know that the 15 reporting committee or reporting subcommittee are 16 really (inaudible) --17 DR. MURRAY: Okay. Thank you. 18 CHAIR BURMAN: And the other thing 19 that I thought was really helpful is the real-20 life examples. And that really put it into focus 21 for me.

And I think we need to think about

22

what ones we can use, in some fashion, in the 1 report and in how we look forward. And with our 2 questioning, asking is this meeting the objective 3 of those examples that resonated with us. 4 5 DR. MURRAY: And there's one more important change or point of reference for the 6 7 committee. Moving forward, PHMSA will be unable 8 to retain the court reporter transcription 9 services. Unfortunately, due to some new 10 11 internal directives, we've been asked to hand 12 that responsibility over to the committees. So that's one of the things that we'll 13 14 probably need to talk more about as we move 15 forward. 16 CHAIR BURMAN: That is, I think, a 17 difficult issue and one that -- I personally 18 believe we need a court reporter. I happen to go 19 back to the transcript. 20 And that has been very helpful to me. 21 And I know that when we go towards the report and

making sure that we've captured everything, a lot

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of what we say, I don't think can be done well by 1 2 someone who is not a court reporter taking notes. And it does concern me. As much I 3 4 don't let the court reporter take a break, I 5 think that we need to facilitate having a court 6 reporter in some fashion. So I don't know if 7 anyone else thinks that that's important. 8 personally think having a recorded transcript is 9 important. Likewise, I do too. 10 MR. PARKER: 11 I don't think it's CHAIR BURMAN: 12 something that can be given to the committee to take care of. 13 14 DR. MURRAY: So that may be something to bring up in the administrative meeting. 15 16 CHAIR BURMAN: We're at the point now where we really need one. 17 So --18 MR. BELLAMY: What is it, the budget? 19 Is the budget the problem? 20 MR. MAYBERRY: No. It's just a change 21 in the -- how FACAs in general are managed by the 22 department.

1 MR. BELLAMY: It's not just ours. 2 MR. MAYBERRY: It's not just this committee. 3 It's all the FACAs. 4 MR. BELLAMY: 5 It's a desire to make MR. MAYBERRY: But, you know, we're 6 them more self-sufficient. 7 at a critical stage now. And I agree we need --8 you know, it's time to start writing a report. 9 CHAIR BURMAN: And they think it's something that will also be useful for the 10 11 record, in terms of capturing what the committee 12 thought. 13 Especially, as we have the discussion 14 on language and the back and forth. You lose it 15 if you go from -- you know, we had this 16 recommendation with this language, to then 17 changing it completely, without have a transcript 18 to showcase the discussion. I'm concerned about 19 that. Kate? 20 MS. BLYSTONE: Kate Blystone. Is it 21 beneficial for us to vote and to write a letter

or something. You know what I mean? Oh, maybe

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Is there something we could do to change 1 2 this policy? I would say that it's a 3 DR. MURRAY: department-wide directive, that I think it's 4 5 going to be very difficult to overturn. I think that the committees, the 6 7 guidance is for the committees to find other ways 8 to seek out the services that they so desire. 9 CHAIR BURMAN: So if there was a need 10 for a court reporter and there was some 11 facilitation of having a court reporter provided, 12 that can be done. And that become the monetary 13 issue. I mean, I personally can't get involved 14 in seeking out sponsorships for court reporter 15 services. 16 But I think that's what I'm hearing. 17 So I would leave it to those who may be on the 18 committee who believe that they may have the 19 ability to have a court reporter. And let's talk to PHMSA and follow the 20 21 appropriate procedures to have that. But I do 22 think the next meeting, we do need a court

1	reporter.
2	And we need to figure out a way to
3	make that happen. And we need to follow
4	appropriate ethical and legal protocols to do
5	that.
6	MR. MAYBERRY: Let us take that back
7	and we'll be talking.
8	CHAIR BURMAN: Okay. Thank you. And
9	we should have this court reporter, if possible.
10	All right. Thank you. And thank you all for
11	everything. You've been great. Safe travels.
12	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
13	went off the record at 4:55 p.m.)
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<u>C E R T I F I C A T E</u>

This is to certify that the foregoing transcript

In the matter of: Voluntary Information Sharing

Working Group Meeting

Before: USDOT/PHMSA

Date: 06-20-18

Place: McLean, VA

was duly recorded and accurately transcribed under my direction; further, that said transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Court Reporter

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